The much-quoted prediction of Ismail Serageldin, former vice president of the World Bank, that the twenty-first century war would be over water resources, is coming true in South Asia. Negative developments regarding fresh water are grave indicators of future conflicts, if not immediate discords, among the riparian states. The most recent of these is the 88^th special meeting of the Permanent Commission of Indus Waters (PICW) between India and Pakistan, held in Islamabad on 4-6 February 2002, that failed to resolve the issue of the 450-Megawaat Baglihar Hydroelectric Power Project on the Chenab river. Pakistan has raised objections to the Indian project claiming it would deprive the Chenab of 6,000 to 7,000 cusecs of water per day that currently irrigates the lands of central Punjab in Pakistan. Baglihar project apart, Pakistan has also raised objections over the construction of the Kishanganga hydropower project on the Jhelum river. India, on the other hand, has rejected all allegations. Notwithstanding the allegations and counter allegations, the moot point is that the Indus Water Treaty (IWT), that was signed between India and Pakistan in 1960 to allocate the waters of three western rivers (Indus, Jhelum and Chenab) to Pakistan and those of the three eastern rivers (Ravi, Sutlej and Bias) to India, and which has survived four wars, is in real danger.

Sharing of the Indus waters is not the only trans-border river issue beleaguering South Asia; the Ganges river dispute (India- Bangladesh) and the Mahakali impasse (Nepal- India), among others, are potentially volatile. Though India inked these treaties (Ganges and Mahakali) only in 1996, resentment and frustration run high against India.

All the riparian states are trying to maximize their gains. Nepal, an upper riparian state, has abundance of water but lacks the resources to convert it into electricity; it is hoping for big investment projects that can be profitable for concerned stake holders. India wants water for hydro-electricity as well as for irrigation of its vast fertile Indo-Gangetic plane; plans are underway to route water from water-rich to water-stress regions through ambitious river linking project without the consent of Nepal or Bangladesh. These diverging interests have stood in the way of any satisfactory negotiated outcome.

While India posits its dialogue with Nepal over the issue of the Himalayan Rivers on the theory of natural flow of rivers, with Bangladesh, it advocates the theory of ‘natural sovereignty’ over waters. To avoid these ambiguities, Bangladesh wants trilateral talks over trans-boundary rivers, which even Nepal is against and successfully stalls any such initiative. In a nutshell, South Asia faces the dilemma of water abundance and water scarcity.

Fresh water is finite and fast depleting in South Asia. The impact of climate change has enlarged the drought area in Pakistan, India and Bangladesh. The predominantly agriculture-dependent population has further depleted water levels. Additionally, access to safe drinking water is a problem in South Asia; more than fifty percent of Bangladesh’s ground water is contaminated by arsenic poison and has little choice but to depend on trans-boundary rivers to provide safe drinking water to its citizens. In Pakistan, a downward trend is noticeable regarding underground water and river water; struggle for clean water has been reported in urban Faisalabad we well as rural Chiniot region. As population increases, corresponding increase in demands for fresh water is bound to end up in confrontational situations.

In South Asia, countries thus far perceive water only in terms of national interests; Indian security analysts always suggest maintaining water deterrence against Pakistan. In the near future, if the problem is not addressed collectively, the situation, already volatile, might result in another skirmish, or worse, pave way for a full-fledged war.