Chinese Perspectives on the Kashmir Dispute

17 Feb, 2002    ·   696

Bhartendu Kumar Singh argues that it best serves Chinese interests to maintain the status quo in Kashmir
Bhartendu Kumar Singh
Chinese perspectives on the Kashmir problem require attention for at least three reasons: First, China is occupying over 20 percent of the total area of the former Kashmir State . A large tract, around 38,000 sq km in Aksai-Chin, was captured by China during the Sino-Indian border war of 1962. Later, it acquired another 5000 sq km from Pakistan . Second, Kashmir is the only issue that can create fissures in future Sino-Pak relations. Third, the Chinese stand on Kashmir indicates the maturity of Chinese foreign policy behaviour.

 

 

The Chinese outlook on Kashmir evolved in two stages. From the 1950s to 1980s, China followed a largely pro-Pakistan policy due to its own pariah status in the international system and animosity with India after the 1962 war. Mao had always treated India in a derogatory fashion, but had serious misgivings over India ’s Tibet policy. By the 1960s, the widening Sino-Soviet rift and the latter’s support to India on Kashmir had put China on the defensive; it began courting Pakistan and supporting it on all issues, including Kashmir . Chinese statements on Kashmir focused on two points: (i) it regarded Kashmir as a disputed territory, and (ii) it supported the principle of self-determination for the people of Kashmir . The Sino-Pak Joint Communiqué of 3 May 1962 and the subsequent Boundary Agreement of 2 March 1963 recognized the disputed nature of Kashmir . The latter agreement provided for the formal delimitation and demarcation of the boundary between China ’s Xinjiang and contiguous areas of Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK). Article VI of the Agreement stated that, after the settlement of the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan , the sovereign authority concerned would open negotiations with the People’s Republic of China on the boundary as delimited by Article II of the same Agreement. During this period, China supported Pakistan and the ‘just struggle of the Kashmir people for self-determination’, and endorsed the relevant UN resolutions to the discomfiture of India .

 

 

However, in the 1980s, Chinese policy on Kashmir underwent a metamorphosis. China ’s rise as a Great Power, coupled with its acceptance by the international fraternity, led to a decline in its radical foreign policy. There was also a perceptible thaw in Sino-Indian relations, particularly after the visit of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to Beijing in 1988. Thereafter, China dropped the mention of the term ‘self-determination’ and the references to the UN resolutions on Kashmir . It seems, however, that the disclaimer of ‘self-determination’ had something to do with the increasing demand for self-determination in the Xinjiang and Tibet . Therefore, China started projecting Kashmir as essentially a ‘bilateral’ dispute between India and Pakistan . Interestingly, China ’s apprehensions about multilateralism persuaded it to shun a role for itself in the dispute-resolution, which reinforced India ’s emphasis on bilateralism.

 

 

Since the early 1990s, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and its own problem of insurgency in Xinjiang have further modified Chinese perspectives on Kashmir . China is under no illusion that in Xinjiang and Kashmir the insurgents were being trained and funded by Islamic fundamentalists operating from Afghanistan and Pakistan . This perception led China to adopt a neutral role during the Kargil War. While China did not wish to criticize Pakistan , it saw merit in India ’s assertion that the issue was essentially one of terrorist infiltration across the LoC. Hence, without naming Pakistan , it called for maintaining the sanctity of the LoC.

 

 

The continued impasse over Kashmir between India and Pakistan endangers the prospects of a regional security order which China is encouraging in South Asia . First, it believes that the Kashmir issue may lead the two countries to the brink of a nuclear war. Second, Kashmir is also impeding the economic development of both countries. Finally, this can spill over into Xinjiang. Therefore, China ’s own national interest demands an early resolution of the problem.

 

 

It is dubious if China will support the idea of an independent Kashmir despite having advocated ‘self-determination’ in the past. An independent Kashmir will add another Muslim state on its border, and bolster Uyghur nationalism in Xinjiang. China may also have to compete with Pakistan and the US for influence in Kashmir . Again, the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir joining with Pakistan or India may not find favour with the Chinese; for, in the first case, Pakistan would extend upto to the Chinese border, making the situation in Xinjiang volatile and, in the second case, China ’s road links with Pakistan would be cut off by the expansion of Indian territory . The maintenance of status quo, therefore, would best serve Chinese interests. It is for this reason that China formally pleads for a negotiated settlement of the dispute between India and Pakistan which is likely to reinforce and legitimize the status quo. 

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