The speaker asked the question: ‘Are we at crossroads’ which is an interesting topic to take up.  I define ‘crossroads’ as a moment of greater opportunity to change. In this regard, 

1.                   What are the identifiable changes that are occurring in Pakistan, both internal and external?

2.                   Is there any link between these changes and policies?

3.                   How are these changes impinging on Pakistan’s relations with other countries, especially India?

Gen. Musharraf spelt out radical policy changes in his speech on 12 January 2002 targeting madrasas, religious extremism, mullahs and of foreign students in religious seminaries. The pronouncements were no doubt driven by external pressures, but one cannot deny the internal compulsions underlying the recourse to change. The economy, particularly, is lying stagnant, and is in a bad shape; enhancing economic activity requires the improving of Pakistan’s image. But, what are the strengths that Musharraf have to implement these reforms? How far has Pakistan’s bureaucracy understood the meaning of these proclamations and does it possess the means to implement them? It is dubious if these questions have positive answers.

Nevertheless, Musharaf has strong military backing; he is seen as the person who could deliver the goods and improve Pakistan’s image. The changes announced were also welcomed by the people as Pakistanis are generally receptive to these changes. Pakistan is not an extreme society and its people are peace loving. But it is not fair to expect changes to take place instantaneously; at least five years are necessary.

But it is disturbing to note the lack of viable alternatives and the establishment’s total rejection of the past. The importance of making changes within the system without upsetting the obtaining balance has not been realized. There are frictions within the establishment both at the policy framing and implementation levels. The interests of the military and civil bureaucracies are divergent. Reforms only at the policy level would not suffice; change of attitude should occur in all the organs of the state. The possible succession of a civilian regime and challenges to be confronted by it is also an issue. Overall, Pakistan is passing through a very critical stage. The next 2-3 years are very important. Much will depend on what route the country is going to take.

On the foreign policy front, after September 11, Pakistanis thought that US-Pak relations would be back on a fast track. Some argued that it was the propitious moment to make use of the opportunity to rebuild Pakistan. But contentious issues are still there. With respect to India, the status quo and continuing at loggerheads continues.

Discussion:

The discussion led to the following conclusions:

·                     It is true that the military is the key player in Pakistan, but it is wrong to assume that it is the only factor important for its unification.

·                     Pakistan finds itself at the crossroads frequently because of its structural problems like other developing states. Many opportunities were lost in the past for effecting a change for a better future. 

·                     The military’s stakes in the economy are high. But once they are realized, the military should yield place to democracy. The military does not understand the intricacies of how an economy operates. 

·                     The recent drive on de-weaponisation was an eyewash. There are large numbers of weapons to be recovered, and this is a difficult exercise since there are no records available for the existing weapons.

·                     Musharraf’s policy pronouncements are important for his personal survival. He might be serious about the new measures, but they are not succeeding because of bureaucratic apathy, and lack of proper analyses of the problem.

·                     The military is united behind Musharraf in its own interests. It is not an extremist organization but is definitely religious. Inter-service and intra-service rivalries are under control. 

·                     There are pressures on Musharraf, especially from the Commonwealth, for the restoration of democracy in some form. But, for this, the political leadership of Pakistan should display some ability to operate without their bitter rivalry and corrupt practices.

·                     There is no linkage between internal and external threats. But, one is reinforcing the other in fact. The Pakistani establishment is instrumental in creating internal threats for short-term gains, and divert people’s attention.