The book under review has been co-authored by a retired Vice Chief of Army Staff and a leading correspondent specializing in security affairs. The book is an informative one particularly for lay readers in that it explains operational and strategic issues much in the news. For security analysts it is relevant since it reveals the thinking within the Army on how to deal with Kashmir and Pakistan. The book is recommended because its title, Operation Parakram, is not quite about the ?strategic relocation? of troops. In its last sentence it supports the Army position that the ?War Unfinished? should be taken to its logical conclusion. ?Even as the military is bracing for another Operation Parakram ? it would be real this time ? the political leadership should attempt to see the strategic imperatives as they are, and not as they ought to be.? Clearly the tail is likely to wag the dog again, something an unsuspecting country cannot permit a second time around; Operation Parakram comprehensively revealed the first and unsuccessful example. It is imperative therefore to question the arguments the book advanced for supporting the Army?s position, lest its advocacy in the book lead up to a clamor for the ?real? thing.

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It is not strange that the book reflects the Army?s position, rather than a Services position, the latter being non-existent. The Army?s position suffers from the limitations of a ?military mindset? in that it is narrow, myopic and has institutional self-interest at its core. It also reveals a grave misreading of Clausewitz, in that the Army believes that the destruction of the military wherewithal of the foe would yield a desired political outcome. This is best summed up by an extract of the Army?s doctrine highlighted in the book: ?The Indian Army believes in fighting the war in enemy territory. If forced into a war, the aim of our offensives would be to apply a sledgehammer blow to the enemy. The Indian Army?s concept of waging war is to ensure decisive victory?.? The doctrine predates Pokhran and Chagai, but it does not appear to have been revised in the age of ?limited war.? Indeed, it reveals that the January 2002 avatar of Op Parakram was a Northern Command inspired ?bottom up? plan limited to POK; by June its ambition had increased to launch three strike corps into Pakistan?s desert sector in the hope that Pakistan?s mobile formations would be destroyed without reaching the nuclear threshold. This plan was devised despite the authors? admitting that the Indian military has not been kept in the full know of India?s nuclear capabilities by its politicians and scientific enclave. If that be so, it can be surmised that it is more ignorant regarding the nuclear capabilities and the intentions of Pakistan. Therefore, it can be argued that the na�ve belief that the war would not go nuclear underlay the position of the Army, a surmise that politicians appear to have happily agreed to.

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This brings one to the aspect of political control. The book rightly criticizes the government for not informing the military of the reasons for the mobilization; this was therefore amenable to a permissive interpretation, evident from the contretemps surrounding the dismissal of a strike corps commander for overstepping his non-existent brief. A more generous interpretation could be that, in leaving the ?war unfinished,? the government exhibited political control despite the Army?s position and pressure. While the book appears critical of the government?s lack of resolve, the contrary appears to be truer. This is an aspect that requires emphasis lest commentary in the manner urged in the book suggest that the government is oblivious to strategic considerations that ought to be the sole preserve of the professional military. In a nuclear environment, this cannot be the case, and Clausewitz?s dictum on the abiding primacy of the political of over two centuries vintage remains valid and enduring.

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The book suggests that there are two possible solutions to India?s Kashmir-Pakistan problems: One, administering a military defeat upon Pakistan; Two, an internal resolution of the Kashmir militancy. It considers the latter impractical and therefore its inclination lies in the military option. The authors rightly dwell on the problems that would occur once Indian military strategy was to be operationalised in the January and June versions of Op Parakram. As regards the January option, they take cognisance of General Musharraf?s definition of ?unconventional war? as involving launching of mujahedeen irregulars to blunt India's attack in the mountains. How this force multiplier would have been tackled by India is not known. It must also be remembered that the Kargil defenders were evicted from their unprepared defences after almost two months of heroic fighting by India's infantry. The authors do not dwell on how the Indian Army proposed to take out the fifty year old defences on the LOC in the middle of winter. The first few chapters dwell on the Taliban threat. The Army had backed a winter offensive even as the Taliban was being wrapped up by Op Enduring Freedom. Regarding the June option, it does not inform how the Indian Army expected to grapple with the ?operational parity? reached by Pakistan. We are only told of the Indian Army?s obsession with ?territory.? The then Vice Chief is quoted as saying: ?the role of the Army was to occupy (territory) with the others (Air Force etc) come in support of it.? The ?what if?s? such as ?What if Pakistan?s reserves refused to play ball?? is completely ignored in this bit of advocacy. Therefore it is serendipitous for the authors to back the military position that ? ?the commanders would know best.? The Indian Army must call Pakistan?s nuclear bluff?.?

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Lastly, the authors believe that the structural and technological changes post Op Parakram like formation of the Nuclear Command Authority would help India prevail next time around with a better politician-military interface. A different approach requires to be privileged in that this reform should be utilized to reassert political control over the military, so that its role expansion into the political domain to determine whether to wage a war and what should be its ends is firmly curbed. There is some urgency here because a quote from the former Army Chief?s account of his term in office indicates that the Indian Army appears is adrift in the era of globalization: ?It was more than obvious that when the Narasimha Rao government embarked on its economic liberalization it also quietly pushed issues like defense and national security very low down in the list of priorities.? Clearly India?s economic strides, with their attendant national security implications, cannot be allowed to be deflected by Army officials self-interestedly pushing the government into over-reacting to crisis.