Himalayan Trouble for the Himalayan Kingdom
05 Dec, 2001 · 653
Dr PV Ramana points out that bad politics and inaction have contributed to the growth of the Maoist insurgency
The Maoist insurgents in
Nepal
re-launched their fight on November 23 after announcing a ceasefire in July. Within the first 72 hours, 300 lives were lost. Till date, more than 2100 people have been killed since the insurgency began in 1996.
Nepal
into a Republic. The government was lulled into the mistaken belief that the insurgents would continue to negotiate and would not take to arms immediately.
In a significant departure from their earlier policy of staying clear of the Army, the insurgents stormed the Army barracks in Ghorai, Dang district, killing 14 troops and injuring 30, besides looting 99 SLRs, unspecified number of machine guns and several hundred rounds of ammunition. They had, thus, challenged the valour and honour of the Royal Nepal Army.
The insurgents seem to have ‘gained’ during the ceasefire period. They secured the release of most, if not all, of their arrested comrades. They had also fortified themselves, besides making public appearances, at which they were accorded heroes’ welcome, and openly spread their message of armed revolt.
During the ceasefire period they sent across the message that they are not averse to a negotiated political solution, and held three rounds of talks with the government negotiating team. Along the way, the government extracted a major compromise from the insurgents who climbed down and announced that they had given up their demand of turning
But the insurgents were very clear, as can be discerned from their statements. Quite early on, one of its leaders declared that he did not expect much from the talks. Besides, insurgent supremo ‘comrade’ Prachanda had, after the second round of talks itself, given sufficient indication that violence would resume. At a time when dates for the fourth round of talks were being mooted, the insurgents announced that the talks were off, and two days later, struck nationwide, destroying a hydel-power project, damaging a civil airport and ruthlessly attacking several people, both security forces and civilians.
The Maoists were never serious about finding a negotiated settlement. They were already speaking from a position of strength; before announcing the ceasefire, they were holding captive some 70 policemen who they had abducted in Hoileri, Rolpa district, on July 12.
They have a presence to varying degrees in 68 of Nepal’s 75 districts, which in electoral terms, translates to 165 of the total 205 parliamentary constituencies; and, boast of a cadre strength of 2000 active men and women, and another 10,000 reservists. Their brazen acts of intimidation, murder and pillage have mortally scared the police force that many police posts in remote areas have been wound up and the staff relocated. Maoists, who attack in bands of a hundred and more, easily overwhelm the small strength of the police at remote areas.
If the insurgents had gained from strength to strength, successive Prime Ministers, the ruling Nepali Congress, the Palace, the Army chief and the opposition have all to share the blame. The insurgency first surfaced in 1996. Intra-party squabbles in the Nepali Congress rendered the government weak. The inability of the Government to contain the insurgency resulted in two Prime Ministers losing their positions: Krishna Prasad Bhattarai in March 2000 and, more recently, Girija Prasad Koirala, in July 2001. Koirala himself had sufficient opportunity to tackle the insurgency, but had prevaricated owing to political considerations. He first appointed a Maoist Resolution Committee to hold informal talks with the insurgents and make suggestions and simultaneously activated other channels too. The Committee, headed by present Prime Minister, Deuba, a Koirala protégé-turned-rival submitted its report, and accused Koirala of undermining the Committee through initiating parallel efforts. Further, Koirala had also the authority to convene a meeting of the National Defence Council that would have paved the way for strong military action against the insurgents.
On its part, the opposition did not play a constructive role and made no suggestions to find a solution to the problem. On the other hand, it was quick to place impediments and desisted from doing anything that would have helped the ‘enemy’ Nepali Congress government to tackle the insurgency as this might have, at a later date, translated into electoral gains for the Nepali Congress.
The Army too did not help the government. It did not respond to repeated requests from the police for modern arms to fight the insurgents. It is more loyal to the Palace than the elected government and the Palace thought the Maoist problem was not its responsibility.
Together, all have pushed
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