Operation Parakram involved the total mobilization of the Indian armed forces along the international border and the Line of Control (LoC). These measures were taken by the Government of India in the wake of the 13 December 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament. Combined with several diplomatic measures, they were meant to compel the Pakistani regime to acquiesce to India’s demands to stop cross-border terrorism. It was a formidable demonstration of intent with the movement of army’s strike elements to the borders and placing the Air Force fighters on full alert at forward locations; the areas straddling the LoC were mined and naval warships, including assets of the eastern fleet, sailed into the Arabian Sea; and, Prithvi missiles were reportedly positioned at earmarked sites. The Indian efforts were widely interpreted as an exercise in coercive diplomacy.

But, after ten months of brinkmanship, over 7000 crores of rupees (US$ 1.46 billion) of expenditure incurred and no tangible gains achieved, the forces were withdrawn to their peace locations. No wonder there is much speculation on the efficacy of this strategy in achieving the government’s intentions. Experts believe that the plan was “flawed” at the very outset, since the aim was never clear.

Having exhausted all other options to persuade the Pakistan regime to halt cross border incursions into India, the government had chosen strong arm tactics. Clearly, this was “compellence”; a well accepted tool in the practice of statecraft, which nation states put to use to protect their vital interests in the arena of international relations. The purpose of compellence is “to force an adversary to do something or stop doing something that it would prefer not to.” According to Thomas Schelling, the threat conveyed should be both “potent” and “credible” for the success of this endeavour and there should be a fair amount of certainty that the objective would be achieved by embarking on this path.

The essence of the Indian threat was that the massive mobilization carried the inherent threat of a possible attack. It was considered “potent” despite an assessment that an absence of requisite balanced force ratios obtained to dominate in an all out conflict. The focused use of air power and naval encirclement were considered pivotal to debilitate the will of the adversary. But on the aspect of “credibility,” it can be argued that with a substantial number of American troops on its soil and a well-knit anti-terrorist alliance with the United States, Pakistan was reasonably certain that an Indian attack will not be possible. This purported Pakistan logic seemed to apply as Indian Navy could not enjoy freedom of navigating the seas due the massive US naval presence in the northern Arabian Sea. According to reports, “a discreet Indian request that US naval forces stay away west of a certain longitude was ignored.” This theory gained credence when, in the third week of January, the media reported the removal of an Indian Corps commander for a tactical initiative, which was not rebutted by the government, leading to suspicions that it was affected on US intervention. Apparently, the Pakistan regime gauged the Indian predicament and decided to take calculated steps to stymie Indian efforts definitively. A few well placed statements in the media, including one by the Pakistan President about going nuclear on the smallest excuse, created enormous global concerns and were able to diffuse the Indian pressure.

It is accepted, however, that there were limited gains. India gained global acceptance that its problems in Kashmir arose out of Pakistan’s flagrant support to terrorist activities. It was able to persuade the US and other major powers to exert pressure on Pakistan to crack down on terrorist groups based in Pakistan that were targeting India. The conduct of free and fair elections in Jammu & Kashmir enhanced the stature of the Indian State as a practicing democracy. But there was unanimity that India was not able to contain cross border terrorism, which continues unabated. The loss to trade and tourism from abroad due to issue of travel advisories by several Western nations has been sizable.

Commentators accept the thesis that an attack on the Parliament was much too provocative and the Indian government had to respond with strong steps to assuage domestic sensibilities. The manner of the response had to appear to be salutary; therefore, an immediate response across the LoC may have served this purpose. The attendant fallout would have been containable. As a general principle, in situations which may lead to armed conflict, an incremental approach is considered suitable. In that realm, both overt and covert actions can be taken. Tactically, it probes and tests the adversary’s intentions and shows a way for steps in future.