On the external front, the English media of Pakistan focused primarily on the United States and India. In its editorial (“Afghan policy shift?,” 11 November 2002)  Dawn commenting on the US policy towards Afghanistan observed, “ The best long-term strategy to fight the menace of terrorism is for the US to seriously rethink its policies in the region. At the heart of the matter is the question of Palestine, where efforts for a just solution must be urgently revived. Every atrocity committed against the hapless Palestinians by an Israel fully supported and bankrolled by the US provokes deep anger in the Muslim world and creates more recruits for militant groups. In the long run, militancy will be defeated not by guns and bombs alone but by removing its root causes.” Pakistanis and for that matter the Muslims in India believe that Palestine is the root cause of Islamic terrorism. It is essential to research this further, instead of merely repeating that Islam is a political religion and a clash of civilizations in inevitable.

  Commenting on elections in Turkey, Pakistan and Palestine, Roedad Khan wrote (“Turkey’s fateful choice,” Dawn, 11 November 2002) “A great admirer of the Turkish system, President Musharraf too has introduced a military-led National Security Council on the Turkish model and kept his two leading civilian opponents out of the October 10 parliamentary elections. The same logic guides Washington's announced policy on Palestinian reforms: democratic elections must be held, but Yasser Arafat has to be kept out. The results in both cases have been dismal. President Musharraf succeeded only in shifting votes from secular to Islamic candidates while the Palestinian elections are on hold because of Arafat's enduring popularity.”

  Khalid Hasan on the issue of nuclear co-operation between Pakistan and North Korea (“Propaganda against Islamabad continues in US,” Daily Times, 11 November 2002) criticized the writes US that, “there is an influential lobby in Washington made up of think tank experts, certain journalists and media people, members of congress, administration officials and Israeli apologists who have constantly tried to blacken Pakistan’s name and create the belief that Islamabad cannot be trusted with nuclear weapons, because it is perfectly capable of transferring nuclear know-how to fellow Muslim countries out of Islamic solidarity or to others for money.”

  On the issue of attack on Al-Jazeera in Afghanistan by the US bombs, Nizamuddin Siddiqui (“Western media and the Afghan War,” Dawn, 14 November 2002) wonders, “whether or not the western media considers the Middle Eastern media an integral part of the world press. They should have viewed the bombing of Al-Jazeera's offices as an attack on all media, regardless of nationalities, cultures and religions.”

  Over the execution of Aimal Kasi, Daily Times in an interesting editorial (“Aimal Kasi’s end”, 16 November 2002) commented, “Why wasn’t he taken to a court in Pakistan? Why was he allowed to be captured through a commando attack on a hotel in Dera Ghazi Khan, allegedly assisted by Pakistani commandos? ... On ground, however, there are facts that cannot be ignored. The courts had become scared of trying a certain category of criminals by 1997. The judges of the Lahore High Court avoided hearing the case of Riaz Basra, the leader of the dreaded Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. One Lahore High Court judge was actually murdered by a religious fanatic and several judges of the lower courts had been done to death in Sindh. The state had proved incapable of protecting the judiciary in blasphemy cases where innocent citizens had been framed by religious organisations. No judge could have heard the Kasi case fairly.”

  The withdrawal of the Indian troops from the border and the controversy over Vajpayee’s visit to Islamabad for the SAARC summit was the main concern of the Pakistani press vis-à-vis India.

  Why did India withdrew its forces from the border? Rejecting the thesis that India did so under American pressure, Muhammad Ali Siddiqi, wrote in The News (“End of stand-off: A balance sheet” 11 November 2002), “The real reason was there was no guarantee of an Indian victory... Ultimately, it was Pakistan's conventional defence set-up that discouraged an Indian military adventure…By looking straight into the Indian eyes along the border for ten months - at an enemy at least five times its size - Islamabad has called New Delhi's bluff. Indeed, by not carrying out its promised "decisive fight", by pulling back from the brink, and by stopping short of an attack on Pakistan, New Delhi has conceded military parity with Islamabad in conventional arms. This is Pakistan's major and indisputable gain. India has gained nothing.”

  Commenting on Vajpayee’s visit to Islamabad for the SAARC summit, Daily Times, in its editorial (Mr Vajpayee’s internal problems,” 13 November 2002) has observed, “The truth of the matter is that Mr Vajpayee has problems internal to the Bharitya Janata Party (BJP) politics. He is no longer the statesman everyone thought he was. In fact his early “wisdom” has made his more stringent Hindu partners wary of him lest he make concessions that would violate the Hindutva pledge. The party is coming under the growing influence of his hawkish appointed successor, L.K. Advani, who didn’t like the recall of Indian troops from the border with Pakistan and thinks that no normalisation with Pakistan be attempted till all “cross-border terrorism” has stopped. The Advani factor is not the only element that is undermining the power of the prime minister in New Delhi. There is a power struggle going on between the parliamentary wing of the BJP and the Sangh Parivar, including the hardline Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), and the more extremist Bajrang Dal and Swadeshi Jagran Manch.”