The website “globalsecurity.org” informs us that the Indian Air Force possessed 55 MiG-21 MF/PFMA, 66 MiG-21FL/U and 165 MiG-21 bis/U fighter/ ground attack aircraft in 2002. They were down to these numbers from 69, 66 and 170 respectively in 2000, revealing the attrition in the MiG-21 inventories of the IAF. It also possesses MiG-29/UB, MiG 27, MiG-23 BN/ UM and MiG-23 MF/UM squadrons, but they are not in the news. Only the MiG-21 series are currently the subject of critical attention and have earned the unfortunate sobriquet of “flying coffins” in the press. Incidentally, the MiG-21 deal was negotiated with the erstwhile Soviet Union in 1962 and the first deliveries of this frontline aircraft were effected in 1964. The IAF’s first preference then was the US Lockheed F-104; its accident rate was so high that the NATO air forces called them “flying coffins” and “widow makers.” The MiG-21 series has now, ironically enough, earned this dubious distinction. 

  Is this fair? Part of the problem is statistical. Of the 690 fighter/ ground attack aircraft with the IAF in 2002, relying again on “globalsecurity.org figures,” 286 were of the MiG-21 series; so a larger number of flying accidents with these aircraft could be expected. Eight of the seventeen accidents that have occurred up to 9 September 2002 involved MiG-21 variants, and they suffered thirty-eight accidents in the period May 1999 to September 2002. So there is a problem which cannot be exaggerated but cannot be wished away either, especially with allegations by Russia’s weapons export organization that sub-standard spares are being purchased by India. 

  Before analyzing this accusation, the general causes of aircraft accidents in the IAF can be reviewed. They fall into four categories: human error, maintenance problems, bird hits and miscellaneous. Human error and maintenance failures together cause some 85-90 percent of flying accidents in roughly equal proportions. Bird hits account for between 10-15 percent, with the remaining accidents being caused by sundry reasons. High performance aircraft are unforgiving; hence an error committed by the pilot could be his last one. The knee-jerk reaction of media persons has been to blame on India’s lack of advanced jet trainers to provide an intermediate training stage between basic trainers and advanced jet aircraft. This proposal has been hanging fire for almost two decades, but its high cost – around Rs 6000 crores (US$ 1.25 billion) for some 60-odd Hawk AJTs – has been the main obstacle to its purchase. 

  I am skeptical whether training IAF pilots on AJTs will bring down the accident rate in any significant manner, since human error accidents account for only 35-40 percent of the total number of accidents. A cheaper option would be more intensive training on simulators and type trainers. Admittedly, this is an arguable proposition and there are two sides to it. China, incidentally, uses the MiG-21 U, a two-seater variant, as its trainer, and has supplied a modified version to Pakistan for training purposes. This trainer costs around Rs 6 crores (US$ 1.25 million) as compared to Rs. 100 crores (US $ 21 million) for the Hawk. India gave up this cheaper option in favour of the elusive Light Combat Aircraft that has been around the corner for the last decade. 

  What is unarguable, however, is the mechanical problems that the MiG-21 series suffer from; indeed, the suspected cause of the most recent accidents has been identified to be “engine flameout and failure to reignite.” Since the MiG-21 is a single-engine aircraft there is nothing the pilot can do in this situation but to eject. Some part of the blame must also attach to the narrow intake of the MiG-21 engines, which makes it particularly vulnerable to bird hits. 

  Besides, the R-25 engine that powers the latest MiG-21 Type 75 and MiG-21 Type 93 versions of these aircraft has been indicted for being accident-prone. This is a serious question, because there seems to be no problem with the R-25 engine equipping MiG aircraft elsewhere in the world. Why, then, is this problem peculiar to the R-25 engines being manufactured by HAL in India? So the problem does not relate to inadequacies in the design of the R-25 engine. Is the problem to do with the manufacturing process? Or associated with integration of the engine and systems with the MiG-21 airframe? Laying the blame on sub-standard spares is easy to make since the MiG-21 manufacturing line has closed down, and its spares and ancillaries have to be sourced from original manufacturers in the Republics of the former Soviet Union. Strict quality control before their purchase by either HAL or the IAF is obviously of the essence, but the possibility of greater indigenous manufacture under license must also be seriously examined.