Pakistan has since its inception been beset with internal contradictions and continues to remain unstable, unsure, and insecure about its future. This insecurity has manifested itself in Pakistan looking for allied co-operation and an enhanced optimism about its military capabilities. A narrow ?survivalist model of national security? has dominated the political discourse of the country and continues to be the central pillar in Pakistan?s strategic calculations. Ahmed Faruqui?s book broadly covers three themes in Pakistan?s national security policies; the military in the light of its exploits, the ?adversary?s combat readiness?; the promise of nuclear weapons and policy recommendations.
���� He argues that national security is a larger concept than defence. It comprises of the utility of power and the psychology of national vulnerability that proceeds far beyond the protection of territory. An investigation into the increasing role of Pakistan army reveals issues of legitimacy, its distrust of politicians, and unwillingness to accommodate change. This highlights its inability to construct an acceptable political framework for the management of the state, including the acquisition and exercise of state power. The author stresses on the political economy and the vested interests of militarism.
���� The military?s powerful position in Pakistan?s political system makes it the most formidable and autonomous political actor in Pakistan, capable of influencing the nature and direction of internal and external politics; strategic, foreign and even economic choices that Pakistan makes. No wonder that any study on the national security of Pakistan naturally centres around the all powerful military and its campaigns in war as well as its role in governance. One finds no disagreement with Faruqui?s discussion on these lines in the chapters ?the political economy of militarism?, ?premises in national security policy? and war-fighting effectiveness.� Faruqui analyses the different military dictators as they governed the country and argues that the Pakistani military steps into power to protect its own corporate interests and not necessarily to promote the national interest.
��� The discussion on war-fighting, with the role of the army, air force and the navy in the 1965 and the 1971 wars deserves special mention. Faruqui?s analyses of the wars is unlike any military history writing. It is rich in content, succinct and most importantly, objective in approach. Faruqui is able to clearly pinpoint the errors of judgment and locate the causes of failures in higher direction of war, inter services rivalry and lack of co-ordination.� In the Kargil War, Pakistan had calculated that India?s conventional advantage would be offset by mutual nuclear deterrence, and that Pakistan could increase the activities of the mujiahideens in a calibrated manner without fear of conventional retaliation from India. The Kargil War had important lessons for the strategist.� Pakistan paid a heavy price of its withdrawal.
��� There has always obtained a delicate balance in Pakistan between the civilian military hierarchies. This was put to the test after its Kargil misadventure; both the civilian and military leaderships indulged in blame game. Faruqui argues that American pressure (on Pakistan to withdraw) only emboldened India. What Ahmad Faruqui has not highlighted is that after the nuclear tests, Pakistan itself sought to alter status-quo. Once domestic pressures begin to accumulate in a crisis, a definite result is what states look for. Otherwise ?backing off? without tangible results might be conceived as a sign of weakness in future crisis situation.
���� This brings one to the discussion on issue of nuclear weapons. Perceptions and psychology in crisis situations play a major role in the logic of deterrence. Deterrence attempts to create risks to ensure that the opponent does not pursue a certain action. This is premised on the threat to use or to punitively retaliate with nuclear weapons if those actions are undertaken. Faruqui?s discussion on what he calls ?deterrence trap? aptly summarises this. While there is no rollback on the nuclear issue, some suggestions on how to ?stabilise? the situation, issues like risk reduction measures, would have made the discussion more complete.
���� In the section on the policy recommendations, while he has surveyed the disarmament experiences of many countries, he focuses much attention to organisational reform in the Pakistan military and has made suggestions for reducing military expenditure. An old argument of health, education versus military expenditure follows. Many scholars don?t subscribe to this view. It is often argued that state security comes first. Perhaps in Pakistan?s case it does come first. But for political, social and economic development resources have to be generated and the mindset has to alter. A reduced military expenditure can fill only the economic gap not the psychological.
���� Overall the book offers a comprehensive look on key issues of military, nuclear weapons, foreign policy and development. It must be read by those who wish to comprehend the complex security dilemmas of Pakistan.