The United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government at the centre does not appear to be opposed to the idea of negotiating with the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) even in a foreign country. In a statement to the press, the Union Minister of State for Defence, B K Handique said on 30 May, “In this age of the global village concept, holding talks in another country is not a problem and to find a solution, we are ready for it.” It is a remarkable departure from the stand of the previous governments who steadfastly opposed accepting the conditions set by the ULFA for initiation of talks.

Strictly speaking, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) does not have any jurisdiction over the peace talks; this is the sole prerogative of the Ministry of Home Affairs. Thus, B K Handique’s statements are clearly out of place and can be comprehended only in the context of the state he represents in the Lower House of the Indian Parliament.  It is but natural that like most of the people of Assam, who have been witnesses to insurgency of the worst kind over the past 25 years, Handique, who represents Jorhat constituency of Assam, is keen to find a solution to the ongoing conflict. However, an approach that bends backwards to accommodate an unreasonable demand by an outfit which has lost most of its popular backing in the state, is fraught with danger of not only providing a stamp of legitimacy to militancy as also being highly unproductive.

The protagonists of the negotiation process with the ULFA in Assam, like the present state government, organisations like the All Assam Students’ Union (AASU) and the Assam Jatiyatabadi Yuva Chhatra Parishad (AJYCP) cite the example of the ongoing negotiation process with the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM) as a benchmark and hence argue that case of ULFA too merits a peace process, which can be held in a foreign country if necessary. However, the argument appears to be high on emotion and lacks rationality.

The top leadership of ULFA, mostly stationed in the comforts of Bangladesh and acting on the directives of the Pakistani intelligence agency, the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) has been projecting the insurgency problem in the state as a political struggle between India and Assam, two sovereign countries. Hence, according to ULFA, any negotiation for solution must be held in a third and neutral country. It would mean that if the government of India indeed agrees for a round of dialogue in a foreign country, it would, in principle, concede the insurgency problem as a conflict between India and Assam.  B K Handiue’s categorical statement need to be compared along with the assertion of Union Home Minister, Shivraj Patil, that the new government is not in favour of redrawing state boundaries.

The single factor that supports the NSCN-IM’s negotiations in a foreign country is the level of acceptability. In 1997, when for the first time a ceasefire was announced with the outfit in Nagaland, the acceptability of the outfit among the Naga population remained significant. Civil society organisations like the Church and the Naga Hoho facilitated the peace process by making sure the militant outfit remained committed to the principles of ceasefire. More significantly, the outfit has renounced its ‘only foreign country’- condition and in January 2003 its leadership held a round of negotiations in New Delhi. In comparison, ULFA in Assam, neither enjoys similar popular support nor is backed by any community-based organisation worth the name, which can make it renounce violence once the peace process begins.

The support behind the initiation of the dialogue with the ULFA is based on a false premise that the outfit believes in a peaceful solution to the conflict. In fact, the outfit, since the early 1990s has used the magic wand of negotiations whenever it is in trouble and has gone back to its violent ways once it replenished itself with fresh recruits, weapons and finance. More importantly, its operational decisions, have long since passed into the hands of the ISI. The ULFA leadership in Bangladesh not only enjoys the patronage of the ISI, but also is entirely dependent on it for its survival. As a result, any process of negotiation, without the improbable sanction of the ISI, is bound to remain a non-starter. It is not surprising that the 16 June assertion of the Assam Chief Minister, Tarun Gogoi, of the receipt of a positive sign on the negotiation front was rebuffed by the ULFA commander-in-chief, Paresh Barua, the same day. 

Irrespective of the occurrence or the absence of a process of dialogue with the outfit, detailed principles for negotiations need to be evolved. The absence of peace must not be a reason for promoting further instability. Assam would probably be better off without a round of dialogue with the outfit, rather than encouraging secessionist tendencies.