The presence of Indian rebel camps in Bhutan poses a complex security problem for both countries. Rendering Indian military operations against militants ineffective and engendering an increasingly delicate security situation in the host country, the problem threatens cordial relations between India and the Mountain Kingdom.

 

?Operation Bajrang-1990? and ?Operation Rhino-1991? launched by India against the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) resulted in outflow of militants to Bhutan and Bangladesh. The ULFA, facing intensified pressure within Assam, began setting up bases inside Bhutan and Bangladesh. Later, these bases are turned into training camps and eventually, the operational headquarters shifted to one of the camps in Bhutan. In the late 90?s, the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), followed by the Kamatapur Liberation Organization (KLO) a couple of years later, also began setting up bases in the thick forests of Bhutan. They have been strengthening their presence ever since. Besides providing a safe operational and training base, the jungles of Bhutan provide sanctuary to militants after their campaigns inside Indian territory.

 

India has been pressurizing Bhutan to close down the rebel camps in its territory. Meanwhile, the tiny Kingdom is faced with constraints of resources and expertise to comply despite its willingness to do so. Bhutan?s sincerity cannot be doubted. Apart from the obligation to heed the concerns of a friendly neighbor, the militants are increasingly becoming a menace to the people in southern Bhutan and the larger security of the Royal Kingdom. Recent reports about the ULFA, NDFB and KLO floating a new insurgent group ?Bhutan Gorkha Liberation Front (BGLF)- by inciting the Nepali community in Bhutan proves the point. The Royal Government has a running feud with the ethnic Nepali community. Some 50,000 were evicted in the late 90s and are currently in Nepal as refugees.

 

Bhutan has held four rounds of talks with the militants to negotiate their peaceful return, but the militants have stayed on, despite an agreement by the ULFA with Bhutan to close down its bases by December 2001. The NDFB and the KLO have also defied the Bhutanese Government. It tried to cut off the militants? food supplies by taking action against traders and citizens found helping the militants in procurement. More recently, the Royal Government has contemplated military action if a final attempt at peaceful resolution to the problem fails. Bhutan has considered proposals to constitute a militia to assist the Royal Bhutanese Army, which is evidently inadequate, for possible operations against the militants.

 

In the light of past developments and taking into consideration the limited capability of the RBA to use force effectively to drive the militants out of Bhutan, the chances of success after the ?final? attempt at a peaceful solution is sadly bleak. In the event of Bhutan exercising the military option, serious consequences are at stake. Some 66,000 Bhutanese citizens in 10 Districts will be directly affected and the booming border trade will be suspended. Besides, the RBA risks the prospect of casualties with no clear prospect of securing its goal, and losing its credibility and respect. The Indian militants, in the event of a military campaign by Bhutan, can be expected to turn the fight into an RBA-BGLF war by strengthening the Nepali militants further and thereby raising the stakes for the Royal Government. Thus, unless a considered  strategy and adequate resource mobilization precedes military operations, it could  only result in failure and compound the problem by spreading the BGLF infection to haunt Thimphu for a long time.

 

That Bhutan is sensitive to allowing direct Indian military operations against rebel groups within its territory is understandable. However, given India?s military strength and experience in counter-insurgency operations, the two countries should seriously discuss the possibilities of, if not a joint operation, Indian military assistance to the RBA in terms of training, arms and ammunitions, logistics and specialized personnel.  This will not only ensure a better chance of success for the RBA but prevent possible adverse consequences if Bhutan decides to go ahead with its military option.

 

All said, driving militants out of camps and burning vacated bases will not ensure the end of insurgency. Bhutan has an obligation to prevent the presence of anti-India militants inside its territory, but India has the same obligation to seek an end to its insurgencies by proactively pursuing talks with the militants to prevent their overflow into a friendly neighbor?s courtyard.