‘Copy cat’ PWG and the al Qaeda cell model

02 Jan, 2003    ·   939

PV Ramana reports the formation of Permanent Action Teams in the PWG and analyzes its implications


People’s War Group (PWG) left-wing extremists have refined their strategy of physically eliminating adversaries and are, reportedly, set to form Permanent Action Teams (PAT), a task hitherto being performed by Special Action Teams (SAT). The PAT idea is a copy of the al Qaeda cellular network model.

A SAT, operating in urban centres where targets live, gathers intelligence, abducts the rich for ransom; and, murders adversaries – politicians and security force personnel. While SAT consists of two to four cadres picked from existing cadres and disbanded upon completing an assignment, PAT, as the name suggests, would function for a longer period of time.

Reports indicate that the decision to make PATs official was made only recently. The idea to form the PATs came up in October 2001, a month after al Qaeda’s September 2001 attacks and details of its cellular network coming to light.  The al Qaeda terrorist network consists of “many cells whose members do not know one another” and “if a cell member is caught the other cells would not be affected”; the cell leader alone knows who the other members are. These members do not maintain communication with one another, take assumed identities and lead a normal life. The higher leadership, through the cell leader, activates a cell to undertake an assignment. Encrypted messages are sent to the cell leader, preferably through human courier.

In the PWG, dynamic cadres cutting across districts are proposed to be drafted into PATs. These cadres would be ‘sleepers’, to be activated even months or years later. Once a target is decided upon, he or she would continue to remain on the hit list until killed.

The PWG chooses its targets on specific criteria.  An interview with a surrendered PWG cadre in February 2002 revealed the method of target selection, specifically, of a security force (SF) personnel. The criteria are

  • Anyone responsible for at least one encounter becomes a target; three or more encounters just spirals the target towards elimination.
  • SF personnel actively participating in anti-extremist operations become PWG targets. The PWG brandies them as harbouring ‘a craving for promotion to higher ranks’; it refuses to accept them as those performing their assigned duty. 
  • SF personnel harassing ‘militants’ become targets; in PWG parlance, ‘militants’ are those providing logistic support but, strictly speaking, are not cadres. In other words, the PWG targets SF personnel who attempt to stymie its logistics/support base.
  • Targets based on information provided by surrendered cadres yet loyal to former colleagues.
  • Targets based on information gathered from so-called ‘neutral’ persons.
  • Targets identified in periodic reviews by the jail committee; a jail committee provides leadership to imprisoned cadres.

In the past, SATs have scored significant successes. Notable among them are the slaying of KS Vyas, former chief of Greyhounds, the anti-Naxalite elite force; killing Umesh Kumar, Superintendent of Police; abduction of P Sudhir Kumar, former legislator; assassination of K Madhava Reddy, Panchayat Raj Minister; and, botched-up abduction attempt that resulted in murder of M Subbirami Reddy, renowned industrialist. While most of these incidents occurred in Hyderabad and thereabouts, the last action was executed in Ongole.

One cannot rule out the possibility of PATs undertaking suicide missions, though the ideological fanaticism and commitment of PWG cadres does not match with that of Islamist militants or the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) rebels.

With creation of PATs being proposed, early detection of PAT members is vital. It is essential to strengthen the intelligence network as well as co-ordination among security forces. This needs to be coupled with enhanced surveillance of PWG squads and cadres. A comprehensive list of all squads and members should be drawn up and given the widest circulation among all affected regions in the country. Police in affected States should notify their counterparts elsewhere of cadres who have gone missing from their known areas of operation, for they might have been drafted into a PAT. The All-Indian Joint Co-ordination Committee, comprising police chiefs of affected States formed to tackle the Naxal menace, could collate and disseminate this information.

Additionally, continuous monitoring of over-ground activists and sympathisers in urban centres is essential. A spurt of PWG recruitment from urban centres also requires attention as it might point to presence of PWG cells at such places.

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