Chairperson’s Introductory Remarks

     All elections are important, but elections to the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly are especially important at the present juncture. Why? 9/11 has undoubtedly altered the political geography of the region in a radical fashion. The international community, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, has supported the US led coalition’s war against terrorism, but there is no doubt about its long-term commitment to eradicating international terrorism.

     Pakistan is a reluctant ally of the United States in its global war against terrorism. This required a sea-change in its policy towards the Taliban and al-Qaeda extremists, from supporting to opposing them, and now hunting them down. Naturally, it cannot proceed against these extremists in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but support their depredations in Kashmir. There is a logical inconsistency in this modality, which has not escaped the international community. But preventing the jihadis from continuing with their cross border terrorism risks alienating the many Islamic and extremist organizations that were created, in the first place, by the ISI, and then used by the Pak Army over the last decade and more.

     In this milieu, the elections in J&K assume unusual significance. The Valley Muslims are almost wholly alienated from both New Delhi and Srinagar. For India, a relatively peaceful electoral process will confer legitimacy for its democratic and secular polity, which is currently under considerable strain. For exactly the opposite reasons, it has become important for Pakistan to disrupt these elections using cross-border terrorism as the modus and the jihadis as the instruments of its perverse policy. Will the elections be held peacefully and credibly?

KASHMIRI PERSPECTIVE

Suba Chandran, Research officer, IPCS

     Based on the field study conducted in Kashmir, he made four submissions followed by four suggestions.

     The first submission was that the majority in Kashmir Valley will not participate in the forthcoming elections. Based on an informal survey conducted in the Valley he was of the opinion that 80 percent of the people would not participate in the elections for two reasons – bad governance and the fear of rigging by the ruling National Conference.

     The Hurriyat will not participate in the elections, despite pressure for the following reasons. First, the fear of losing whatever support it enjoys in the Valley. Secondly, the Hurriyat’s support base in the last few years has shrunk, has little organized support at the grass roots level. Thirdly, Hurriyat lacks charismatic leadership. Two of its leaders – Syed Geelani and Yaseen Malik are in jail and its most popular leader – Abdul Ghani Lone was assassinated recently. According to a survey conducted by The Week, Shabir Shah seems to enjoy greater popularity than any other Hurriyat leader. Finally, the threat from across the border would prevent them from participating in the elections.

     The National Conference would win the forthcoming elections and would form the next government. Despite the criticism against it, the NC is the only party that has an organized presence at the grass-roots level in all three divisions of the state -Jammu, the Valley and Leh..

     Finally, opposition to the NC inside the Valley is not organized. The Hurriyat and other leaders such as Shabir Shah have announced that they would not participate in the elections. Parties like the BJP, Congress and PDP will not have any major impact on the forthcoming elections.

     He had four suggestions to make the elections credible, free and fair. First, to postpone the elections and start a dialogue aimed at both the parties and the people. Second, and third suggestions were to conduct elections under Governor’s rule and invite national and international observers, since 40 percent of those who would not want to participate in the elections would do so under Governor’s rule and with international observers. These measures would increase the credibility of the elections in the eyes of the people. His final suggestion was not to force the people to vote. What is essential is to increase the credibility of the elections and not increase the voting percentages.

MILITANTS’ STRATEGY

Ajai Sahni, Director, Institute of Conflict Management

     His opening remark was that there is nothing like a militants’ strategy and it is Pakistan’s strategy that really dictates their moves. He disagreed with the view that the forthcoming elections are a contest for credibility between India and Pakistan, and contended that their outcome on the overall situation in the Valley and international perceptions of Indian credibility would be minimal.

     He pointed out that the following would be the Pakistani strategy:

• It will seek to create widespread disruption to discredit the electoral exercise. This might be achieved by ensuring low participation by threats and disrupting the elections with violence. Any attempt by India to counter this disruption would be criticized as using force to conduct a farcical election.

• There will be targeting and killing of leaders, especially of the National Conference Party, and intimidation of the others.

• The militants will target soft civilian targets and resort to mine waste and other explosives in view of the large scale military presence.

     The panelist also pointed out that the war in J&K is not against the militants but against Pakistan. He also commented that the democratic process in the country has been allowed to be taken over by the militants in view of the importance attached to their participation in the polls.

