Chronicling the Afghanistan Tragedy – VII Sending troops to Afghanistan: The Soviet Dilemma

23 Oct, 2001    ·   622

Suba Chandran narrates the Soviet dilemma prior to sending its troops to Afghanistan


Soviet policy towards Afghanistan in the post World War period followed the old Tsarist principles.  Its leaders were initially interested in settling the border dispute with Afghanistan . Lenin wrote to King Amanullah Khan in November 1919 that they would grant “assistance on the widest scale to the Afghan nation, and to repair the injustice done by the former government of Russian Czars…by adjusting the Soviet-Afghan frontier so as to add to the territory of Afghanistan at the expense of Russia .” These territorial adjustments never took place as plebiscites there favored Soviet rule; but the Russians provided economic and military assistance to Afghanistan on a much wider scale. A treaty was signed in 1921 providing an annual subsidy of $500,000 to Afghanistan

 

 

The main objective of Soviet Union was to maintain ethnic harmony in its Central Asian Republics since Uzbek, Tajik and Kirghiz communities lived on both sides of the border. The Central Asian Muslims were then using Afghanistan as their base to fight the Soviet Union

 

 

Secondly, the Cold War in the 1950s witnessed Pakistan becoming a frontline state for the US , which made the Soviets to keep Afghanistan on their side, or at least as a buffer state. Traditionally Afghanistan had been a buffer state between Russia and British India .

 

 

Thirdly, the bilateral problems between Afghanistan and Pakistan , especially over the Durand Line and the presence of Pashtuns across the line resulted in Afghanistan looking for external military and economic support. With the US unwilling to assist Afghanistan , it had no other choice apart from seeking Soviet help. Besides, the rulers of Afghanistan needed Soviet military assistance to keep their subjects under control. The Soviet Union soon became the sole supplier of arms to Afghanistan which strengthened their mutual relations. 

 

 

Fourthly, the Soviet Union was interested in the spread of Communism into neighboring countries and therefore supported the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). Though its establishment in Afghanistan was not effected by the Soviet Union , it served Soviet interests. 

 

 

Soviet interests in Afghanistan continued to be guided by these objectives, but the developments during 1978-79, led the Soviet Union to focus more on Afghanistan . First, the Saur Revolution resulted in the communists establishing power in Afghanistan . Though Soviet involvement in the coup was minimal, its interests increased after the formation of the PDPA government – it did not want the communist government in Afghanistan to fall. 

 

 

Secondly, developments outside Afghanistan also made the Soviet Union increase its stakes in Afghanistan . In 1978, the revolution in Iran resulted in the overthrow of the Shah, who was very close to the US . This increased American anxieties. The US , led by its National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, believed that the Soviet Union had “territorial interest” in the region and started aiding the anti-establishment forces in Afghanistan . The CIA (American Central Intelligence Agency) and the ISI (Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence) became active in Afghanistan by the beginning of 1979; US-Pak support to Afghan rebels was an important element in the Soviet Union increasing its support to the PDPA regime. 

 

 

Recently de-classified Politburo documents suggest that the Soviet Union was not planning to send its troops till October 1979, though this option was discussed since March 1979. Dmitri Ustinov had prepared a strategy in March 1979 to deploy Soviet forces in three days. But the Politburo did not take up that option, as the ground situation in Afghanistan was not clear. The differences between Taraki and Amin inside Afghanistan (Amin imprisoned Taraki in September 1978 and later killed him) and the differences within the Politburo (Kosygin, Andropov and Gromyko were against sending Soviet troops into Afghanistan ) did create a dilemma to send troops. In March, the Politburo explained the Russian position to Taraki: “We ( Soviet Union ) will increase our assistance to you ( Afghanistan ), but we cannot deploy troops, since they would be fighting not against the army...  There would be huge minuses for us.  A whole contingent of countries would quickly come out against us.  And there are no pluses for us at all.”

 

 

Only in December 1979 did the Soviet Union decide to intervene in Afghanistan and overthrow Amin with the help of Soviet officers present in Afghanistan . Amin had by then eliminated Taraki and was involved in anti-Soviet activities. He started negotiating with American agents, which was a threat to Soviet interests and gains accrued until then. This persuaded the Soviet Union to overthrow Amin. The decision was only taken in December 1979. The Politburo was reluctant until then to enter Afghanistan .  

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