The continuing insurgency in northeast India suggests the failure of the counter-insurgency strategy in place over the years. Considering the threats to human, economic and national security that it poses, a re-examination of this strategy, the presumptions underlying it, their shortcomings, and the formulation of an alternative counter-insurgency plan acquires importance. 

  Counter-insurgency in India has largely been synonymous with army deployment. Army Headquarters is known to have a counter-insurgency bureau to draw up strategies to bring an end to insurgency. Civil and military intelligence agencies are placed in over-drive. The Police take the back seat in fighting insurgents. Their role is limited to keeping the arrested under-trials in custody, after the army or paramilitary forces have done with their ‘arrests.’ The Judiciary is unquestioningly taken to be just, although no authority exists to probe the integrity and accountability of the Judges. Whatever local support is enjoyed by insurgents is sought to be diminished by rough treatment of the civilian population in areas of militant activity by conducting combing operations; the message is, “keep away from insurgents or suffer the consequences.” Often, civilian support to insurgent groups is taken as a given, resulting in their widespread repression. Insurgency is considered a hindrance to development, to be dealt with severely. This is based on the premise that development will arrest insurgency, which is a late realization that lack of development is at the root of it all. 

  Surrenders are encouraged, and surrendered militants are often promised benefits that are later found hard to fulfil. Patronage to insurgents by local political figures is often established, but never seriously sought to be undone. Allegations of human rights violations by the army are rampant, but hardly any convictions occur. Worst of all, the brutality of insurgent violence is often used to justify excesses committed by the security forces. Lastly, a posting in insurgency affected areas is considered a punishment, and the general attitude of officials here is of utter disdain or excessive paternalism, (both are invariably resented by the locals) and never quite one of facing a challenge, requiring service or in-house dedication.

  Deploying the military, trained to fight enemy hostility, to deal with civilian populations is bound to have, and has had, disastrous consequences. However, this is still resorted to with impunity. Therefore, the rationale, if any, behind this dispensation needs proper analysis. Is it an admission of the wretched state of the police forces, and their incapability to ensure law and order, which is their raison d’etre? Is insurgency much more than a law and order problem, having wider political and security implications, to handle which the police forces are incapable? Or, is it a combination of both factors?  What have the concerned state governments and central ministries done to improve the capability of the police forces? If insurgency has wider political and security implications, what are the initiatives taken to deal with them? Are the political and security initiatives in place adequate to address the problem? If military deployment was inevitable, are there any arrangements to train the deployed units in terms of attitudinal re-orientation, respect and observance of human rights, cognition of civilian and ethnic sensibilities? These are pertinent questions that have to be answered positively to effectively counter the menace of insurgency which is caused by alienation, political, developmental, ethnic, religio-cultural, economic and geographical, and combinations thereof.

  Some analysts have concluded that most insurgent organizations in the northeast are nothing more than illegal money making enterprises. While one could find some truth in this, it is also true that insurgency serves this very purpose for corrupt government officials. In states like Manipur, one can safely assert that corruption is the main hindrance to effective counter-insurgency operations. An arrested insurgent can become a petty thief in the police records if the inspector in charge receives sufficient “Cha thaknaba” (a local term for bribe, which literally means ‘for the purpose of having tea’). The Judicial system is in such a wretched state that lawyers no longer argue the merits of a case but evolve conduits for  reaching bribes to Magistrates, and are rated in terms of their personal rapport with concerned Magistrates, and their ability to favorably influence judgments through bribes. A terrible spin-off of this messy police and judicial system is that unscrupulous police officers can arrest innocent and ignorant civilians on charges of insurgency to extract bribes. A young man once subjected to this injustice almost always proves to be a ready recruit for insurgent organizations.