     The following summarize his other observations:

• The Center’s job is to ensure that the elections are free from rigging and people willing to vote are given the security and opportunity to do so, not to set up alternative political parties or persuade people to participate in the elections. India will not lose out in the credibility debate as long as rigging is prevented. 

• The media and international observers in their individual and diplomatic capacities should be encouraged, but no official foreign observers should be entertained. This is to ensure transparency and let the world see who are for democracy, and who are for disruption of the democratic process. The international community will also come to know the circumstances under which the elections were held. 

• Information management, not propaganda, needs to be stepped up to gather favourable international opinion on the whole issue of J&K.

     Responding to participants’ queries on the desirability of having international mediation in J&K, the panelist cautioned that we need to look at the history of international mediation worldwide, before deciding to have it in J&K, most of them ended in mess ups.

PAKISTAN DIMENSION

Lt Gen H Kaul, Former VCOAS, Indian Army

     Lt General Kaul discussed the Pakistani Dimension in the forthcoming J & K Elections.

     Explaining why this factor still intrudes even after five decades of Independent India, General Kaul pointed out that this was the consequence of the actions and omissions committed by both the Central and State governments over the years. The unnatural birth of Pakistan, and the subsequent iniquitous path on which it was taken by its political leaders: under the pretence of creating a democratic process has moulded its current political reality.

     The twin aims of "inflicting a thousand cuts" on the Indian body politic; and using every opportunity to spread anti-India propaganda and misinformation that India is in illegal occupation of Jammu and Kashmir was always relevant to Pakistan. Recognising that Pakistani democracy is at best inchoate; and as shown by historical experience, directed by a coterie of the elite; even short spells of civilian rule were subject to the influence of the military.

     In this scenario, the main objective of Pakistan was to prevent a viable democratic process from emerging in Kashmir, as it will only strengthen similar demands in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, and thereby weaken its propaganda campaign in the region.

     Discussing the actions and intent of the Jehadis, Gen Kaul pointed out that, besides following the directives formulated in Islamabad, its own actions reveal vested interests. A successful election in Kashmir would only weaken their claims of liberating their oppressed brethren; thus the Indian government has to be prepared for the violence that will ensue.

     As an aside, Gen Kaul cautioned against surveys, assessments and oral interviews conducted by people not belonging to the state with Kashmiris. What is often revealed to a Kashmiri is usually not relayed to a non-Kashmiri. However, Gen Kaul conceded this was a generalisation stemming from his personal experience.

     The need of the hour was to continue the democratic process, and pursue a vigorous information campaign that is truthful and factual.

DISCUSSION

     The discussions were centred on seven issues. Some had been flagged by the panellists, while others were highlighted during the discussion. Additionally, significant comments were made to provide the background and suggest a reorientation of Kashmir policy.

International Observers

• Not permitting international observation shows a lack of confidence on India’s part.

• International observation required catering to the international audience, but also the domestic constituency in other parts of India, who are apprehensive about the elections in J&K.

• India should go a step further and also have Pakistani observers.

• Many Indians have been part of international observation teams in elections held in other countries, specifically in the region. A similar invitation extended to nationals of these countries to witness our elections would advance their credibility.

• J&K elections are a special case and international observers should be welcomed.

• International observation and NGOs will help project transparency in the elections; they should be encouraged.

• India does not require foreign observers to observe the elections, nor does it require their certification on the transparency and conduct of the elections.

Postponement of elections

• Postponement of elections is not possible and there is not much merit in suggesting this action.

• Postponing the elections would only send out wrong signals. A fifty-year old problem cannot be solved in the period for which the elections are postponed. The elections, by itself, will not usher in any great changes. 

• A dialogue process has been set in motion. For it to serve any purpose, a more comprehensive dialogue must be initiated with a wider spectrum of political leaders. This will not be possible within the limited time left before the elections. Postponing the elections, therefore, would result in a more inclusive dialogue process.

• The dates for the elections were finalized five years ago. If the government or Kashmiri representatives were serious about a dialogue, they should have commenced this process earlier, and not requested a postponement of the elections now.

