Communitarian or communal? Revolutionary or Reactionary? These questions arise when one analyses the Janatha Vimukthi Permuna’s (JVP) stand on the ethnic issue.
It called the MoU signed between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE in February 2002 as the “greatest betrayal”, arguing that it would convert
Sri Lanka
into a “Norwegian colony”. The JVP feels this move has given a breather to the LTTE, which is being subjected to intense international pressure. The solution lies in defeating the LTTE militarily, not in talks. Indeed, its 2001 parliamentary election manifesto mentions the holding of talks with the LTTE only under three conditions: giving up the Eelam demand, surrender of arms, and never to wage war. Its prominent slogan has been “fight to protect the motherland”.
The same JVP had advanced the slogan of “self-determination for the national minorities” in the mid-1970s. In a policy declaration in 1977, it stated that the “maintenance of the territorial integrity of the country will be based on true egalitarianism and autonomous rule by the minorities”. On 24 September 1979, the JVP, alongwith other left parties, called for repeal of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, lifting of emergency, and ending military domination of
Jaffna
. Lionel Bopage, a JVP ideologue, in “A Marxist Analysis of the National Question”, had bitterly opposed the discriminatory policies and repressive police action against the Tamils. The JVP believed that the cry for Eelam arose not from Sri Lankan Tamils, but from “Tamil racism” originating in Tamil Nadu, and the “imperialist ambitions” of the
US
.
But the JVP was never serious in championing the cause of minorities; several political situations have revealed the Sinhala chauvinism in the party, though it talks of giving “equal rights” to the Tamils. Whether this means all citizens are equal in accordance with Marxist principles, or that Tamils are not eligible for devolution of powers is not clear. Voices like Bopage were in minority and he was forced to resign by the hardliners when he sought to include the Tamils’ cause within a Marxist framework of struggle. The JVP’s strategy has been to use the opportunities available to gain political mileage. Marxism “withers away” when it comes to political opportunism. For instance, when the JVP realized that the anti-India factor could be a greater mobilizing factor among the Sinhalese in the mid-1980s, it changed its earlier view on
India
being a “progressive and communist friendly state” to indulge in India-bashing. The Indo-Sri Lankan Accord of 1987 was compared to the Kandyan Convention of 2 March 1815 by which the British took control of the
Kandyan
Kingdom
. Rohana Wijeweera, in his “Solutions to the Tamil Eelam Question” (1986), accused the Tamil militants of being agents of Tamil Nadu for carrying out “Cholan ambitions”. Drawing such parallels, though illogical, heightened the Sinhalese opposition to the Accord.
In the mid-1980s the party gained, apart from Sinhala public support, political patronage from President Premadasa, who was opposed to the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord. He made use of the JVP to settle scores with his political rivals, increase his support base among the disaffected rural masses, and terrorize the working class. Ironically, a group which embraces Marxism, worked against the working class. But it is difficult to categorise the JVP within any existing
school
of
Marxism
. It advocates a Stalinist model of totalitarianism and collectivism; it admires the Maoist method of armed revolution; and tried the “scorched earth” policy of Brazilian revolutionary Carlos Marigella during the 1988-89 bheeshanaya (terror campaign) by destroying public property to turn the wrath of the people against the government.
The JVP could pose a serious obstacle to the peace talks to be held in May in
Thailand
on the ethnic issue. To recall, withholding talks on the ethnic issue was an important condition imposed by the JVP for its political support to the People’s
Alliance
government last year. Though the JVP’s anti-peace campaign faced a drubbing in the recently held local elections, it will not take much time and effort for the party to convert the people’s frustration into political mileage. The prevailing student unrest in the universities of
Sri Lanka
and general societal frustration must be taken as caution. Such parallels existed even during 1988-89, which the JVP exploited for its armed rebellion. One cannot forget the assertions of Somawansa Amarasinghe, during the last parliamentary election campaigning, of waging “armed struggle in appropriate time”. Both the government and the Tamil parties should keep this in mind to reach an agreement as soon as possible without adding to the frustrations in the common man. Both parties should cooperate in building the shattered economy. The rest will follow.