Army in Aid to Civil Authority
10 Apr, 2002 · 728
Brig SS Chandel advocates the need to revise Doctrine and Standard Operating Procedures before deploying the Army to aid civil authority
In
Gujarat
the Army was deployed in forward deployment areas when the carnage began, hence, it could not have reached the trouble spots to prevent the blood bath. Looking to the future with a view to making the Army more effective in an environment as had obtained in
Gujarat
, it would have to revise its pre-Second World War vintage doctrine, drills and procedures as detailed in its manual on Aid to Civil Authority. There seems to be an urgent need to review these in view of the sophistication available to the mischief making elements. The torching of ‘karsevaks’ at Godhara Railway Station could have been avoided with adequate foresight, actionable intelligence, planning and coordination. Some miscreants in this case would have kept a tab on the movement of ‘karsevaks’, while others would have organized logistics like petrol and transport. To deter such elements, the Army must constantly review the internal security situation obtaining in various parts of the country and update its antiquated doctrine and drills. Let us examine a new format.
Gujarat
could be effectively controlled by a regiment of tanks, an armoured personnel carrier battalion, two brigades of infantry, integrated signal regiment's communications and a flight of three helicopters assisted by local police, homeguards and para-military forces. What will be even more remarkable is that this force will be able to shift its weight as per the changing situation.
The Government should anticipate the requirement well in advance and keep the Army Headquarters posted of it. Closer interaction and exchange of intelligence between the Army and the Police must be ensured. The Army should take into account the new contours of the internal security situation and incorporate new means of surveillance and mobility. The miscreants would be deterred if they knew that the Army could react in hours instead of days or weeks, by means of para-dropped/air borne/heliborne troops and that troubled areas could be kept under close surveillance by helicopter borne teams instead of infantry in slow moving trucks. It may be advisable to deploy tanks and armoured personnel carriers along with the infantry. Unlike in a battle situation, the tanks and armoured personnel carriers should be deployed singly alongwith infantry and police/paramilitary personnel for their protection. Thus a city like Ahmedabad could be effectively covered by a regiment of tanks (45 tanks), a brigade of infantry (3000 troops) and three helicopters. The state of
These measures will obviously mean a paradigm shift from the time worn practice of deploying only infantry with small arms. These tactics used to succeed in earlier times because of three factors. One, the police and the administration were sincere, apolitical and not corrupt; two, the Government was uncompromisingly behind the law and could not be manipulated; and three, the lawless elements were not so well equipped or organized, nor were they backed by various political factions. In the last fifty years, all that has changed for the worse. The Police is physically unfit and is not capable of shooting straight besides being totally susceptible to manipulation by the political party in power. The people do not trust it. The Army is the only apolitical and competent instrument available for the purpose now. But it is hamstrung by its own mental inertia and reluctance to be imaginative and innovative. This cautious attitude is understandable since the political masters do not have the requisite background knowledge or understanding of how the Army should operate, they will forgive inaction, but not firm action taken in good faith by the man on the spot.
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