| Speaker:
|
Prof TV Paul
Mc
Gill University, Canada
|
Dr Paul began his presentation with a brief sketch of his forthcoming book provisionally entitled India and the World Order. Its major argument is that
India
has the potential to become a global power, but needs to evolve a global vision and a grand theory to realize this goal. Jawaharlal Nehru aspired to make
India
a world power, though this issue was not openly discussed in the Indian political establishment. This is responsible for the lack of strategic vision in Indian foreign policy.
India
possesses hard and soft power resources to achieve a world power status. Paul identified military strength, economic power, population and technology as hard resources; but norms, institutions and leadership as the soft sources of power.
He went on to qualify that although
India
has large military forces, it is locked in to the region with
Pakistan
and
China
acting as the constraining factors. The bracketing of
India
and
Pakistan
is not justified as
Pakistan
has one seventh the population of
India
and is one fourth its size.
India
, on the other hand, is a rising global power and can balance
China
effectively in the region. For
India
to achieve world power status, it needs to evolve a grand strategy to guide sustained involvement in global issues. Episodic intervention is not enough. It is also important for
India
to push for its membership of the UN Security Council and the G-8.
India
faces several constraints in attaining world power status. It has fundamental disagreements with the
US
on issues like the NPT; this should not be perceived as a conflict between a hegemonic and a rising power.
China
impacts
India
’s strategic concerns by aligning with
Pakistan
and effectively confining
India
to the region.
Pakistan
has successfully constrained the growth of
India
’s power by its policy of unremitting hostility. There are a number of reasons underlying
Pakistan
’s success in this asymmetric conflict with
India
.
Pakistan
is a middle level power in terms of its population and size. Its army and government are dominated by the Punjabi elite that see the conflict with
India
as
Pakistan
’s raison d’être. It follows a brinkmanship style of diplomacy that has sometimes won concessions from
India
. Finally, it possesses nuclear weapons that are a power equalizer in military terms.
India
suffers cultural constraints in its Gandhian legacy, which forestalls the evolution of a grand strategy to achieve global power status. Kautilya’s vision is more suited for achieving this objective.
China
has opted for the vision of Sun Zi in cultivating a rising power image in the global order.
India
’s reluctance to play a global role in the international balance of power is due to domestic political concerns and its military and economic weakness. Further, it must be recognized that the global balance of power has essentially frozen since 1945 and no new power will be allowed to alter it without fighting a war. Hence, an institutional and soft balancing role is a more suitable option for
India
. Simultaneously,
India
must develop a calibrated relationship with the
US
.
Dr Paul wrapped up his presentation with a brief analysis of the post-September 11 international situation. The fears of
Pakistan
getting back in the game and this being detrimental to
India
’s interests are unfounded. The
US
is using
Pakistan
to reach its objectives in
Afghanistan
; after the Afghan campaign is over, it will turn its attention to the terrorist networks inside
Pakistan
.
India
’s response to the WTC attacks was mature as it did not involve itself too deeply in the Afghan crisis.
India
is a mature power and its military restraint during the Kargil war and its ‘No First Use’ commitment regarding to nuclear weapons have established this.
The September 11 attacks pose new challenges to international peace and security. The state centric balance of power and theory of deterrence no longer guarantee safety from attacks. The
US
national security establishment is state centric and has not paid enough attention to security threats from non-state actors. It is not equipped to deal with war waged by non state actors that do not operate under the assumption of rational choice theory that guides state behaviour. Secondly, no security agreement can be negotiated with non-state actors as they do not adhere to any law of international regimes.
Discussion:
The discussion generated the following points:
· The world is moving towards stronger regional groupings. But
South Asia
seems far behind in this due to the asymmetrical nature of the region.
India
, instead of getting itself locked into region, should look beyond it, as the region will not serve
India
’s interest beyond a point.
·
India
is successful in managing its numerous multicultural groups; it is a model of stability. These characteristics of ‘soft power’ are being increasingly recognized by the outside world, which is a great asset for
India
.
· In future,
Asia
would pose a major challenge to the western-dominated power structure in world politics. The West recognizes this and is adopting various strategies ranging from containment (in the soft sense) to engagement.
·
India
has its own domestic constraints in using power.
New Delhi
should use its power in an incremental manner. Military strength alone is not a decisive element of power. It is better to concentrate on ‘soft power’ in which we have an edge.
· The 1998 nuclear test did not provide any enhanced security capability to
India
, but it did provide greater military strength. It also enabled
India
to come off its “fence sitting” status for over two decades.
·
India
should not involve itself in any great power calculus. We have to think whether we have the wherewithal to involve ourselves in a larger role.
·
India
will automatically acquire great power status if it strives for its acceptability in the neighbourhood. It should also think in inclusive terms.
