Flushing out Indian Insurgents from Bhutan: The Stumbling Blocks

26 Apr, 2002    ·   737

SY Surendra Kumar highlights the challenges before the Bhutanese government in tackling Indian insurgents on its soil


Militant groups operating in the Northeastern states of India constitute a major security threat to Bhutan . Of the many militant organizations here, three groups " United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) and Bodoland Liberation Tiger Force (BLTF) " have indulged in training and hiding in the southern parts of Bhutan , adjoining Assam .

 

 

Ironically, the Royal Bhutanese government has allowed them ingress since 1991 on the implicit understanding that they would terrorize the Nepali-speaking Lhotshampas to leave Bhutan . It was also alleged that the Royal Bhutanese government wanted to use them as a trump card in its negotiations with India . Bhutan 's objectives, though backfired, suited the interests of the militants, especially following the military operations launched by the Indian Army against them in Assam in 1992. A large number of militants entered Bhutan thereafter and used its territory as a safe-haven for training and launching attacks on the Indian security forces.

 

 

Towards the end of the 1990s, Bhutan realized that the militants were posing a security threat to its southern districts. The militants are reported to be involved in killing, extorting from and kidnapping the local population. Besides, there is enormous pressure from the Indian government to prevent Bhutan 's territory from being used against India by the militants. The Bhutanese government has tried to adopt a two pronged strategy. The first involved negotiations, which failed to materialize. After that it issued an ultimatum that the militants should leave Bhutanese soil by December 2001. The militants refused to leave; hence Bhutan has decided to take steps to remove them forcibly.

 

 

However, it would be difficult for Bhutan to succeed. Economically, Bhutan is not in a position to spend enough to combat the militants, as they are mainly located in the hilly parts of southern Bhutan , where communication facilities are poor. The government would have to establish adequate infrastructure to reach the remote areas before engaging in combat operations.

 

 

Bhutan is also worried about the consequences of military confrontation with the insurgents on its society, especially the impact on the social and the economic life of people." Around 80,000 people would have to be evacuated from southern Bhutan if military operations are launched." Members of the security forces, civil servants, businessmen and common people would also face serious dangers leading to human casualties. In military terms, the Royal Army is no match for the militant organizations. Whereas the Royal Army has vintage World War II rifles, the militant groups are armed with AK-47s.

 

 

Besides the economic and military problems, there are other problems that the Royal Government is facing in fighting the militants. The country is divided whether it should take India ?s help in combating these militants. A section argues that it is India's responsibility to solve the problem since it is basically affected by the insurgency, but supports joint Indo-Bhutan army operations to evict them. The other section is against India playing any role in matters relating to Bhutan 's national security, as they fear this would result in Indian troops staying on permanently in Bhutanese territory. Hence the Royal government has not been able to decide whether it should formally request Indian government's support. Finally, a strong nexus exists between the militants and a section of the Royal Bhutan Army, the police and the local people which ensures a ready flow of rations and logistical support to them. This nexus was exposed by the involvement of two Bhutanese foreign ministry officials in transferring a sum of $38,000 and Rs. 300, 000 (US$ 6667) between January and July 1996 to the ULFA militants through diplomatic channels.

 

 

Launching an effective military operation is a big challenge before the government. With Bhutan not having adequate economic and military strength and a section of Bhutan's Army and society benefiting from the militants in Bhutan, it would not be possible for the Royal government to fight them without active economic and military assistance from India.

 

 

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