The Debate about Deterrence
13 Jul, 2002 · 781
Prof RVR Chandrasekhara Rao evaluates the role of nuclear deterrence in the recent Indo-Pak crisis and concludes that Pakistani claim was more credible
It was to be expected that four years after the emergence of
India
and
Pakistan
as nuclear weapons powers, the debate on the impact of nuclear deterrence would come into the open. More so since the two crises – one in Kargil and the near-war situation in the last few months – occurred between the two South Asian powers.
Pakistan
and Dr.Abdul Kalam, the de facto President-elect of India, declaring that nuclear deterrence has worked as demonstrated by the two nations recoiling from confrontation in recent weeks.
US
and
Soviet Union
did not come so near the awesome possibility of nuclear war.
India
was pre-empted from a war by
Pakistan
's deterrent or vice-versa and whether there was any mutuality of deterrence. President Musharraf clearly implied that
Pakistan
's bomb deterred
India
from launching even a conventional war. He also added that his country's conventional might played a role in this process.
India
's Abdul Kalam is equally emphatic that the Indian bomb made
Pakistan
stop its nuclear sabre-rattling from going beyond a short rattle.
India
starting a conventional war, becomes a credible threat. Of course there is no moral dimension entering the calculus. It is arguable that
India
's second-strike capability could have played a deterrent role. The point is that the calculations of second-strike capability are less precise than that of first-use. The unacceptable damage that
India
would suffer from
Pakistan
's first-use, even if it left
India
's second-strike capability intact, it could be agreed, is a sufficient deterrent to
India
's contemplation of a conventional war.
Their official declarations are anchored in the orthodox concept of deterrence with the usual strategic jargon of minimum credible deterrence, whatever that means. At the highest levels we have President Musharraf of
However, some significant implications remain to be analysed. Is the avoidance of war by two nuclear powers attributable ipso facto to the vindication of the deterrence doctrine? If so, whose deterrence prevented the other from resorting to conventional war?
The possession of atomic weapons, in miniscule numbers by NATO and Warsaw Pact comparisons, introduces the prospect of nuclear holocaust in the region. The fact that both belligerents have the terror-weapon becomes irrelevant if one party feels compelled to use the bomb. In the Indo-Pak context both adversaries being nuclear emphasizes the horror of the situation. Never before in the half century history of nuclear stand-offs, have two nuclear rivals came so close to actual hostilities with threats to use the weapon. With the possible exception of the Cuban crisis of 1962, the
Thus, the Indo-Pak eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation was unique. No wonder international anxiety reached traumatic proportions. To that extent, the possession of nuclear weapons by the concerned parties led to actual war being prevented.
But does this logically constitute a vindication of deterrence? For, deterrence primarily hinges on the psychology of the prospective belligerent and only secondarily on the fears of outsiders. The real question is whether
Of the two claims it seems that the Pakistani claim was more credible. Given its categorical refusal to agree to a no first-use, the prospect of its resorting to the nuclear weapon in response to
The problem is that it is impossible to quantify the effect of deterrence when both adversaries play games with nuclear deterrence. The only thing that can be said is that the threshold of nuclear conflict is raised to a qualitatively new level. The Kargil war may have provided the false hope, particularly on the Indian side, that a conventional war is still possible. But this time Musharraf's nuclear diplomacy, call it blackmail, has paid off.
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