Many questions need being raised over the concept of a limited war, which has been advocated in India since the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in 1998 and the Kargil War in 1999. 

  First, the concept of limited war gained ascendancy in the West in the late 1950s, with the US and former Soviet Union acquiring enough weapons of mass destruction (WMD) under their safe possession. The command and control structure for them was complete and both parties were reasonably assured that they would not be used. Thus the idea of limited war was advocated when deterrence was established between them. In the Indo-Pak context, an important question is how credible are their command and control structure of nuclear weapons. Are the security and military strategists in India and Pakistan aware of each other’s nuclear capabilities? 

  Secondly, limited war was advocated when both super powers knew that an unlimited war would be disastrous for both countries in social, economic and political terms. In the Indo-Pak context, an unlimited conventional war would be equally disastrous for both countries, especially for Pakistan. Even a limited war would be politically ruinous and militarily demoralizing to Pakistan, as happened after Kargil War. To a large extent, it was the Kargil War that led to the military coup. The Pakistani military, by distancing itself from the Sharif-Clinton agreement and blaming Sharif solely for the Kargil debacle, was able to maintain its morale. Given past experiences of Indo-Pak wars, the Pakistan Army is aware that any military defeat at the hands of India in a conventional war would affect its political career. Since both a limited war and a conventional war would not be in the interest of Pakistan, especially it’s Army, why would it wish to keep the war limited, even if India chooses to?

  Thirdly, in most cases of limited war that the US has fought, there were clear political objectives which had the unanimous support of its people. Military maneuvers in a limited war are not the ends but only the means to achieve limited political objectives. In the Indo-Pak context, what could be the political objectives of a limited war with Pakistan? Winning back Pakistan occupied Kashmir? Restraining Pakistan from abetting cross-border terrorism? Forcing Pakistan to hand over the terrorists and criminals that India has been demanding? Asking Pakistan not to involve in the affairs of Kashmir? 

  It should be kept in mind that in a limited war the political objectives of the party initiating the conflict should be not wholly unacceptable to the other side, otherwise, why should it keep the war limited? While losing PoK to India is wholly unacceptable to Pakistan, it could assure that it would control militant operations in its territory. Yet, it may continue encouraging cross-border terrorism as in the past; in that case, what would India gain by initiating a limited war?

  Besides, it is believed in India that once a limited war starts there would be international pressure on both sides to conclude an agreement. The main reason for India to initiate a limited war would be to end cross-border terrorism and there is widespread support for India’s position on this issue, especially in the post September 11 period. It is therefore believed that international pressure on Pakistan would benefit India. But it is doubtful that in future, especially after bin Laden is captured or Al Qaeda destroyed, the same level of international support favoring India would continue. In that case, the pressure would be greater on India than on Pakistan to conclude the war. It is also doubtful whether there would be unanimous support for such an offensive policy at national level. How much pressure can India therefore apply on Pakistan in a limited war scenario, if it finds itself under pressure?

  Fourthly, presuming that India launches a war with limited political and military objectives, what happens if it is not able to achieve its political objectives through its military and diplomatic offensive in a limited period? If there is no support for India’s position at the international level, then, would India keep its military engaged for a longer period till its political objectives are achieved? In that case would it be possible for India to remain militarily engaged without escalating the conflict?

  Fifthly, most calculations on limited war are based on the premise that there are only two actors involved – India and Pakistan, thus ignoring a vital third factor – the non-state actors. What if, during the limited war, there is a major attack by terrorists on an institution or an individual of vital political and military significance to India? With India having suffered fidayeen on the Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly in Srinagar and on the Parliament in New Delhi, another such attack is possible. In that case, would India, after initiating a limited war be able to keep it limited?

  Finally, what if Pakistan decides to escalate the conflict to a higher level after it realizes that keeping the war limited is not in its interests? After all, why should Pakistan keep the war limited, if it is not going in its favour!