Apprehension, concern and trepidation are some of the words used to comment on the elections in Pakistan – before they took place and after the results were announced.  The unease continues, as observed in this analysis of the issue as reported in the international media.

  In his article, “Musharraf’s embrace of democracy doubted” (Washington Post, 6 October 2002), John Lancaster cites one of the contestants, Raja Zafar ul-Haq, stating that he was skeptical of President Musharraf’s claims that the elections will help pave the way for restoration of “real democracy”; the electricity failed mysteriously thrice last month just as he was to address campaign rallies.

  The Washington Post (“Pakistani Leader Urged Back to Barracks after Vote,” 6 October 2002) also quotes the International Crisis Group’s observation, “It is in the international communities interest to encourage the military to withdraw to the barracks and restore democracy.” The report added that Musharraf intended to withdraw after the elections and empower the Prime Minster to govern the country and be fully in charge. However, Musharraf’s behaviour in the run up to the elections has left analysts, commentators and ordinary Pakistanis to expect a weak Parliament, which would be forced to compromise with the General.  The Pakistan Muslim League–Quaid-e-Azam (PML-QA), one of the largest political parties contesting the elections, is widely perceived as a tool used by the Military to dilute the power of parties opposing Musharraf.

  On the election, John Lancaster notes (“Religious parties gain muted Pakistani vote,” The Washington Post 11 October 2002), that the Pakistanis who voted hailed President Musharraf for ushering in a new democratic era.  However, the surprise in the elections was the strong performance by the hardline religious parties opposed to Pakistan’s role in the US led war on terrorism. President Musharraf’s coalition with the US led war against terrorism received a severe blow as The United Action Forum, a coalition of hardline religious parties, captured a clear majority of seats in the Legislative Assembly of Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province (NWFP).  John Lancaster attributes this victory of The United Action Forum to the tide of public anger over American anti-terrorist operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan (“Islamic parties gains may be West’s loss in Pakistan vote,” Washington Post 12 October 2002). 

  Commenting on the concerns raised by analysts on this issue, David Rhode writes (“Muslim Parties’ Election Strength Weakens Musharraf,” The New York Times 12 October 2002), “(the) results in Pakistan's first nationwide voting in seven years have left the country's military ruler, Gen Pervez Musharraf, in a weakened political position to crack down on Islamic militancy along the Afghan border.’’ On similar lines, David Blair feels that the operation to track down Osama bin Laden and the al-Queda terrorists is under threat due to the victory of the MMA –a coalition of six religious parties that swept their way to power in NWFP and Baluchistan (“Islamist Success in Pakistan polls hinders US hunt for al-Queda,” Telegraph 13 October 2002). 

  David Blair further observes, “It is widely feared that the result of Thursday's Pakistani elections will create a safe hiding place for terrorists fleeing Afghanistan,” and adds, “the European Union criticized the elections as “seriously flawed”, complaining that authorities had helped parties which backed President Pervez Musharraf. The Pakistan's Peoples Party and the Muslim League have both already denounced the elections as rigged.” Also commenting on the outcome of the elections, especially the religious parties gaining control of the tribal belt, was the British office spokesman: “even before the elections Gen. Musharraf exerted minimal control over the seven tribal areas between the border provinces and Afghanistan. With the MMA in power in those provinces and playing a key role nationally as the third largest party in a hung Parliament, he will have even less.”

  In The New York Times (“Pakistan's Elite Show Anti-Americanism in Elections” 13 October 2002), David Rhode flags another concern: anti-American sentiments. Though anti-American sentiments have deep roots in Pakistan, there was no great cause for concern as Pakistan's wealthy elite and urban middle class would never support the country's Islamic religious parties. However, he adds that, “the widespread belief in conspiracy theories here stemmed from an education system that teaches rote learning, not critical thinking.” 

  Notwithstanding the various concerns raised over the religious parties coming into decision-making positions, the actions of the parties themselves need some thought; “days after sweeping their way to power, the leader of the radical Islamic group, Maulana Fazal-ur Rehman, leader of a six-party alliance of hard-line Islamic groups called the United Action Forum… insisted Washington must soften its attitude toward Pakistan's Islamic parties,” (“Pakistan Cleric Calls for US Ties” The New York Times, 15 October 2002). 

  The early return of a democratically elected government taking office has received a severe jolt with none of the parties getting the required seats to form the government. To apply salt to the wound, “religious parties that won only four seats in the last election in 1997 won at least 49…. A group dismissed as a marginal political force a few days ago will now be the third-largest voting block in Parliament.”