The talk on the Maoist insurgency in Nepal was held on 9 August 2002. The speaker began by giving a historical account of the Himalayan kingdom, which has been quite distinct in terms of not having come under colonial rule, bestowed with a unique topography (land locked country) and a history of political upsurge against the governing elites from 1960-1990, when political activities were banned. The Insurgency, which began on 13 May 1996, has presently engulfed the interior regions of Nepal with the key players, i.e. the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA), the Monarchy and the Maoist insurgents having drawn up their respective battle lines. 

Royal Nepalese Army  

     It is not under civilian rule, and is primarily concerned with defending the monarch.

• It does not have any operational role in Nepal, but has excelled abroad, especially in the UN peace keeping operations. However, it has been loathe to fight the Maoists on the home front. 

• They have contempt for the political class and a general dislike for getting involved in conflict, and were drawn into it only when directly attacked by the Maoists.

• Given its composition on the basis of caste, the Royal Nepal Army lacks cohesiveness and regimentation, a must for an army. 

RNA strategy   

     The RNA has a strength of 53,000. Nepal has raised an Armed Police Force of 7,000 personnel, which is an interim force between the RNA and Police to tackle the Maoists. 80 percent of these forces are deployed in District Head Quarters. The RNA uses mortars, helicopters and artillery. Their performance is marked by an abysmal record of human rights violation. Their problems have been exacerbated by a lack of volunteers to join it and the reluctance of retirees to rejoin. They present an image of a demoralized force which lacks the vision to confront challenges. 

The Maoists  

     Their movement is completely indigenous, with their cadres belonging to various sections of society. Their operations are brilliantly conceived, with their leaders Baburam Bhattarai and Prachanda dealing with politico-economic agenda and operational strategy, respectively. 

• Their strength is estimated between 5,000 and 8,000 and their operations are distinguished by stealth, cunning and deception. 

• Very high morale built on political indoctrination and physical fitness. 

• They avoid armed conflicts in cities and restrict their action here to propaganda.

• Before 9/11, around 80 percent of the local population supported them, but this has started waning due to extortion and human rights violation.

• Most of the casualties sustained by them were after the imposition of the emergency.

• Women played a significant role in running the parallel governments of the Maoists before the emergency.

• They derive external support from outfits like LTTE, PWG, MCC and ULFA, which includes training and ideological orientation. 

Their demands  

• Establishment of an interim national government.

• Holding elections.

• Bringing the RNA under civilian control.

Prospects  

     The ruling Nepali congress party is divided into two factions (Deuba and Koirala). Prime Minister Deuba has already rejected the Maoists offer for talks. There are three possible scenarios:

• Maoists declare unilateral ceasefire and align with UML to fight the elections, which could result in their getting 2/3rds majority.

• Maoists boycott the elections.

• If elections are held, it could lead to large-scale violence resulting in a constitutional impasse.

     In the present situation, the king can break the impasse by bringing both the parties to the negotiating table, but he seems to be ambivalent and the election authorities are very doubtful about holding the elections.

Implications for India  

• There are 8-10 million Nepalese (2 million floating population) in India who play a vital role in the sustenance of the Maoist campaign by providing monetary support.

• The Maoist linkages with the Indian insurgent groups has exacerbated India’s security problem in the tribal belt, from the 24 Parganas to Arabian sea, which could result in the radicalisation of this area. 

• The role of ex-servicemen in training the Maoists and coming on the payrolls of the ISI could aggravate the present crisis.

• There are apprehensions about the Gurkhas recruited in the Indian army resorting to subversive activities. This is perceived as a long-term threat, given the fact that these Gorkhas, the Maoists and the soldiers of the RNA belong to the same social groups.

• Any major military offensive could have a spill over effect, triggering a large-scale movement of population across the border. 

Discussions

In the discussions, the following issues were raised:

• Indian foreign policy has been partial towards the monarchy in Nepal and it is to be seen if the present government can break this mould. Given India’s sensitivity to crossborder support terrorism, it should take note of the help provided by the Indian Nepalis to the Maoists.

• India must play a greater role in strengthening the RNA, as developments in Nepal have adverse implications for India, in the wake of the Maoist’s ties with the Indian insurgents.

• The Maoist movement is not a terrorist movement per se but a class/caste movement. Hence, instead of the militarily suppressing them, they should be brought into the political process.

• Their demand for an interim government is a tactical move to regroup themselves. It is in the interest of the Maoists not to derail the democratic process, as this would strengthen the monarchy.

• The US intervention in Nepal is being viewed as part of restricting the Chinese influence and acquiring a military presence in the region after 9/11.

• The main challenge to India is to keep foreign powers out. So, it is in India’s long-term interests to support democracy and provide aid for socio-economic development, rather than providing any military aid. 

• Apart from border surveillance and intelligence sharing, India must put pressure on both parties, i.e. the government and the Maoists, to hold peace talks and influence the King to play a constructive role.