The continuing brinkmanship of India and Pakistan reflects the incessant need to raise the ante to gain advantage in their bilateral nuclear and missile competition. India contends an unpredictable Pakistan needs to repeatedly test its Chinese supplied M-9 missiles, codenamed Hatf 4 or Shaheen I. The latter is solid-fuelled, and has a range of 750 km, with a ton payload; the missile tests in May 2002 and the recent test validates Pakistan’s claims of maintaining a high missile alert. The Hatf 4 or Shaheen I and Hatf 7 (Shaheen II) are IRBM range category of missiles, with ranges of 2500 km, with a 1-ton payload, but are essentially mobile solid-fuelled missiles with a quick fire capability. They can be launched from a transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) similar to the ex-Soviet MAZ-547V, used to transport the Soviet SS-20s.

  Pakistan’s operational readiness to deploy two categories of solid-fuelled missiles, namely the 750 Km Shaheen I MRBM and the 2500 Km Shaheen II IRBM in mobile formations reflects the quick reaction capability of its nuclear arsenal. A fully operational battery of MRBMs and IRBMs in readiness to fire sends a powerful message of escalation potential that would enable Pakistan to cross the nuclear and missile Rubicon to strikes on India.

  India’s nuclear force-in-being and its ability to reach higher levels of readiness is not in doubt; but Pakistan’s unpredictable strategic behaviour necessitates a limited missile defense capability, that should be able to neutralise surprise attacks. Despite Pakistan’s claims of restraint, its intent to fire demonstration shots would have all potent escalatory effects into a spiraling round of attacks. India’s recent test-firing of its Akash missile reflects the latent anti-missile capability of the system. Though its intercept performance against a ballistic missile is yet to be proven, the technological potential and the possible improvements to the system by collaborative ventures with either Russia or Israel is there. The recent Indian decision to acquire the Arrow anti-missile system reflects the need for India to bolster its defenses against a possible Pakistani nuclear missile attack, considering Pakistan’s frequent resort to missile rattling in crisis situations. However, the sale by Israel would be subject to US approval, since its components are being supplied by the US. Israel offers the optimal technological solutions to suit the Indian requirements of a missile shield. Earlier acquisitions of the Green Pine radar, and the Aerostat long-range radar to bolster the air defences along the border have been quite viable. The proposed acquisition of the Phalcon radar for India’s AWACS was in the cards.

  An Indian Limited Missile Defense Initiative keeping in view Pakistani missile capabilities would have the following consequences:

a) It would heighten the Pakistani resolve to increase its operational Shaheen I and Shaheen II missiles with larger acquisitions and enhance indigenous production in its Chinese built factories. The intent would be to foil any missile defense shield that India might deploy.

b) The Chinese response to an Indian Missile Defense Initiative would be the tripling or even quadrupling of its deployed missiles against India. It would further encourage by overt transfer of its earlier supplied MRBMs and IRBMs to Pakistan. It would give the impetus to  deploying new variants in the DF-21/21 A categories. 

c) India’s efforts to maintain a minimal deterrent and limited missile defense capability would get complicated as the Chinese would enhance their targeting capability against India’s counterforce and countervalue nuclear forces through the proposed MIRV/MRV capabilities that it is now developing for its DF-31s and DF-41 ICBMs.

d) India would have to accelerate its integrated air-defense network with the Akash-Trishul systems being networked into the air defense system along with Israeli-supplied Aerostat air defense radars, along with the Green Pine radars installed on Indian aerial early warning aircraft. Its other tiers would comprise a network of the Russian SA-300 system and/or the Israeli Arrow deployed in substantial numbers, say 150-200 batteries, providing limited missile intercept capabilities against high value targets. 

  The quest for an Indian omni-directional air and missile defense capability would be consistent with India’s minimal deterrent posture. But in the offense-defense mix, India’s priorities would have to would lie between a robust minimal nuclear deterrent built around its manned aircraft and a land based missile force that would have the certitude of assured retaliation, along with a conventional force posture that would dissuade Pakistan to escalate. 

  India’s options for a missile defense would be limited given its crucial priorities for an optimal and robust conventional posture along with the challenges of an emergent nuclear and missile force. The dilemmas would thus persist between India’s emphasis for its nuclear tipped missile force buildup as the primary objective with ideas of a missile defense capability to neutralize Pakistani missile intimidation.