Kolkata terrorist attack: Privatization of Islamist terror?
13 Mar, 2002 · 713
Kanchan L, looking into the “privatization” of Islamic terror, advocates adoption of new strategies “as the frontiers between organized crime and terrorism get blurred”
The arrest and deportation of Aftab Ansari alias Farhan Malik alias Aftab Ahmed, a Dubai-based Mafiosi, for his role in the 22 January 2002 terrorist attack on the American Centre in Kolkata reinforces the convergence of organized crime with terrorism. Ansari’s confession during the interrogation has led to a series of arrests and also the unearthing of networks in
Agra
, Mumbai, Jaipur, Kolkata,
Varanasi
,
Malegaon
,
Bhopal
, Hazaribagh and
Surat
. Simultaneously, the confessions in
Pakistan
by Sheikh Omar Saeed, the new hero of Islamic terrorism, reveals a complex web of terror and crime. Available evidence shows that terrorist violence follows a decontrolled and localized pattern. Even as terrorist violence continues unabated in
Jammu and Kashmir
, cities like Kolkata, Chennai and Mumbai are coming on under the terrorist radar. In a critical sense, this marks a shift in the theatre of Pakistan’s proxy war in
India
.
Gujarat
, in November 2001. The seizure followed the arrest of Asif Reza Khan, Ansari’s lieutenant, and a Pakistani national in
New Delhi
on 29 October 2001 . He was subsequently killed by the police at
Rajkot
in
Gujarat
on 7 December 2001 , allegedly trying to escape. Ansari’s linkages with Omar Sheikh go back to their sojourn at the Tihar jail in
New Delhi
during the nineties. Ansari confessed that Azim Cheema, a leader of the proscribed Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), referred to him by Sheikh, had provided him with a Pakistani passport and travel documents. Media reports also indicate that Ansari admitted to have given money to Omar Sheikh on several occasions and that the arms consignment seized in Patan was funded by him. Ansari’s confession to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) highlighted that he had masterminded the abduction of Kolkata-based businessman Parthapratim Roy Burman and extracted a ransom of Rs 3.75 crore ($815,000) via Dubai through hawala (illegal money transfer channels). Quoting intelligence sources, reports indicate that, out of this money, Omar Sheikh had wired $100,000 to Mohammed Atta, leader of the hijackers in the multiple terrorist attacks in
USA
on September 11, 2001 . Ansari said that the Kolkata attack was masterminded by two ISI officials — Brigadier Yusuf and Brigadier Khan, whom he met in
Dubai
and
Pakistan
. The Kolkata attack was planned, according to his confession, in September-November 2000. Ansari added that while the ISI officials planned the attack, he gave the “men and means” (“ISI planned and I arranged Kolkata attack, says Ansari”,
Hindustan
Times, New
Delhi
, 16 February 16 2002 ). While admitting to meeting senior ISI officials in
Dubai
and
Rawalpindi
on at least five occasions since 1999, Ansari reportedly confirmed his links with the LeT, Jaish-e-Mohammed and the Harkat-ul-Jehadi Islamia, and also revealed that he had visited their training camps in
Pakistan
. Moreover, a substantial portion of the Rs 105 crore ($23 million) that he claimed to have ‘earned’ through abductions and arms deals was utilized – directly and indirectly – to establish a terror network across the country. Most of these abductions and arms deals were undertaken in collusion with terrorist cadres based in
Pakistan
and
Bangladesh
.
Ansari was reportedly the financier of a large consignment of arms and ammunition, including 14 kgs of RDX seized in Patan district,
Although the link between of organized crime syndicates, terrorist groups and state supporters of terrorism is not new (the 1993 serial blasts in Mumbai reveals this co-ordination), the radically altered security framework after ‘9/11’ could lead to mutually advantageous alliances forming between crime syndicates and terrorist groups. As direct state sponsorship of terror gets weakened by the International Coalition against terrorism, terrorist groups and their state sponsors rely increasingly on organized crime syndicates to undertake terrorist activities taking advantage of their operational flexibility. The ‘privatization’ of Islamist terror would accentuate in the future. Further, as the frontiers between organized crime and terrorism get blurred, new strategies would need to be evolved.