US
Defence Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, is reported [Hindustan Times, 30 October 2001] to have said, “The 5000-pound bombs are going to be able to do the job of hitting the Al-Qaeda in their underground facilities.” But when pressed for an answer on whether or not the US would rule out the use of nuclear weapons, especially smaller tactical nuclear weapons, he said, “I don’t rule out anything.” Note the date of the statement, end-October, when the war in
Afghanistan
had turned in favour of the
Northern Alliance
and the US-led coalition of forces. Why then did he have to make this gratuitous declaration? Apparently, nuclear weapons are under consideration if conventional weapons do not flush out terrorists to destroy their hideouts located in tunnels and caves.
It is common knowledge that “mini-nukes” were developed in American weapons laboratories for tasks like destroying military facilities located underground, which can, no doubt, be performed by conventional weapons. These programmes were accelerated after the Gulf War; especially, “mini-nukes” were developed for undertaking tasks like the destruction of underground facilities. It would be recollected, apropos, that the Iraqi troops had taken shelter in deep trenches during the Gulf War, and that the
US
had used “fuel-air explosives” (FAE) against them with great success. (FAE had been first used in
Vietnam
). These weapons burn up oxygen in the air leading to the creation of a vacuum and blast wave, resulting in over-pressures being generated, that have severe antipersonnel effects on troops in enclosed spaces like foxholes, caves, buildings and bunkers. Technically, “fuel-air explosives” are conventional weapons and not chemical weapons, classifiable as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs). They are not banned under international humanitarian law. Could they be used in
Afghanistan
to target Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden?
"Mini-nukes”, however, fall unquestionably in the genre of nuclear weapons and are recognizable as WMDs. The deployment of “mini-nukes”, essentially battlefield weapons, adds to nuclear war scenarios becoming credible, and their use would blur the distinction or “fire-break” obtaining between nuclear and conventional weapons. Any attempt to “conventionalize” the use of nuclear weapons is per se destabilizing, since it erodes the traditional belief that nuclear weapons are instruments of deterrence, intended to prevent wars; they are not weapons expressly designed for use in the battlefield. Their use against a non-nuclear country, moreover, would strengthen the unfortunate impression that nuclear weapons could be used by nuclear weapon states when there is no fear of retaliation. What effect will this have on the psychology of non-nuclear weapon signatories to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty that have forsworn their nuclear option? Will the production of “mini-nukes”, assigning them a battlefield role, and suggesting they could be used for identified operational tasks not add to the mystique surrounding these weapons? A milieu conducive to clandestine acquisition of nuclear weapons would then be generated, adding to the dangers of horizontal proliferation, which obsesses the
United States
.
Incidentally, the state entity of
Afghanistan
does not possess nuclear weapons. Does bin Laden have them, as alleged in scary news reports to this effect? The preponderance of scientific opinion is highly skeptical about these reports in the belief that, whereas the scientific knowledge may be widely available, the technology to manufacture nuclear weapons is very difficult to acquire. But opinion is divided on whether bin Laden possesses chemical and biological warfare (CBW) weapons. Could the “mini-nukes” threat held out by Rumsfeld be intended to deter bin Laden’s contemplating the use of CBW weapons?
US
policy during the Gulf War might usefully be recollected here when it faced a plausible threat of Saddam Hussein using chemical and biological weapons. (Later discoveries of these programmes in
Iraq
and the stockpiles available confirm that this CBW threat was not fictional.) During the Gulf War, the
US
had emphatically stated that it would retaliate with nuclear weapons if
Iraq
used chemical or biological weapons against the coalition forces. The intention was obviously to create a sense of uncertainty in Saddam Hussein’s military planning and deter him from using CBW weapons. Apart from deterring their use by bin Laden in
Afghanistan
or elsewhere, the need for using “mini-nukes” to achieve tactical military objectives seems to have become an accretion to US military thinking. Is the
US
merely creating a sense of uncertainty in bin Laden’s thinking? Or will it really use “mini-nukes” against bin Laden in
Afghanistan
if he acts in desperation elsewhere with a CBW attack or another spectacular act of mass violence? Will the
US
ignore the inevitability of collateral damage, shorthand for civilian deaths and destruction of civilian property, in this process?
With the net closing in on Mullah Omar and Osama Bin Laden, one must hope for the best but also realize what the worst can be.
