Indo-Pak Joint Patrolling
25 Jun, 2002 · 773
Brig SS Chandel brings out various difficulties in joint patrolling of the Indo-Pak borders
The idea of Indo-Pak joint patrolling to check infiltration from
Pakistan
raises a host of difficult questions. For instance, what is in it for
Pakistan
? Will the Pakistani troops who have been facilitators for infiltrators till date, suddenly turn around and stop them? If Pakistan really wants infiltrators to stop, it can easily do so at its very source i.e. madrassas and training camps, at induction points at the LoC/IB and by choking off weapons, ammunition, communication, coordination and funds. Why is it not doing so? Will the Pakistani soldiers be willing to kill their own mujahids/fidayeens. In fact, it is quite conceivable that some of them might give away the route and timings of joint patrolling to the infiltrators. What will happen to the ‘moral, political and diplomatic support’ that Musharraf continues to offer to the so-called ‘freedom fighters’? Is such a volte-face possible? One may recall the assassination of President Anwar Sadat of
Egypt
after his reconciliation offer to
Israel
and many attempts on the life of the present President of Egypt.
US
: The
US
alone has the required surveillance and communication systems. The command of such a joint venture should rest on them with inputs from both sides. Such a composition, besides assuaging the egos of both
India
and
Pakistan
, will ensure confidentially and impartially in the operation undertaken.
Pakistan
's Gain: An externally imposed quietening down of the LoC/IB is likely to give President Musharraf a chance to enforce law and order and deal firmly with the fanatic elements within
Pakistan
. In time, it may be feasible to adopt a rational approach towards the
Kashmir
issue.
Intelligence: How will the requisite intelligence be acquired? Will the Pakistani leadership, which itself is divided on the issue, be able to persuade the mujahideens to part with crucial information? Even if they are successful, will it be credible?
Coordination: How will the operation be coordinated – on the Indian side of the LOC/IB – or on the Pakistani soil? How will secrecy be ensured? Where will the troops be located? On their own sides or together somewhere?
Execution: If undertaken, will it be like BSF and the Pak Rangers walking on either side of the fence? The infiltration is undertaken in difficult wooded and high altitude terrain, where even at the best of times, patrolling is unimaginably difficult due to snow. In the event of joint patrolling, movement and coordination will be doubly difficult.
Equipment: The US and the West provide their soldiers with geosynchronised satellite generated pictures on their hand-held sets and communications; Global Positioning System for each individual, body armor, infra-red imager, hand-held computers and state of the art weaponry. Indian and Pakistani forces are rather inadequately equipped.
Role of the
Therefore, a practical format for joint patrolling would be each side patrolling the areas on their own side of the LoC/IB with Western representatives accompanying them as observers. These observers should have requisite communications with their counterparts on the other side to avoid/prevent clashes. Such a system can be experimented and refined for one year to begin with
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