Afghanistan: Getting the Political Considerations Correct
22 Nov, 2001 · 646
Maj Gen Ashok Krishna outlines the “Dos and Don’ts” in arriving at a political formula in post-Taliban Afghanistan
The campaign in
Afghanistan
against terrorism has entered the phase involving ground troops. Hence, the need for bringing political considerations about
Afghanistan
’s future into sharper focus. There is considerable vagueness at present about these political objectives. This leaves room for speculation and gives rise to alarmist rumours about the intentions of the anti-terrorist coalition. That could damage the military efforts and the coalition’s cohesion.
Afghanistan
by the British rulers of
India
in the 19th century, and by the
Soviet Union
more recently, have left behind a host of warnings about what needs to be avoided. Foisting on the Afghans a ruler or a ruling group chosen by foreigners is one of them. Propping up such rulers by external military support is another. Attempting to hold down the country by military force is yet another.
Soviet Union
’s withdrawal in 1989, the international community was totally indifferent to who controls
Afghanistan
.
Pakistan
filled this vacuum by propping up the Taliban as a puppet government to pursue its regional objective of acquiring strategic depth against
India
. A policy between the extremes of intervention and indifference is required to tackle the massive problems facing a post-Taliban
Afghanistan
. This could comprise the following four elements.
Northern Alliance
, as it has the opposite blemish. A coalition government, if it is to be acceptable, will have to become more broad-based. The UN’s experienced special representative, Lakhdar Brahimi, could well have a role in brokering the formation of a representative government including all the main ethnic groups. Loose talk about a UN protectorate is not wise.
Afghanistan
did not resist external domination over the past two centuries only to submit to it at this stage.
Afghanistan
’s woes have come from outside. Osama bin Laden is the latest in a long line of foreign interventionists who have dragged
Afghanistan
into conflict. So the aim should be to establish a set of binding international legal obligations, accepted by all, including
Afghanistan
’s neighbours, committing them to avoid any further meddling in its affairs.
Pakistan
must not be allowed to de-structure
Afghanistan
again. And
Afghanistan
should accept the same obligations towards its neighbours, recognizing the Durand line as its border with
Pakistan
, burying once and for all the idea of 'Pashtunistan', which is the major reason for the continuing militarization of the border areas. A process of reconciliation could best be set into motion by the UN, which should form a suitable commission for the purpose. The
US
would of course be involved, but rather than directly involving
Afghanistan
’s neighbours, it would be desirable to get members from neutral countries – Nordic or Latin American – who would be acceptable also to its regional neighbours.
It is perhaps easier to set out what the political objectives should not be than to indicate what they should be. The various misguided and mismanaged attempts to dominate
On the other hand, after the
First, there is a clear need for a massive humanitarian relief effort by the international community to help the Afghans who are suffering the effects of drought and war. The refugees need similar assistance. It is time for non-governmental organizations, the United Nations agencies and coalition allies to put aside their differences and cooperate to avoid a humanitarian disaster this winter. Supplies will have to be air dropped in parts of the country that cannot otherwise be reached. Effective co-ordination between all concerned agencies will be essential.
Next, there should be a renewed attempt to encourage the Afghans themselves to put together a broad-based and representative government. By definition, this cannot be the Taliban, whose support comes from the Pashtuns who lack support from the Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek and Turkmen communities. Nor can it be the
Third, the international community, and in particular the leading members of the anti-terrorist coalition, should set out publicly what they are prepared to do by way of aid and backing for any representative Afghan government that hands over the terrorists and dismantles training camps. The reluctance to set out a positive agenda will severely weaken the effectiveness and acceptability of other policies.
Finally, it is essential to deal with the fact that most of
Such a commitment to non-intervention was accepted, admittedly far too late, in the case of