September 11 and Pakistan
12 Sep, 2002 · 860
Suba Chandran evaluates post-September 11 developments in Pakistan
September 11 and the American War on Terrorism has affected the internal politics, external policies and the future of Pakistan. The post-September 11 events inside Pakistan have both short-term implications and long-term repercussions.
Internally, the military regime has strengthened its position. Musharraf is aware that the international community (read the US) prefers a stable and friendly government in Pakistan. American strategic interests in Pakistan have always been better served by a military regime. General Musharraf would not have held his referendum, making himself President for the next five years, without the indirect support of the US. There was no official criticism from the US, except in newspaper editorials.
The military regime has also changed the Parliamentary content of the Constitution, providing an institutional role for the military to guide Pakistan’s democracy. These legal measures make the Prime Minster a puppet and the Parliament subservient to the President. Besides, the National Security Council makes the elected representatives dummies, which has serious repercussions for the future of democracy in Pakistan.
Secondly, though the military regime has supported the US attack on Afghanistan, this has reduced Musharraf’s popularity. Led by the Pakistan-Afghanistan Defence Forum, and later the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), the religious parties spearheaded by the Jamaat-e-Islami and Jamiat-ul-Islam, has rallied popular support against the military regime. Besides, the steps taken by Musharraf under US pressure to curb the jihadi activities have made these groups hostile to the regime. Some jihadi organizations were banned; their accounts frozen, and their leaders arrested. They have retaliated by launching attacks inside the country using rockets, explosives and bombs – both chemical and human. The threats from these groups would continue.
Thirdly, the War on Terrorism has increased anti-American and anti-West sentiments. A cursory look at the reports and opinion articles in the Urdu press and in English dailies reveals that the killing of Daniel Pearl, the Wall Street Journal reporter, and the suicide attacks are expressions of these resentments. Osama bin Laden is being glorified inside Pakistan (T-Shirts with Osama’s picture are still popular) for standing up against American imperialism. This feeling will continue, unless the US changes its policy towards Muslim countries, starting with Palestine. In future, one can expect more such attacks on citizens from Western countries and Christians in Pakistan. Attacks on the minority communities had occurred in the past, but after September 11, the Christian community has become the main target.
A direct fallout of Pakistan’s support to the War on Terrorism has been the internal re-organization of the Pakistani Army in October last year. Generals who supported the rightist agenda were removed from important posts, and moderates appointed. Lt Gen Mahmood, the Director General of the ISI who strongly supported the earlier Afghan policy, was removed. Moderate officers loyal to Musharraf, like Lt Gen Mohammad Aziz, was appointed Chairman of the JCSC; Lt Gen Ehsan-ul Haq as the Director General of the ISI; Lt Gen Shahid Aziz as the Chief of General Staff; and Gen Mohammad Yousuf as Vice Chief of the Army Staff.
On the economic front, Pakistan’s assistance to the War on Terrorism has increased its aid inflow. In December last year, the IMF agreed to $ 1.3 billion for a Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF); the Paris Club agreed for a $12.5 billion for debt rescheduling; the Asian Development Bank agreed for a $ 1 billion loan for civil reforms, and later in the same month approved two more loans for a total of $ 386 million for a Justice Programme and Reproductive Health Care Project. During February this year, US President George Bush announced an economic package of $ 1 billion for debt relief; $ 100 million for education and $ 142 million for market access. However, it should be underlined that only foreign aid has increased, not foreign direct investment in Pakistan. FDI for the year 2001 was $ 322 millions, which is expected to increase to $ 470 to $ 500 millions. However, it is unlikely that FDI would even reach the level of the previous year. Thus, the aid from outside would only benefit Pakistan in short term.
On the external front, Pakistan’s foreign policy has undergone a dramatic change. Its traditional Afghan policy has been changed to suit American interests. This shift has also affected its security in terms of its losing “strategic depth”, and this would increase Pakistan’s emphasis on Kashmir. One can therefore expect increased tension between India and Pakistan over Kashmir.