Undeniably the ban on the LTTE is a thorn in the flesh of the peace process between the government and the outfit to find a viable solution to the ethnic question. The LTTE was banned by the Sri Lankan government through a Presidential proclamation on 27 January 1998 under the Public Security Ordinance (Chapter 40), and subsequently under the Prevention of Terrorism Act for the following reasons:

1. Violation of Art 3(2) of the VI Amendment by advocating secessionism.

2. Waging war against the state and obstructing national development.

3. Destruction of public and sacred property in the island state, assassination of leaders and innocent people in the country.

Here are the prominent views on the ban:

     For the LTTE, de-proscription is an important prerequisite for talks. The ban will not provide equality at the negotiating table. The Tigers are unwilling to participate in negotiations as a “group of criminals”. It is argued that lifting the ban symbolizes “recognition of the legitimacy of the Tamil people’s struggle” and “an acknowledgement of LTTE’s position as the authentic representative of the Tamil people”.

But the anti-de-proscriptionists, who include the People’s Alliance, Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, and other Sinhala nationalist groups, argue that lifting the ban would not have any legal consequences for the peace talks and this is just a clamour by the Tigers. Many countries are cited which held talks with proscribed organizations. For some hardliners, de-proscription is as good as “forgetting the past” doings of the LTTE, which are unpardonable. Most importantly, it is feared that, once the ban is lifted at home, getting the ban lifted in other countries would not be difficult for the outfit. The LTTE is currently banned by India, USA, Australia, Malaysia, Britain and Canada which provide most of the funds and other logistics for the LTTE. De-proscription could be considered only if the LTTE surrenders its weaponry, relinquishes the demand for a separate state, and stops further recruitment.

Rather than accepting or rejecting either of the positions, Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe has, in his policy statement on 22 January 2002, promised to give “deep thought” to the issue. It is important to get the facts right. That the local ban has not resulted in any weakening of the LTTE is a fact; proscription has in fact strengthened the hands of the Tigers by providing it more public support. Undeniably, the ban at the international level has worked its magic in taming the Tigers. The LTTE does not want to stifle itself by inviting more bans by other countries. But, to argue the lifting of the local ban would result in automatic de-proscription at the international level is not correct. India and the United States banned the Tigers long before Sri Lanka proscribed it. They did this for their own security reasons.

Here I am not advocating the lifting of the ban. Utmost caution is the need of the hour. De-proscription should be effected in tandem with progress in the talks and good behaviour by the LTTE. Suspension of the ban for the period of the talks is worth considering. If something goes wrong it is not difficult to re-impose the ban. Detailed negotiations could be held on the demands to drop the call for separation or recruitment or arms supplies rather than insisting on their being a pre-condition on de-proscription. 

For its part, the LTTE should do its best to win the confidence of the Sinhalese. It should observe some moderation in its ‘political work’ allowed in the government controlled areas through the recently signed MoU. Declaring Trincomallee to be the ‘capital of Eelam’, arranging mass rallies eulogizing a separate state, starting an intense recruitment drive and fund raising only creates doubts and fears in the majority community. If the LTTE is sincere about talks and political settlement, it is imperative for it to create a conducive atmosphere when the process is on. In a positive atmosphere de-proscription will not be a hurdle.