Protracted Contest is the story of a contest between two large nations, India and China, and their rivalries for supremacy in South Asia.� Graver has explored the ?deep and enduring geopolitical rivalry? between the two Asian giants. He identifies two roots of rivalry between India and China. Firstly, powerful national narratives based on conflicting spheres of national greatness; and secondly the classic security dilemma wherein actions by one nation to enhance its security are perceived as posing a challenge to the security of the other.

�By providing a comprehensive and lucid history of 50 years of India-China relations, the book is a valuable contribution towards understanding the nature of this conflict. This is especially useful at a time when scholars are debating the emerging contours of this relationship. Extensive citation of original Chinese language material and observations based on interviews and field visits to India, China, and Pakistan enhances the value of this book.

The book is a result of several years of painstaking research and provides a fine exposition of the entire gamut of issues in India-China relations?the Tibetan factor, the territorial dispute, the contest for influence in Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, their rivalry in the Indian Ocean and the nuclear factor. Garver also explores the contradictions inherent in China?s parallel policy of maintaining the Sino-Pakistani entente while at the same time promoting dialogue with India. On the moves and countermoves by India and China to garner influence in Myanmar, Garver concludes, ?there will be continuing rivalry as they move down the path of cooperative regional development centred on Myanmar.?

After a rigorous analysis of the conflictual relations, Garver offers his prognosis for the future. It is here that he stumbles and loses much of the grip over the subject that he had displayed so far. In the last chapter entitled ?Prospects for a Qualitative Change in PRC-ROI� Relations?, Garver posits two scenarios whereby the protracted contest could draw to a close and ?thereby usher in a new era of predominantly cooperative, non-conflictual Sino-Indian relations?. This could become a reality, he says, if either China ?could agree that South Asia is India?s security zone and sphere of influence? or if there is an ?Indian acceptance of Chinese preeminence in that region.? Of the two, Garver is of the opinion that the latter is more likely, with India ?accommodating? itself to the growth of Chinese power in the region.

Garver?s reasoning is flawed on several counts. Firstly, the proposition that the conflict could be resolved through capitulation by either India or China is impractical and unworkable. Secondly, if one works on the assumption that under the classic security dilemma, an increase in the influence of one decreases the security of the other, it stands to reason that China?s growing influence should increase India?s anxiety levels and intensify the search for options to counter its spread. One is at a loss to understand how an ?inexorable rise in China?s influence? could lead to an ?Indian acceptance of Chinese preeminence?, ?where India could play a junior partner to an emerging Chinese superpower and become ?China?s regional partner? in return for ?Chinese friendship and respect?. That Garver gives serious consideration to this scenario displays a grave and unfortunate lack of understanding of the Indian psyche and its national aspirations. Thirdly, since the regional and the global arenas are not mutually exclusive spheres, a capitulation by India in South Asia would be tantamount to also forsaking its bid to play a meaningful role in global affairs.

�Garver also makes the curious assertion that ?India also has few close supporters among the major powers, since the demise of the USSR, really none?.India has been unwilling and unable to forge a strategic partnership with the United States or China or even with major second-tier powers like Japan, Germany, or Britain.? Garver fails to mention the recasting of India?s foreign policy in the post-Cold War period aimed at establishing linkages with key players in the global area. There is also no mention of India?s successful ongoing dialogues with the US, key European countries and Japan; the support from all the P5 countries, save China, on the issue of India?s membership of the UN Security Council; and India?s successful efforts at reengaging the world in the wake of Pokhran-II.

Building influence is also not a one-way street as Garver seems to imply, with India passively viewing what he calls China?s ?inexorably expanding presence in South Asia?. India?s Look-East policy, membership of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), dialogue partnership with the ASEAN all demonstrate the resolve to determinedly move beyond a South Asian frame of reference and to be a key player in defining the evolving Asian security agenda. India is also positioning itself as a strategic stabilizer in the Indian Ocean region. The setting up of the Far Eastern Naval Command (FENC), the hosting of the International Fleet Review by the Indian Navy, Indo-US joint patrolling of the Malacca Straits, closer cooperation with Japan are all part of India?s rising profile in the region. Importantly, China has not been able to prevent this accretion in India?s influence. The short point to be stressed is that it will be natural for India and China to compete for influence both in the regional and global arena.

Finally, there are always inherent dangers in viewing this dyad only through the prism of conflict. Since this book is exclusively about conflict, Garver does not offer any thought on how it could be alleviated. Neglecting the facet of cooperation and ignoring the convergence of interests between India and China, the book presents a distorted and partial picture of Sino-Indian relations. The reality is that this relationship will be characterized by competition and cooperation, with cooperation playing a vital role in moderating the protracted contest.