B Raman ·       

In the late 1980s, the Afghan Government headed by Najibullah repeatedly brought to the notice of the Government of India the jihadi training of some Kashmiris in camps run by Pakistan?s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and their participation in the fight against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. The Government of India did not pay serious attention to it till the late 1989 when Kashmiri terrorists kidnapped the daughter of Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, the then Home Minister of the Government of India, and forced the Government of India to concede their demands for the release of some persons in return for her release.

 

Initially, the ISI helped any Kashmiri group that was prepared to take up arms against the Indian security forces, irrespective of their political objective. In the early 1990s, it started giving preference to groups such as the Hizbul Mujahideen of the Jamaat-e-Islami, which called for the merger of J&K with Pakistan.

 

Between 1989 and 1993, many Kashmiri organizations, encouraged by the ISI, mushroomed in J&K. They were directly trained and armed by the ISI in camps in Pakistani territory during the first tenure of Mrs Benazir Bhutto as the Prime Minister (1988-90) and the subsequent tenure of Mr Nawaz Sharif (1990-93). The failure of the indigenous Kashmiri organizations to make any headway in forcing the Government of India to concede their demands and the action of the Clinton Administration in the US in 1993 in placing Pakistan on the so-called watch list of suspected state sponsors of international terrorism led to two important changes in the ISI?s modus operandi.

 

Firstly, it started infiltrating into J&K in increasing numbers cadres of Pakistani jihadi organizations led by Punjabis and Pashtuns with experience of having fought against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan to beef up the indigenous Kashmiri organizations. Secondly, it started funneling its assistance to the terrorist organizations through Pakistani fundamentalist political parties instead of directly in order to conceal the hand of the ISI.

 

The return of Osama bin Laden to Afghanistan in 1996 and his formation in 1998 of the International Islamic Front (IIF) for jihad against the Crusaders and the Jewish People had its impact on the terrorist situation in J&K. Firstly, four of the Pakistani jihadi organizations active in J&K became members of the IIF. These were the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), the Harkat-ul-Jihad-Al-Islami (HUJI), the Laskar-e-Toiba (LET) and the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM). The HUM was the first to join the IIF in 1998. The others joined in subsequent years.

 

Secondly, suicide terrorism, which was non-existent in J&K before 1999, made its appearance for the first time in 1999 under the influence of the IIF. Since then, there have been 46 instances of suicide terrorism, of which 44 were carried out by the Pakistani jihadi organizations.

 

Thirdly, the Pakistani jihadi organizations, which the Friday Times of Lahore once referred to as the Punjabi Taliban, broadened their objectives to include not only the ?liberation? of J&K from the control of the Hindus and its merger with Pakistan, but also the ?liberation? of the Muslims in other parts of India and the creation of two more ?Muslim homelands? in North and South India. The LET describes J&K as the gateway to India and, as part of its overall objective of ?liberating? the Muslims in other parts of India, it has been extending its network and activities much beyond J&K, expanding as far down south as Hyderabad in Andhra Pradesh.

 

As a result of these developments, the terrorist movement in J&K has been virtually taken over by the Pakistani jihadi organizations aligned with Osama bin Laden, who have been operating under the guise of Kashmiris. They are responsible for the majority of the Pakistan-sponsored terrorist incidents in J&K and elsewhere in India.

 

The compilation titled Jihadis in Jammu & Kashmir: A Portrait Gallery brought out by the prestigious Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses of New Delhi does highlight these ominous changes in the terrorist scene in J&K since bin Laden returned to Afghanistan in 1996, but not as adequately as one would have wished. As a result, the fact that it is the pan-Islamic Pakistani jihadis who are now operating in predominant numbers under the guise of Kashmiris does not come out loud and clear. Even Indian public opinion is not adequately aware that it is the Pakistanis who are now responsible for a majority of the terrorist incidents, not to talk of international opinion.

 

Despite this shortcoming, one could see that much hard work has gone into this documentation and the IDSA and its staff needs to be complimented for their initiative in placing in the hands of research scholars and public in India and abroad a data-base on the various terrorist organizations active in J&K. A data-base of this nature would be of limited use to the Governmental agencies which are known to have a much more comprehensive data-base.

 

Its real value would be as an aid to assist the public in India and the international community in having a better understanding of the recent qualitative changes in the terrorist situation in the State and the background and capabilities of the plethora of terrorist organizations active there. The compilation?s focus has rightly been on their organizational set-up, capabilities and terrorist actions, with attention also paid to the three important aspects of their background (Kashmiri or Pakistani), objectives and ideology. Some of the chapters such as that on the Harkat-ul-Ansar are very rich in valuable details. The chapter on the LET is somewhat thin and lacking in meat despite the fact that it is the most active terrorist organization today. It is a proper understanding of these aspects which would enable the Indian public and the international community not to fall a prey to the Pakistani propaganda that what has been happening in J&K is due to domestic causes and that Pakistan has no responsibility for it.

 

The compilation has followed the alphabetical order. A better arrangement would have been to have separate parts for indigenous and Pakistani organizations and in each part to categorize the organizations in accordance with their objectives ��? independence, merger with Pakistan and/or pan-Islamic.