Beginning with the 1997 ceasefire, the peace process between the Government of India (GOI) and the National Socialist Council of Nagalim–Isak-Muivah faction (NSCN-IM) has witnessed several rounds of talks, consultations and extensions of the ceasefire agreement. On August 1, the peace process completed five years. The latest round of talks in Amsterdam, which concluded on 11 July 2002, promises a break from the past stalemate. The ceasefire has been extended by another year and the NSCN (IM) leadership has, for the first time since 1997, agreed to come to India for further talks. Further, the GOI has recognized the “unique history and situation” of the Naga people, a long standing demand of the NSCN (IM). However, there are many hurdles to be crossed before progress can be achieved in these talks.

     One prominent hurdle is the NSCN (IM) demand for a sovereign Naga state. The GOI has insisted that dialogue must be held within the parameters of the Indian Constitution. This posturing by the two sides can never be compromised. If the post-Amsterdam recognition by the GOI of the “unique history and situation” of the Nagas is interpreted to mean the Center’s acceptance of the historical sovereignty claims of the NSCN, the talks could progress. On the flip side, this could open the Pandora’s Box as the ‘uniqueness’ of the Nagas is common to almost all the major tribal communities in the northeast who could make similar demands.

     Second, there is a division within the Naga people. While the NSCN(IM) claims to represent the Nagas, this is contradicted by a press statement issued by its rival faction, the NSCN (Khaplang), on 27 June 2002, cautioning against using the term ‘Nagas’ in place of NSCN(IM) in references to talks between the Center and the NSCN(IM). In another press release dated 11 July 2002, the NSCN (K) went to the extent of declaring Th. Muivah a non-Naga, stating that Tangkhuls are not Naga citizens and had only ten years of association with the Nagas. The GPRN (the NSCN-K government) also stated that the GOI must talk to the Nagas to solve this political problem and not to a non-entity who does not even have Naga citizenship. It may be construed therefore that no comprehensive peace plan acceptable to all Nagas can ever be worked out dealing only with the NSCN (IM). The GOI must think twice before signing any peace deals with the NSCN (IM), to not find itself repeating the mistakes of the Shillong Accord.

     A third hurdle would be the NSCN (IM)’s demand for inclusion of its so-called Naga inhabited areas into a greater Nagalim. This would affect the territorial integrity of neighbouring states – Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh and Assam. Though, constitutionally, the redrawing of state boundaries only require a simple majority in the Parliament, the Center may not find this easy in practice. A clear pointer to this is the turbulence that erupted in Manipur in June 2001 over the extension of the Center-NSCN (IM) ceasefire, without defining territorial limits.

     Fourthly, the NSCN (IM)’s territorial claims to Kuki inhabited areas in Manipur and Assam is pregnant with the seeds of a bloody ethnic conflict. Kukis, who co-inhabit the hill districts of Senapati, Chandel, Tamenglong and Ukhrul in Manipur with the various Naga tribes, are averse to the concept of a Greater Nagaland. They claim to hold about fifty percent of the land in these hill districts, which the NSCN (IM) wishes to be made part of a greater Nagaland. The Kukis are also demanding a separate state to be carved out of the areas inhabited by them in these districts in addition to the entire Churachandpur district. Their cause is espoused by various Kuki insurgent units. The ethnic cleansing perpetrated by the NSCN (IM) on the Kuki inhabitants of these districts between the summer of 1992 and winter of 1995 was perhaps intended to discourage this demand. However, the strategy backfired and resulted in the NSCN (IM) losing credibility in international human rights and other fora. Its campaign to cast the Indian security forces as perpetrators of human atrocities on the Nagas was weakened by the outfit’s ‘perpetrators of genocide’ image. The Government of India, judging from its unhurried and cautious approach to these talks, is aware that any settlement with the NSCN (IM) ignoring the complex ethnic relations is likely to fuel rather than douse the flames of discord in the region.

     To conclude, these prolonged talks have been hindered by deadlocks on contentious issues rather than by any lack of sincerity and effort by the actors. Recognizing this and working towards disentangling these knotted issues would greatly help the peace process.