Flushing out Indian Insurgents from Bhutan: The Stumbling Blocks
26 Apr, 2002 · 737
SY Surendra Kumar highlights the challenges before the Bhutanese government in tackling Indian insurgents on its soil
Militant groups operating in the Northeastern states of
India
constitute a major security threat to
Bhutan
. Of the many militant organizations here, three groups " United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) and Bodoland Liberation Tiger Force (BLTF) " have indulged in training and hiding in the southern parts of
Bhutan
, adjoining
Assam
.
Bhutan
. It was also alleged that the Royal Bhutanese government wanted to use them as a trump card in its negotiations with
India
.
Bhutan
's objectives, though backfired, suited the interests of the militants, especially following the military operations launched by the Indian Army against them in
Assam
in 1992. A large number of militants entered
Bhutan
thereafter and used its territory as a safe-haven for training and launching attacks on the Indian security forces.
Bhutan
realized that the militants were posing a security threat to its southern districts. The militants are reported to be involved in killing, extorting from and kidnapping the local population. Besides, there is enormous pressure from the Indian government to prevent
Bhutan
's territory from being used against
India
by the militants. The Bhutanese government has tried to adopt a two pronged strategy. The first involved negotiations, which failed to materialize. After that it issued an ultimatum that the militants should leave Bhutanese soil by December 2001. The militants refused to leave; hence
Bhutan
has decided to take steps to remove them forcibly.
Bhutan
to succeed. Economically,
Bhutan
is not in a position to spend enough to combat the militants, as they are mainly located in the hilly parts of southern
Bhutan
, where communication facilities are poor. The government would have to establish adequate infrastructure to reach the remote areas before engaging in combat operations.
Bhutan
is also worried about the consequences of military confrontation with the insurgents on its society, especially the impact on the social and the economic life of people." Around 80,000 people would have to be evacuated from southern
Bhutan
if military operations are launched." Members of the security forces, civil servants, businessmen and common people would also face serious dangers leading to human casualties. In military terms, the Royal Army is no match for the militant organizations. Whereas the Royal Army has vintage World War II rifles, the militant groups are armed with AK-47s.
India
?s help in combating these militants. A section argues that it is
India's responsibility to solve the problem since it is basically affected by the insurgency, but supports joint Indo-Bhutan army operations to evict them. The other section is against
India
playing any role in matters relating to
Bhutan
's national security, as they fear this would result in Indian troops staying on permanently in Bhutanese territory. Hence the Royal government has not been able to decide whether it should formally request Indian government's support. Finally, a strong nexus exists between the militants and a section of the Royal Bhutan Army, the police and the local people which ensures a ready flow of rations and logistical support to them. This nexus was exposed by the involvement of two Bhutanese foreign ministry officials in transferring a sum of $38,000 and Rs. 300, 000 (US$ 6667) between January and July 1996 to the ULFA militants through diplomatic channels.
Ironically, the Royal Bhutanese government has allowed them ingress since 1991 on the implicit understanding that they would terrorize the Nepali-speaking Lhotshampas to leave
Towards the end of the 1990s,
However, it would be difficult for
Besides the economic and military problems, there are other problems that the Royal Government is facing in fighting the militants. The country is divided whether it should take
Launching an effective military operation is a big challenge before the government. With Bhutan not having adequate economic and military strength and a section of Bhutan's Army and society benefiting from the militants in Bhutan, it would not be possible for the Royal government to fight them without active economic and military assistance from India.