The 12 October 2002 bomb blasts in Bali have given a new twist to the ongoing War on Terrorism. In what is probably the worst terrorist attack in the region, the attack claimed more than 183 lives, mostly foreign tourists. The bombings strengthened apprehensions that Southeast Asia was becoming the new epicenter of terror. 

  Jemaah Islamiah (JI), a radical Islamic group linked to Al Qaeda is suspected to have masterminded the attack, which was executed in the same manner as other Al Qaeda attacks. Some pointers in this regard are embodied in the 3Ts:

• Training – The attackers carried out the bombings simultaneously, a tactic usually implemented by the Al Qaeda with the aim of creating panic and confusion.

• Timing – The blasts took place exactly two years after the terrorist attack on the USS Cole that killed 17 sailors and wounded 39 others in the Gulf of Aden. This meticulous calculation of timing highlights the Al Qaeda policy of attacking to commemorate a previous attack.

• Target – The targets selected by the attackers had the two main criteria that Al Qaeda looks for. It was a densely populated place enabling the attackers to maximize the death toll. Besides, the target was a revenue generation source and an economic target. Sari Club, which caters to international visitors, is a part of Indonesia’s third largest income generating industry - Tourism.  

  These similarities portend a looming threat of rising Islamic fundamentalism and militancy in the region, especially after the removal of the Taliban in Afghanistan. The disbanded jehadis were seeking a sanctuary to regroup and start operations; they have found a safe haven in Southeast Asia, which has many Muslim dominated countries.

  Southeast Asia’s Muslim population is only next to the Middle East. It has Indonesia, which is the world’s most populous Muslim-majority country, apart from the Muslim states of Malaysia and Brunei. Singapore, Thailand and Philippines also have a substantial Muslim minority population. This demographic distribution provides a fertile breeding ground for jehadi sentiments. Unstable and autocratic regimes coupled with volatile economies heightens his threat. A stark example is the state of affairs in Indonesia, which is considered a potential Afghanistan. The country’s economy is in a deplorable state. Despite three reschedulings of its debt since the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Indonesia spent 40 percent of its budget this year on debt servicing. 

  Militant outfits like Jemaah Islamiah (JI), Abu Sayyaf, Lashkar Jihad and the Kumpulan Mujahideen Malaysia (KMM) are capitalizing on Southeast Asian intrastate instability and interstate non-cooperation. Emboldened by the porosity of borders and absence of cooperation between states, the region facilitates free movement of peoples, money and arms across borders. Since most of these countries do not have a cogent legislation to fight money-laundering and arms smuggling, which form the lifeline of terrorist organizations, jehadi outfits find this useful to make the region their new theatre of action.  

  The biggest problem that law enforcers face is to distinguish between genuine Islamic revivalist movements which seek the spiritual and cultural revival of Islam, and Jehadi outfits. An example of the former is the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Indonesia’s and the world’s largest Islamic organization having a following of thirty million people. Though a conservative Muslim party, it promotes tolerance towards other faiths, and multiculturalism. Crackdown on such organizations would prove counter productive as many of these organizations oppose self styled radical militant outfits like the Al Qaeda and the Taliban. However, they would fail the American acid test of “either with us or against us,” as they are equally vocal in their opposition to the US policy towards Islamic countries like Afghanistan and those in the Middle East. Unites States, in it’s over-enthusiasm to cleanse the world of the “baddies,” should not create new enemies among these moderate Islamists by persecuting them. 

  The silver lining is that most of these countries are still under the firm control of secular parties or moderate Islamic parties. Radical Islam has not gained firm control over the region. This was decisively proved in Indonesia, which saw radical Islamic parties, propagating the establishment of an Islamic state, winning only 16 percent votes in the 1999 elections, compared to more than 40 percent in the 1955 elections, showing a marked tendency towards liberalization and secularization of the society.  Hence, excessive use of military means in the region will not serve any useful purpose in the long run. What is required is socio-economic and political accommodation of the aspirations of the various groups and multilateral cooperation, as transnational threat can only be combated by transnational mechanisms.