East Asia Compass
China’s Strategic Silence on the Hanoi Summit
22 Mar, 2019 · 5570
Dr Sandip Kumar Mishra contextualises China's circumspect behaviour in the wake of the US-North Korea summit in Hanoi
An abrupt end of the
Hanoi summit between the leaders of the US and North Korea on 28 February 2019
was disappointing for many. But for many others, it was unsurprising because the
two parties did not have enough exchanges and understanding at the official
level before the summit and there were considerable gaps in their respective
positions. After the summit, the US and North Korea have gradually been hardening
their positions on the issue of latter’s de-nuclearisation and it appears that
both sides have been drifting away rather than moving towards an accommodative
position.
The US Special
Representative for North Korea, Stephen Biegun said Washington would not agree
on an ‘incremental’ approach to denuclearise North Korea and argued for an
all-or-none approach. In response, North Korea expressed that it has been
contemplating over whether to continue talks with the US and maintain its self-moratorium
on its nuclear and missiles tests. In a way, the Washington-Pyongyang engagement
on the denuclearisation issue has been passing through a critical phase and
there is a real possibility of a derailment of the process.
Amidst all these developments, Beijing has been
quite circumspect. The Spokesperson of China’s Foreign Ministry, Lu Kang,
stated that China considered it premature to call it a setback or failure of
the US-North Korea talks, and that Beijing would like to ‘listen to what the US
and the DPRK governments will say’ in future. He added that China hopes
that the DPRK and the US “will continue to engage in dialogue, show sincerity,
respect and accommodate each other's legitimate concerns and jointly promote
denuclearization and the establishment of a peace mechanism on the Korean
Peninsula.”
Actually, it appears
that China still does not want to take a clear stand on the current disconnect
between the Washington and Pyongyang. It is interesting to note that China has
intrinsically been part of the US-North Korea talks and provided important
logistical assistance for the Hanoi summit when the North Korean leader, Kim
Jong-un, covered a long train journey to Hanoi via China. China reportedly
expected progress in the US-North Korea talks as these talks happened as per
the Chinese framework. In the talks, two important Chinese suggestions—denuclearisation
of North Korea and use of diplomatic means—were adhered to and Beijing would
have been satisfied if some progress had been made. North Korea has also been
in close consultation with China. To illustrate, Kim and China’s President Xi
Jinping met four times and coordinated their policy objectives.
In fact, China has
been in agreement with the North Korean demand that since some ‘positive
developments’ have been achieved in the process of North Korea’s de-nuclearisation,
proportional concessions must be provided to North Korea vis-à-vis international
sanctions. However, the US has not been keen to consider any such proposal.
Washington wants to achieve a significant level of denuclearisation in North
Korea before providing any concession on the sanctions. The US believes that if
the sanctions are diluted, North Korea might use the window to buy time and
after a breathing span, might go back to its effort towards nuclearisation.
China appears to share North Korea’s point that given this low level of trust
between the US and North Korea, it would be over-ambitious to put forth such
unrealistic demands to North Korea. China is also dissatisfied with the fact that in Hanoi, at
the last moment, US President Donald Trump refused to relax any sanctions on North
Korea in exchange for verified dismantlement of Yongbyon and some other
facilities.
However, China chose to be silent and cautious. China’s choice could
basically be understood in the context of its trade war with the US. China
seeks to have a successful workable deal with the US in near future on the
trade issues and a failure to do so would have serious implications for
the Chinese economy, which is continuing to slow down. In fact, Xi would be
worried by Trump’s open threat that he is “never afraid to walk from a deal,”
and that he “would do that with China, too, if it didn't work out.” Xi is
scheduled to visit the US around 27 March and he appears to be careful that any
open stand on the Hanoi summit might become a stumbling block for China’s
possible deal with the US. For the same reason, contrary to expectations, China
advised Kim not to have a stop-over
in Beijing while returning from Hanoi.
Thus, China’s silence or circumspection on the Hanoi summit is a
deliberate strategy to let the US and North Korea clarify their responses and
positions further. It is also a deliberate choice on China’s part to avoid its
shadow on the US-China summit meet in the late March. However, China definitely
is in proximity with North Korea’s position. Beijing would like to make a
clearer statement about the Hanoi summit once the outcomes of the US-China
summit are decided and it would also like to use the issue in its negotiation
with the US.
Dr Sandip Kumar Mishra is Associate Professor, Centre for East Asian Studies, School of International Studies, JNU, and Visiting Fellow, IPCS.