A major share of Tripura’s woes emerges from its 856-kilometre international border with Bangladesh, which touches each of its four districts, being porous. This unmanned border has allowed entry of illegal migrants from Bangladesh apart from unlawful elements like militants, smugglers and armed thugs. The response of the ruling Left Front government in Tripura to this challenge has been repeated demands for erecting fences along the border. The central government has invested a substantial amount of money in the Indo-Bangladesh Border Roads and Fence Project, but progress has been slow and tedious. It is yet to bring about any diminution in the level of violence in the State.

Tripura is affected by a 25-year old insurgency problem that has seen many changes through accords, mass surrenders of terrorists and revival of violence by factions. According to the Chief Minister, Manik Sarkar, during the last five years, between 10 April 1998 to 30 April 2003, 1150 civilians were killed in the State due to insurgency related violence, primarily by four outfits in the State (two factions of the National Liberation Front of Tripura, the Borok National Council of Tripura and the All Tripura Tiger Force) with a combined strength of 1435.  These outfits have camps in Bangladesh; a detailed list has been submitted to the Bangladeshi authorities in the latter part of 2002. Over the years, militants crossed the border to carry out massacres and have gone back to the safety of Bangladesh. To cite an example, on 7 May 2003 this year, a total of 33 non-tribal villagers, including 7 children and 8 women, were killed by the ATTF and NLFT terrorists in four separate incidents in two districts. The militants chose villages close to the international border in these four attacks. Apart from the militants, armed dacoits and smugglers have exploited the porous border to carry out sporadic raids.

Even though the effectiveness of fences in preventing anti-socials from carrying out their attacks is doubtful, the process itself has been dogged by problems such as inadequate forces to counter the level of violence in the region. According to one estimate, 18 battalions of Border Security Force (BSF) personnel are required to guard the border and help erecting fences. Presently, there are only nine battalions. A large force, including 11 battalions of Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), four battalions of Assam Rifles and eight battalions of Tripura State Rifles (TSR) are engaged in security related duties and counter insurgency operations. As a result of this shortfall in forces, only 10 kilometers of the border has been fenced in six years. The implementing agency, the Border Road Task Force (BRTF), has failed to utilize its budgetary allocation over the past few years. 

Cooperation from the Bangladeshi authorities has also been found wanting. On a regular basis, Bangladesh denies having any knowledge of insurgent camps in its territory. Conclusive evidence of a regular exchange of complements between militant leaders of Tripura, fundamentalist outfits in Bangladesh and elements of the Directorate of General Forces Intelligence (DGFI) in districts like Bandarban, Rangamati, Habiganj, Khagrachari and Moulvi Bazar has been denied. In 2001, BSF authorities had dialogues on intelligence sharing with the Bangladeshi Rifles (BDR) personnel in Agartala. The outcome of the meeting is still unclear.

Police modernization in the State forms an inherent component of border management. Capacity building in the police to thwart any threat to the State and its population needs to be closely integrated with the empowerment of the people, especially in border areas. Most of the villages in the border area are poverty stricken and susceptible to allurements as well as threats from anti-social elements. In the early 1980s, five border area projects were undertaken under the Central Social Welfare Board (CSWB), New Delhi, with the object of promoting emotional and cultural integration. Though a substantial amount of money is earmarked each year for such projects, it has not led to any visible improvements in the quality of life of these people.

The importance of effective border management has been reiterated innumberable times by various authorities. On 1 March 2002, former Governor of Tripura, Lt Gen (Retd) KM Seth, was quoted as having said, “The shortage of Security Forces, existence of terrorist camps in the neighboring country and inadequate border management continue to hamper effective and result oriented anti-terrorism operations in Tripura.” The fact remains that, without significant improvements in intelligence sharing, capability enhancement among civilians in the border areas and the police, and substantial achievements in the fencing of the porous border, the problems of Tripura would continue to haunt it for years to come.