Nepalese Premier’s India Visit: Quid Pro Quo measures?

12 Apr, 2002    ·   732

Kanchan L highlights the main point in the Nepal Prime Minister’s India visit: securing Indian support for its counter insurgency operations against the Maoists


The main point on the Nepalese Premier Sher Bahadur Deuba’s agenda during his six-day visit to India in March 2002 was to secure the Indian government’s support in combating the Maoist insurgency in his country. There has been increasing concern in Nepal , some of it misplaced, that India has become a safe haven for Maoist leaders responsible for fomenting violence in the Himalayan kingdom.

 

 

Not surprisingly, as a precursor to the Deuba visit, the Nepalese Finance Minister, Ramsharan Mahat, said in Kathmandu on 15 March that the Maoists were receiving assistance and shelter from terrorist groups based in India . This thought on the Maoist leadership seeking safe havens in the Naxalite zones in India and along the porous border was also broached by the Nepalese Premier in an interview to an Indian newsmagazine. While making it clear that India has not deliberately patronized the Maoists, he pointed out that certain top Maoist leaders were in India and were directing the violence in Nepal . (‘The Top Maoists are in India ’, Outlook, New Delhi , 1 April 2002). The Nepalese Premier is also reported to have sought assurances from the Indian authorities on the aspect of cracking down on arms shipments to the Maoists from various Naxalite groups in India

 

 

During his various confabulations in India , Deuba was reportedly given assurance that India would initiate adequate action to counter the Maoist activity in the border regions and elsewhere in India . Reiterating its support, India offered equipment and training to Nepal for combating the Maoist insurgency. Media reports, quoting official sources, have indicated that both the countries have agreed to cooperate in intelligence-sharing and border surveillance. While speaking to the state-run Nepal Television on 22 March, the Nepalese Prime Minister disclosed that India had assured complete cooperation to stop the smuggling of arms and explosives by the Maoists into Nepal from India . India is also reported to have assured Nepal of training and provision of arms and equipment to counter the insurgency.  Indeed, in what can be discerned as a follow-up measure, at a meeting on 31 March in Madhubani (northern Bihar ) between Indian and Nepali officials, the Indian side agreed to assist the Nepali authorities in curbing the Maoist violence. It should be noted that India has recently provided two helicopters to help Nepal counter the Maoists consequent to the latter jettisoning the ceasefire and heightening their violent campaign in November 2001. 

 

 

Given the trajectory of the Maoist violence, it has become clear that Nepal cannot effectively succeed in counter-insurgency operations so long as the Maoists can escape to safe havens in India and weapons can freely move into Nepal . Media reports have indicated that even as the Nepalese Premier was meeting the West Bengal Chief Minister Buddhadev Bhattacharya in Kolkata, three top Maoist leaders – Chandra Prasad Gajurel, the Central Committee member in-charge of international relations, Mohan Baidya, Central Committee member, and Bahadur Raimajhi, Maoist negotiator in the first round of talks with the Nepalese government – were ensconced in Siliguri, West Bengal (“Maoist Olive Branch”, Nepali Times, Kathmandu, March 29-April 4, 2002). Thus, India ’s assistance is vital to Nepalese counter-insurgency operations. 

 

 

At the other end, India has reportedly communicated its concern to Nepal regarding the subversive activities directed against India from Nepalese soil by the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan in addition to the increasing ISI infiltration into India through Nepal . These concerns were conveyed to Deuba during his meeting with the Union Home Minister LK Advani. The West Bengal Chief Minister said during a press conference in Kolkata that the ISI was backing various subversive groups to destabilize India ’s strategic Siliguri Corridor. The Chief Minister added that it was in the mutual interests of India and Nepal to counter the Maoists. 

 

 

To the domestic constituency, Deuba’s India visit, at this juncture, would be justifiable only if he is able to convince the opposition that he has been able to secure definite commitments from the Indian establishment on the need to regulate the Nepal-India border to control the illegal flow of arms and contraband either way and also to counter the Maoist activity. However, it can be discerned that Indian assistance may be contingent on Nepal initiating measures to countering the ISI’s subversive presence in Nepal . A reasonable degree of reciprocity is in order vis-à-vis Indo-Nepal relations in the context of counter-insurgency operations.  

 

 

 

 

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