• Elections and political dialogue are different means to address the Kashmir issue. Elections will not change the situation. Political dialogue will be relevant even after the elections. Postponing the elections only to accommodate political dialogue serves no purpose.

• Postponing the elections is not a wise strategy.

• Postponement can be pursued if an arrangement can be made with the Hurriyat to participate in the elections.

• Irrespective of the Hurriyat’s participation in the elections, the political game in the State will remain unaltered in the post-elections period. The argument for postponing the elections based on their participation is quite lame.

Elections under Governor’s rule

• There should be no link between Governor’s rule and the credibility of the elections. The elections process has a proven record of transparency. Positing credibility with Governor’s rule would set a wrong precedent.

Militancy

• What strategy do we have in the event of increased militancy?

• Recent figures reveal that 35 percent of the local population is involved in the militancy.

• The will of the people cannot be expressed under the shadow of the gun. This necessitates measures to control militancy before and during the elections.

• There will be a marked increase in violence during the elections.

• Militancy is bound to mar the elections in the Valley. However, the focus should be on the State as a whole and not just the Valley. This would yield significantly different results, considering that the polls in the rest of the State would be peaceful.

• Elections are bound to be marred by violence considering that the militants in the Valley are seasoned Afghan veterans. This has added a new dimension to militancy.

• Violence is likely to increase, particularly in October. This is because elections in Pakistan are scheduled for the same period. The tactical move of the militants would be to engage the Indian security forces, while relieving Pakistani forces along the border for their elections. 

Media and Information Campaign

• There is need for an active information campaign on the Kashmir issue, nationally and internationally. Even Indian nationals are unaware of its factual details. However, there needs to be a distinction between media propaganda and information campaign.

• Most of the suggestions that have been discussed are not doable within the limited timeframe available before the elections. What is possible is to indulge in a media blitz that supplements an active information campaign. Considering the inevitability of a foreign media presence in the State during the elections, the Government should facilitate their work by ensuring adequate logistic support for efficient reporting from the state. This could include improvement, at least temporarily, of facilitates relating to telecommunications, transport, internet, physical security and boarding for media correspondents.

• The West is waiting for India to provide them with a credible argument to reorient their policy towards Pakistan. An active information campaign would serve this purpose.

Alternate political options

• In Kashmir, an alternate political force cannot be propped up by the Centre. It has to emerge from within.

• According to the survey conducted by the IPCS, 40 percent expressed their desire to participate in the elections if some conditions were fulfilled. Hypothetically, if the elections were conducted under these conditions, what would the alternative to the National Conference be?

• Prominent leaders like Shabir Shah and Tarigami could form an alternative to the NC. Additionally there are a number of local people who are prominent and respected by the people. If these persons could be persuaded to contest as independents, they could provide an alternative to the NC.

• Some of the leaders who are prominent in the Valley, and are hopeful of providing an alternative to the NC, do not have a credible background; worse, some of them are known to be murderers.

Rigging

• India is not a dictatorship but a democracy, where rigging of elections should not be permitted.

• Rigging is easier said than done considering the number of people involved in the election process. Unless all of them want to rig and are involved, rigging is not possible. 

General Remarks

• 9/11 has made significant changes to the international response to terrorism.

• 9/11 has appreciated India’s concerns on terrorism. Conducting free and fair elections would only enhance its reputation.

• 9/11 has not changed Pakistan’s policy on Kashmir.

• There is need for a coherent Kashmir policy.

• Any new initiative that is drawn up must be people-centric and people-oriented.

• India is shy of tapping the pro-Indian constituency in Kashmir.

• In initiating a political dialogue, priority should be given to the militants, not the Hurriyat. The militants call the shots in the Valley, not the Hurriyat, which should be ignored. 

• Kashmiri women want an alternative to violence and there is a momentum building up for peace. This needs to be encouraged.

• Any policy on Kashmir needs to include the 400,000 Kashmiri pandits living outside the state.

• To increase peoples’ participation, the government should make voting easy – it should have more polling booths and locate them in more accessible areas. 

• Elections in J&K need to be viewed against the larger framework of Indo-Pak relations. Elections, per se, would have little significance for the Kashmiris or the region.