India and China: Cutting the Gordian Knot

23 Apr, 2002    ·   735

Brig SS Chandel throws light on the gains of rapprochement between Indian and China.
Brig. SS Chandel
On 11 October 1962 Prime Minister Chou En Li called on Prime Minister Nehru with a proposal intended to avoid a clash between the two Asian giants. In essence, it envisaged de jure recognition of the Chinese occupation of the Aksai Chin area through which the vital
East-West Road
 to Lhasa passed. In return, the Chinese would recognise the Mc Mohan line in Northeastern India . It was a last ditch effort by the Chinese Prime Minister against the preferred approach of Chairman Mao Tse Tung who wanted to demonstrate the Chinese military might across the Sino-Indian borders. These talks failed because Prime Minister Nehru and his bumptious Defence Minister overrated their international political influence assuming that Mao Tse Tung’s (not Chou En Li’s) China would not want to tread on India ’s toes. The Prime Minister went on to tell the Press that he has instructed the Army to ‘throw out’ the intruders, which precipitated the Army’s sorry but inevitable debacle. 

 

 

A standoff between the two countries has gone on now for nearly 40 years. Pakistan exploited this window of opportunity to develop a close relationship with China politically, economically and militarily. Much to its credit, Pakistan managed to keep the US and the West on its right side too. The partnership progressed with Pakistan and China linking themselves via the Khunjerab Pass; they are in the process of developing Gwadar as a logistics base for the Chinese navy which, alongwith the facilities made available in Coco Island off Myanmar, will enable it to maintain a presence in the Indian Ocean. Above all, China helped Pakistan develop into a nuclear and missile capable nation, neutralising India ’s conventional military edge, and letting Pakistan pursue its cross border terrorism against India .

 

 

However, the September 11 act of the Arab terrorists in the US brought about a paradigm shift in the world strategic scene which nobody could have foreseen. The Frankenstein monster of jehad is out, threatening even China whose western and north-western states are predominantly Muslim and amenable to the theocratic and financial blandishments by the Rabita Al Islami of Saudi Arabia , the hub for the propagation of Islam by theocratic, economic and military means. This has China worried, providing India a window of opportunity, although subtlety, imagination and creativity will be required to exploit it. The crunch issue will remain the Aksai Chin area. This means looking at the realities hard in the face.

 

 

First, there is the military reality. It must be acknowledged that we are weaker than the Chinese in military man power, equipment, air power, and logistics. So we cannot hope to capture the area in de facto occupation of the Chinese. Second, nobody is going to support us diplomatically in any military venture. The third reality is money; we are an impoverished nation who cannot afford to spend crores of rupees to fight an avoidance war. The fourth reality is the possibility, though remote, of triggering a nuclear war. The fifth reality is that we have very few stakes in this area, and may only be fighting for primarily emotional reasons.

 

 

On the other hand, there would seem to be many advantages in working out a rapprochement with China . Firstly, we would have eliminated the Chinese threat from the North and the East. Secondly, as a logical corollary, it would qualitatively reduce the threat from Pakistan , whose utility as a counterweight to India would diminish since there would be no bone of contention left between India and China . Pakistan would perhaps keep getting its armament and equipment from China but this would progressively become a commercial matter. Pakistan may also feel persuaded to pursue a less strident line in regard to Kashmir and terrorism across the border into India . Third, with the gradual scaling down of hostilities between India and Pakistan , there may be a cooling down of Islamic belligerence within India . Shorn of support from Pakistan , the ordinary people, who have nothing to gain by hostility against one another, will start seeing opportunities in business and trade. 

 

 

China , too, has much to gain from such a rapprochement. Firstly, it will find a huge market for its goods in India . Secondly, it will gain from India ’s expertise in software development, which it has been avidly seeking. Thirdly, it would wean India away from the US to support its quest for oil and gas in the South China Sea . This would help China emerge as an equal of the US in the next 25 years. Therefore, for the pragmatic Chinese to agree to a rapprochement with India would be a welcome step not to be spurned. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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