The latest meeting between the Special Representatives of India and China in New Delhi on 26 and 27 July marks the third round in a new exercise begun as a result of a special initiative between the Prime Ministers of the two countries last June to unfreeze the overhanging political issues in relations between the two countries, especially the boundary question. Notwithstanding the statements made recently by Chinese officials, there was little expectation that gut issues would be addressed at this meeting.

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This was not so much because, on the Indian side, the interlocutor was new and yet to establish a personal equation with his Chinese counterpart. After all the essential subtext of the exercise was provided by the Rajiv Gandhi visit to China in 1988 which, for the first time, articulated a political undertaking by both sides to pursue a mutually acceptable resolution of the boundary question based on mutual understanding and adjustment. During the annual meetings of the JWG in subsequent years some of this was translated not just in agreements on peace and tranquility as well as confidence building measures along the LAC in 1993 and 1996, but even on the crucial underlying question of developing a common perception of the alignment of the LAC. Some initial progress seemed possible when maps were exchanged in November 2000 on the middle sector. If the process was not pushed beyond that sector, the reasons were evidently because there was still ambiguity on one or both sides whether the time was ripe to translate the expressed political commitment to "mutual adjustment, understanding and concession" in cartographic terms covering eastern and western sectors.

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At the first two rounds in October last year and January this year, the aim was ostensibly to find "guiding principles" for such a solution. As it stands, it would appear these principles had so far only found oral expression in the parleys between the two Special Representatives. By all accounts, the close personal rapport that had developed between Dai Bingguo and Brajesh Mishra as well as Chinese satisfaction with the Vajpayee visit had left a credit balance in relations which the Indian side needed to leverage to a degree more than that of securing Chinese acquiescence on the Indian position on Sikkim. Though the continuity in dialogue is apparent in the composition of the official teams on both sides, the new Indian government could not be expected to move without getting some clearer signals of flexibility from the other side.

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On its part, the UPA government cannot but take the current exercise seriously. Apart from the fact that improvement of relations with China is an important element in its foreign policy menu, the Congress has always been keen on appropriating for itself a substantial portion of political credit for the steady improvement in ties with this neighbour. In the context of its current compulsions in relations with the US and the broader rhetoric of opposition to unilateralism and support for multilateralism voiced by the new government, and considering this is the fiftieth anniversary of Panchsheel, such a stance also has a politically correct resonance at the popular level in the country.

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Notwithstanding its determination to seek every opportunity to embarrass the present government, the BJP is unlikely to upset the applecart in the case of understandings with China. For China, too, there may be some compulsions in showing forward movement in relations with India. Relations with the US are marked by the need to steer a careful line between continued suspicion of Washington???s intentions inter alia over arms supplies to Taiwan on the one hand and the sedulous cultivation of a productive and pragmatic all round relationship both bilaterally and multilaterally on the other. Though US National Security Advisor, Condoleeza Rice, recently in Beijing, reportedly took pains to deny Washington was spearheading a "containment policy" drive against China there is still popular suspicion and concern over US policies and their potential implications both internationally as well as more specifically for China. In such a situation, considerable attention is being paid to the temperature of Indo-US ties and, given the reality of a new government in India, to the need to insulate as far as possible the China factor from the Indo-US relationship.

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But, does the above mean that China is anywhere near considering the present juncture as ripe for an overall understanding on the border? There are no real indications upon which we can ground any such impression. However, a similar question may well be asked of the political leadership in India and as long as an answer to this question eludes us, the shadow play between the Special Representatives can be expected to continue.