An analysis of terrorist attacks in J&K in recent months reveals the following pattern:

• They have the initiative and the element of surprise being totally unencumbered by considerations like time, place, conscience or humanity. Killing civilians or security men brings equal fame/notoriety.

•  They are bold and courageous, being doubly fortified by money while alive and assured of a place in heaven in case they are killed. 

•  They are free to choose their targets and the ground, including the escape routes.

•  The security forces – all footsloggers – cannot possibly guess their objectives or escape routes, being unable to cover them in the mountains or block the escape routes.

•   Intelligence regarding them is always inadequate.

The Baluch insurgents similarly harassed the Pakistani Army from 1973 to 1977, even when the latter deployed four infantry divisions against them. The Baluch insurgents knew the terrain far better and could vanish into the gorges and mountains when chased. The Pakistani Army decided to use helicopters. Initially, they used Chinook helicopters, modifying them to mount a couple of machine guns. Chinook is a cousin of our own Cheetah on Chetak helicopters, i.e. basically used for transporting personnel or supplies. Our other helicopters, Mi17 and Mi35, are also not versatile-fighting machines. The Chinook proved ineffective and vulnerable. Then the Shah of Iran came to Pakistan’s rescue. He loaned them 30 Huey Cobra helicopters which is a formidable air platform mounting two heavy machine guns capable of firing 750 rounds per minute and two rocket pods. With this they could track insurgents anywhere immediately after an encounter had taken place and inflict heavy causalities. In addition, they used fighter-bombers if the concentration of guerrillas deserved that kind of punishment. Communications between the aircraft posed no problems. They also used heavy calibre artillery. The Baluch suffered heavily and sued for peace. The innovativeness had paid off.

For some incomprehensible reason, our operational staff and commanders have fought shy of using airpowers in counter insurgency operations, the only weapon for which the jehadis have no answer. One reason could be that we have no Huey Cobras. But we could buy them. If the Americans do not sell them to us, we could buy them on wet lease from other countries such as Israel or whoever else has them. If even that is not feasible, we could buy/lease their equivalents from Russia. But, they are a must.

Next come the use of our fighter bombers. There is no reason why we cannot use them. The IAF’s usual inclination is to fight Second World War type air battles for air supremacy, which is not likely to happen in future. They could be ordered to do their bit.

Finally, the artillery. It, along with the Air OP helicopters, could well engage the guerrillas. Even the Sri Lankan Army does so with élan and gusto.

There is no gainsaying the fact that the only way India can win in J&K is by unshackling its hidebound mindset and do some creative thinking and fighting. The fact that we would be doing so in our own country should preclude the apprehension of any international opprobrium. It is felt that with such innovations, the proxy war in J&K can be brought to a victorious end.

For effective use and quick response, these combat helicopters should be part of the Army Aviation Corps, which has demonstrated its skill and ability in Sri Lanka, Siachen and Kargil.