Peace Process in Sri Lanka – I: Past Perfect Sense
28 Feb, 2002 · 712
N Manoharan argues that history is a good teacher in guiding future course of negotiations in Sri Lanka
Peace is a journey of a million miles. This journey has commenced in
Sri Lanka
with the installation of the United National Front (UNF) government in December 2001 and the subsequent declaration of ceasefire between the government and the LTTE. Intense preparations are on for talks with Norwegian facilitation. But the past failures in reaching a settlement cast a long shadow, leading to ‘peace cynicism’. Past failures however provide valuable insights for the future. A synoptic analysis of these past negotiations between the Sri Lankan government and the Tamil militants is attempted below.
These past failures provide the following lessons:
India
) resulted in an agreement, it fell through because it was perceived by the Sinhalese as interventionist and biased towards the Tamils. The LTTE believed
New Delhi
was collaborating with
Colombo
in “continuing injustice on Tamils”. The lesson here is that a third party mediator can hold the negotiating parties together despite setbacks and frustrations, but the mediating party must be perceived as being strictly neutral.
India
since the outfit is proscribed. Various venues chosen in the past did not have any impact. Hence it is not where, but how the talks proceed, which is important.
Sri Lanka
as a channel of communication. The people should be informed of the broad contours of the talks and allowed to give their opinions. This broad-basing of negotiations will weaken their manipulation by nationalist forces. Selling secretly negotiated agreements have failed in the past.
| Year
|
Regime
|
Venue
|
External Actor
|
Outcome
|
Reasons for the Failure
|
| 1984
|
UNP under Jeyewardena
|
Thimpu
|
|
None
|
1. Absence of commitmentto peace process and faith in each other.
2. Mutually exclusive demands.
|
| 1987
|
UNP under Jeyewardena
|
|
|
Indo-Sri Lankan Accord
|
1. Indian neutrality as mediator doubted.
2. Non-abiding with the Accord by LTTE and resistance by Sinhala nationalistforces.
3. Solution perceived as an imposition by the LTTE.
|
| 1989-90
|
UNP under Premadasa
|
|
None (but
|
Short-term peace escalating later into conflict
|
1.Lack of trust.
2.Talks only for short-term gain (drive out IPKF) and not for enduringpeace.
|
| 1994-95
|
PA under Chandrika Kumaratunga
|
|
None
|
Short-term peaceand later intensification of war
|
1. Lack of sincerity on part of LTTE.
2. Lack of Professionalism in the negotiating team selected by thegovernment.
3. Lack of flexibility and inability to meet new challenges emergingduring talks.
|
| 2002
|
UNF under Ranil Wickremasinghe
|
Undecided
|
|
?
|
_
|
Third Party: During 1989-90 and 1994-95 the absence of a mediator enabled the negotiating parties to withdraw unilaterally. But, in 1987, though the presence of a mediator (
Venue: The LTTE is currently insisting on an Indian location which is convenient for it, but this is not acceptable to
Mutual Confidence: The history of previous failures in these talks reveals the existing mutual suspicions. Lack of trust is prevailing since the 1950s for which no single party can be blamed. Unless both parties repose some faith and trust in each other, negotiations should not commence.
Sincerity: The conflicting parties should display some commitment towards political settlement. In the past, the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE came to the negotiating table due to either external pressure or to achieve some short-term gains. The LTTE is wanting in this regard. If it decides to talk because of international pressure and not out of genuine interest in solving the issue, the history suggests that entering into a dialogue is futile.
Sustenance: Peace process through negotiations is an arduous and time consuming task; the negotiating parties must show resilience to stay on track despite setbacks and frustrations.
Professionalism: Past experience shows that professional handling of the negotiations process is of great importance. Professionalism includes constituting the negotiating parties, agenda for negotiations, method and conduct of talks, and readiness to present alternative proposals.
Flexibility: The negotiating teams should display flexibility to reaching a compromise solution, and finding a golden mean between the narrow but long-term perspective of the LTTE and the broader but short-term perspective of the government. The negotiations agenda should widen as the negotiations proceed to maintain confidence in the process.
Vox Populi: Support from civil society is crucial for any settlement to ethnic conflicts. The people’s voice is weak in
POPULAR COMMENTARIES
