The Sri Lankan Ceasefire

28 Feb, 2002    ·   708

Brig SP Sinha discusses the background to the recent announcement of unilateral ceasefire by the LTTE
Brig. SP Sinha
The LTTE announced another cease-fire beginning from Christmas Day 2001. The newly elected Ranil Wickremasinghe government reciprocated by ordering a cessation of hostilities for one month from December 24.

 

 

While the truce offer by the LTTE was not new, it was taken up in the past but aborted during the process of negotiation. This new offer has drawn optimistic comments from political analysts and sections of the new government. This optimism arises from Prabhakaran’s broadcast on Heroes’ Day that the Tamil Struggle is “neither separation nor terrorism.” However, the LTTE has always used truce and negotiations to consolidate itself militarily, and escape from difficult situations. 

 

 

It would therefore be useful to review the behavior of the LTTE during earlier negotiations in the light of past experience. Prabhakaran had no faith in the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord of 1987 and had made up his mind to sabotage it. The rest is history. The LTTE entered into negotiations with Premadasa between May 1989 and June 1990 with the sole purpose of getting the IPKF out of Sri Lanka . The honeymoon between the two ended after the IPKF was withdrawn in March 1990. The vacuum left by its withdrawal was filled by the LTTE, who became the virtual rulers of Northeast Sri Lanka for five years. When Premadasa refused to accept the LTTE demand for dissolution of the Northeast Provincial Council and the repeal of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution (which makes the advocacy of separation in any form illegal); he was assassinated by a LTTE suicide bomber later. 

 

 

Chandrika Kumartunga would have met the same fate, but she survived the assassination attempt. She came to power in 1994 and negotiated a credible devolution package with the LTTE from November 1994 to April 1995; many political observers considered it to be a sound framework on which a solution could be found. But the LTTE, rather than engage in serious negotiations, walked out, accusing the government of bad faith, and began hostilities again. Since then the fortunes of the two adversaries have fluctuated. After the spectacular success of the LTTE in the Elephant Pass area in early 2000, the Sri Lankan forces checked their further advance. Since then both sides are bogged down in a stalemate.

 

 

Is the present cease-fire any different in scope or intent? Many have argued that the recent statement of Prabhakaran - “struggle of Sri Lankan Tamils is neither separatism not terrorism” – is a significant departure from the past and a strategic shift. But Prabhakaran has yet to show any inclination to accept a Tamil homeland within the framework of a united Sri Lanka . The hardening of world opinion against terrorism after the September 11 suicide attack on the World Trade Centre in New York must have forced Prabhakaran to review his strategy. The present offer of a truce has been forced on him by Western Countries like the US , the UK and Canada turning the financial screws on the LTTE. It would be unable to continue its operations in Sri Lanka without external financial support. 

 

 

India , the USA and Malaysia had banned the LTTE earlier. Now Canada and the UK have also banned it. No organization which carries the tag of a terrorist outfit can hope to survive in the emerging milieu against terrorism. Yet, in view of past experience, it is difficult to see how Prabhakaran can drop his demand for separate Eelam and abandon the path of violence. In all probability the latest truce is only a clever bid for time and effort to improve his battered image in the meantime.  

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