Iraq Next?
10 Dec, 2001 · 657
Prof Chandrasekhara Rao cautions that the “consensus on the US role in Afghanistan is likely to break down if extended to Iraq”
President Bush’s demand that
Iraq
open its research establishments to UN inspection was expected, even if a little late in being made. The Bush administration has a visceral interest in bringing
Iraq
to its knees again, and the current war against terrorism provides an ideal opportunity for this. By alleging that
Iraq
’s chemical and biological weapons research, besides its nuclear programme, constitutes a terrorist threat, the
US
has widened its definition of terrorism to include the development of weapons that could “terrorize nations”. Thus, even terrorist intentions will be brought within the definition.
US
demand is designed to reestablish over
Iraq
the UN imposed inspections regime that operated after the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait
and the American military action under a UN mandate.
Iraq
then had reluctantly acquiesced. In 1998 the inspection teams withdrew but the sanctions continued. Saddam seized upon them to highlight the suffering of his civilian population. To contain their impact on world public opinion, the UN formulated the ‘oil-for-food plan’ under which Iraq is permitted to sell its oil, with the profits going into an escrow account to buy food and other civilian supplies. The
US
is agreeable now to lift the ban on almost all the civilian goods but impose stricter controls on certain materials that
Iraq
could use for nuclear and biological weapons development. Under this formula called ‘goods review list’, the
US
apparently wants to ease the sanctions whilst tightening control over certain items.
Russia
vehemently opposed this with the threat of a veto in the Security Council, as this would jeopardize its trade relations with
Iraq
. Thus, till recently, the American desire to tighten the screw on
Iraq
was thwarted.
Moscow
has been persuaded to accept the ‘goods review list’ that comes into effect in June 2002 on condition that the present sanctions would continue till then. This Russian concession is part of the bonhomie following the Bush-Putin meeting in the
US
. Apparently Putin has agreed to distance himself from Saddam, but the
US
may be mistaking this for Russian willingness to go after Saddam. In the event of Saddam refusing to accept renewed inspections, as is most likely, Bush has threatened ‘unspecified consequences’– some type of military action – but such an adventure could go awry.
US
will secure will not be as extensive as for its war in
Afghanistan
. There is no
Northern Alliance
to bear the brunt of ground action and guide American air strikes. It is true that the unsavory Saddam regime is internally disliked. But these internal dissensions cannot be translated into strategic or tactical collaboration from within to assist military action from outside.
Saudi Arabia
will be most reluctant to allow the stationing of foreign troops. Despite its unflinching support for the
US
during the Gulf War, bin Laden’s opposition to US military presence in
Saudi Arabia
would make
Riyadh
reluctant to be associated with yet another American-sponsored punitive action against an Arab neighbour.
France
and
Germany
have been lukewarm in supporting the
US
war against terrorism.
Britain
, no doubt, has been extremely supportive of the
US
, but this appears motivated by a desire to influence
US
policy indirectly.
Britain
has misgivings over any further aggravation of the crisis over
Iraq
.
Britain
should then be asked to guarantee the protection of the
US
! Bush’s own choice is probably not very different.
Kabul
, although the world body is unlikely to be a stumbling block and the
US
can always take its mandate for granted. American global power has transformed itself from informal to formal imperialism. Prof Niell Ferguson of
Oxford
has recently highlighted this trend: “Slowly and rather unreflectively the
United States
has been responding to crises by intervening directly in the internal affairs of faraway countries. True, it has tended to do so behind a veil of multilateralism, acting in the name of the United Nations or NATO.”
US
role in
Afghanistan
is likely to break down if extended to
Iraq
.
Ostensibly, the
What has transpired now is that
For one thing, the support that the
The European response would be ambivalent, if not negative.
The Bush administration is itself divided about how to deal with Saddam. The hawks derive their inspiration from the likes of Richard Pearle, a hawk among hawks, who was also a senior official in earlier Republican regimes. Pearle advocates a strike-Saddam-first option. In a recent radio talk, when asked about British reluctance, he said that
The UN cannot be ignored when it is seized with reestablishing a regime in
Once again, the syndrome of the sole superpower donning the supranational mantle is manifesting itself. And, in this process, the consensus on the
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