Pakistan’s decision to go nuclear was taken in January 1972 at a secret meeting of Pakistan’s top scientists in Multan. Pakistani scientific community arrived at the logical conclusion that they can never match the conventional superiority of India and needed a nuclear deterrent. It was this strategic consideration that compelled Islamabad to embark upon its nuclear programme. The rationale was to counter India’s conventional military superiority.

In the early 1970s, the Arab world was reaping the benefits of it oil resources. Petrodollars were flowing in this part of the globe. Acting swiftly, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who gave the green signal for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme, undertook a whirlwind tour of Saudi Arabia, Libya, Turkey, Syria, Morocco, Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia and United Arab Emirates, to garner material and moral support for Pakistan from the Islamic and the Arab world. The purpose was to convince the Muslim world that Pakistan still remained a viable and important force.

The most fruitful result was the Pakistan-Libya equation. Libya was keen to acquire nuclear technology and offered staggering sums of money to finance Pakistan’s nuclear programme. Bhutto also visited China to reinforce a mutually beneficial relationship between the two countries. In 1976, a deal was finalized for transfer of nuclear technology information from China to Pakistan.

It is quite obvious that Pakistan received its early funding from Libya and other Arab countries while nuclear technological collaboration was forged with China.

Ever since, there has been a pattern of nuclear assistance and proliferation from China to Pakistan. Even today, the Chinese are assiduously engaged in developing an unsafeguarded 40 KW plutonium plant for miniaturized nuclear warheads at Kushab. China is using nuclear proliferation as a tactic by giving Pakistan equalizers, to contain India within the sub-continent. Another reason for consistent Chinese nuclear assistance to Pakistan is to keep the Americans off the Taiwan Straits which is a persistent source of problem to Beijing. Thus the nuclear programme of Pakistan is heavily dependent upon Chinese support.

The nuclear axis between Pakistan and China has been further widened by the inclusion of North Korea. At the initial stages Pyongyang was incapable to launch its nuclear programme due to financial constraints. However, cash strapped Pyongyang was able to build its nuclear weapons programme with significant missile transfers from China. Evidence indicates that Pakistan has also played an important role in the development of North Korea’s nuclear programme. In 2002, Pakistan shipped 47 tons of special aluminium to North Korea. Thus a distinct and defined Beijing-Islamabad-Pyongyang nuclear axis is emerging in the international scenario.

At present, Pakistan is trying to garner support for its nuclear programme from various quarters, particularly from the Middle East. There is mounting evidence which indicates that the early financing of Pakistan’s nuclear programme was provided by Libya and Saudi Arabia. Since 1994, Saudi Arabia has been trying to acquire nuclear weapons. In March 1999, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif escorted the Saudi Defence Minister to the Kahuta enrichment plant. It is interesting to note that this was the first time that a foreigner was given access inside Kahuta – a place where the Pakistani Prime Minister Mir Zaffarullah Jamali has till date been denied access. Quite obviously, there is a distinct nuke for oil deal with Saudi Arabia.

Pakistanis have a sound nuclear strategy. It consists of using nuclear weapons as an instrument for blackmail for achieving territorial ambitions. Pakistan also portrays Kashmir as a nuclear flashpoint in order to draw the attention of the Americans to the sub-continent. Besides, Pakistan intends to play a lead role within the Islamic Ummah. To this extent, Islamabad finds nothing wrong in sharing information of its nuclear and missile technology with the Muslim world.

However, the ramifications of such a strategy are potentially perilous to the world and particularly to India. Though Pakistan assures that its arsenal is reasonably secure, there will always remain the risk of technology leaks as is evident from recent developments. The consequences of nuclear weapons falling into terrorist hands will imply imminent disaster to the whole world.

In his concluding remarks, the Speaker referred to the long term challenges to India because of Pakistani nuclear proliferation. China is engaged in clandestine nuclear proliferation with Pakistan with the sole aim of providing Islamabad an equalizer in relation to New Delhi. The larger purpose is directed towards containment of India within the South Asian region in particular. In the sphere of improved relations emerging from the recently concluded SAARC summit, issues of interest must not be forgotten. India must face the challenges posed by nuclear proliferation from Pakistan and play it to its advantage.

Discussion

·         Pakistan seeks to use its nuclear strategy as an instrument for blackmail for larger territorial ambitions.

·         Islamabad’s policy includes using Kashmir as a nuclear flashpoint to draw the American attention to South Asia, primarily for the purpose of containing India.

·         Pakistan has been secretly proliferating nuclear technology for a long time. Why is the American media coming out with these revelations now?

·         Post 9/11 the United States have increased its control over Pakistan’s nuclear assets.