The author, Anthony Cordesman, holds the Arleigh Burke Chair in Strategy at the CSIS and serves as a national security analyst for ABC News. His previous books include one on Terrorism, Asymmetric Warfare and Weapons of Mass Destruction?. This book is an assessment of the operations undertaken by the USA and its allies in Afghanistan since October 2001 with a view to drawing lessons particularly for war fighting, intelligence and force transformation. The author acknowledges the handicap of not having access to statistics and details on the course of the war from the Pentagon and the UK MOD. Estimates of other forces in the area of operations like the Al Qaaeda, the Taliban and even friendly forces are apparently nothing more than intelligent guesswork. He laments the fact that the theatre commander?s determination not to allow teams of military analysts during the most critical periods of fighting, seriously limit the quality of analysis. He also stresses that drawing lessons from the conflict is further complicated by as the war is far from over. Though the Taliban has been ousted from power, most of their cadres have dispersed rather than being killed or captured. Similarly the Al Qaeeda fighters have largely escaped and dispersed into Pakistan and other countries.

The unique conditions of the war and its equally unique intangibles are briefly set out. The unpopularity of the Taliban, the dispersal of its forces due to armed opposition, its total lack of air power and little air defence capability, and the lack of sophistication of equipment and training, and factionalism, are aspects that may not necessarily prevail in future situations. These severe limitations were reflected in the fact that there was little frontal fighting during the operations. The most important factor that assisted the USA and its allies was the total and universal revulsion at the attacks of 11^th September 2001. Equally important was the apparent fault-line in relations between the Taliban and the Al Qaeeda. The author claims that there were many in the Taliban who felt that it was dragged into the conflict by the Al Qaeeda and it is not unlikely that a number of these elements defected or deserted. The lesson drawn is that the clash within civilisations is more important than the clash between civilisations. Other factors were the early collapse of the Taliban, the lack of support links between the Al Qaeeda and other countries, the good response from Pakistan and its control over indigenous Islamists, and the unreserved support of the Central Asian republics, Russia and Iran. It is a matter of some irony that the author draws a parallel to the situation in the Balkans by stating that, mid- and long-term success in building a stable nation in Afghanistan is as uncertain as it is in the Balkans?. The author argues that the conflict in Afghanistan is providing lessons to enemies also. The primary one being that terrorist and other asymmetric adversaries should create looser and more distributed networks that have a high degree of individual independence and survivability. He mentions that intelligence sources believe that Al Qaeeda may be sub-contracting smaller operations to local terrorist groups to engage in ?distributed warfare?.

The author attempts to draw many lessons in the field of weapons systems, both for further effectiveness and to address the aspect of collateral damage by developing smaller precision guided weapons, small diameter bombs, miniature cruise missiles, and improving the strike capability of unmanned combat aerial vehicles. The possibility of the development and use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons is debated. The aspect of post-conflict activity in the light of the fact that the Afghan Great Game has already commenced is highlighted. Here the author makes a rather telling statement: that war plans that do not include peace plans have always been signs of gross military incompetence?.

The author then goes on to analyse aspects of power projection and force transformation for the USA. Some of the deductions are based on lessons from the operations but it is obvious that the analysis goes well beyond the Afghan experience. Many aspects of the analysis are of relevance to analysts and strategists surveying the contemporary military scene. Notwithstanding the awesome technical assets that were deployed in Afghanistan for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance by the US forces, many shortcomings emerged; this underscored the importance of human intelligence. Limitations on the use of sensors and unmanned aerial vehicles that cannot ?see? through mountains and heavy brush are highlighted. The limitations of sensors must be recognised in context of suggestions being made in the Indian context for their deployment along the Line of Control and in the Glaciers area; they can only supplement existing resources, not replace them. Similarly, the effects of high altitude on helicopter's lift capacity and use of field artillery in mountainous areas are factors that impact on conduct of operations; aspects on which the Indian Army already has considerable experience. Supervision of the conduct the operations from a headquarters based in Florida in the USA and the aspect of joint command in the initial stages is adversely commented on. The inadequacy in dealing with the media is highlighted. Commenting on the coalition effort, the problems of language, command-and-control assets, lack of training with US intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets, and different battle management techniques are highlighted by the author. But the important point made is that most other forces lack strategic mobility and sustainability, and the USA was not geared to use many of the assets offered by other countries.

In the penultimate chapter the author's focus is on the challenges of force transformation in so far as the USA is concerned. He acknowledges that the broader force transformation efforts that began early in the Bush administration cannot be separated from the efforts being introduced as a result of the Afghan experience. He lists out the various measures apparently included in the US Program Decision Memorandum 4, the so-called Transformation PDM. He also dwells on other significant aspects like the defence planning guidance for 2004-2009 and future military strategy and produces a further list of force transformation efforts that cover a wide range of items whose development would provide the capability for pre-emptive action. Most significant is reference to the new triad that comprises a scaled down nuclear deterrent, a more deadly and responsive conventional deterrent, and missile defence. In covering aspects of media and psychological operations, an interesting observation is made; War does involve deception, half-truths, and sometimes lies. In blunt terms, it is better to lie than to kill?. The Pentagon is apparently examining ways of creating some form of global command to coordinate the new battle against terrorism and asymmetric warfare. The importance of an effective regional and in-theatre command structure is also recognised.

A useful book that analyses and draws lessons from the conflict in Afghanistan but it probably has greater relevance to defence analysts in the assessments and analysis of force projections of the USA in the years to come.