The Spectre of Chem-Bio Terrorism - II
18 Oct, 2001 · 618
Arpit Rajain dispels heightened anxiety over chem.-bio terrorism and suggests that only a cooperative approach could lead to effective implementation of the chem-bio Conventions
Biological weapons have been used in war since antiquity. The Persians, Romans and Greeks poisoned the drinking water wells of their adversaries by throwing corpses into them, while the British and French infected North American Indians by giving them small pox infected blankets. Biological agents were employed in military conflicts in the 20th century too (Japanese experiments on prisoners killed some 3000 people at unit 731, its main facility for biological warfare research, and trichothecene mycotoxins or ‘yellow rain’ was used in Southeast Asia).
US
in July this year announced that it could not support the draft protocol, as this would not improve the ability to verify BWC compliance.
Biological warfare agents that spread disease include bacteria (anthrax, plague), virus (smallpox, ebola), fungus (potato blight, wheat rust) rickettsiae (resembling bacteria, but grown in living tissue eg. typhus), and toxins (non-living products of micro-organisms eg. botulinum, ricin, saxitoxin). There is a likelihood of non state actors using a tested micro-organism for an offensive biological weapons programme. Pathogenic micro-organisms have the property of multiplying rapidly within their host; hence quantities of biological agents dispersed as an aerosol can cause widespread casualties over a large area, if meteorological conditions are suitable. There is a complex interrelationship and balance between the host, the parasite (or pathogen) and the environment.
Hypothetically non state actors could carry out three types of biological attacks. First, the pathogen or toxin could be injected. This method is suitable when the need is to cause injury (or death) to a single individual. Second, pathogens could be used to contaminate or poison foods and beverages. This method has the potential to cause hundreds of casualties. Third, pathogens or toxins may be suspended in a wet or dry formulation and dispersed over the target area as aerosolized particles. This manner of attack has the potential to produce thousands of casualties. It needs three key conditions to operate in tandem (a) the formulation to be designed for aerosol dispersal; (b) the aerosol particles produced by the dispersal mechanism should have the capability to withstand environmental stresses; and (c) meteorological conditions (sunshine, humidity, temperature) at the time of dispersal should be conducive for the pathogen to have the maximum effect.
The prospect of non state actors carrying out an airborne attack with pathogens is possible. Nevertheless there are technical difficulties in formulating pathogens and toxins for airborne dispersal, successfully developing dispersal mechanisms and ensuring that meteorological conditions are suitable for effective aerosol dispersal. For these reasons, this type of attack is very difficult for terrorist and criminal groups to attempt. Additionally, after they have been produced, pathogens and toxins have to be preserved in a storage facility before dispersal, or they might lose their potency. This could involve developing methodologies necessary for suspending or dissolving weaponized pathogens and toxins in special solutions containing preservatives, adjuvants and anti-static chemicals. Hence an airborne attack is unlikely; besides it could be detected. A more likely scenario is using pathogens or toxins to contaminate food and beverages or livestock. Another route could be contaminating the water supply of a city. Given the poor health standards in the developing world such contamination may go unnoticed for a long time.
The Geneva Protocol 1925 and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) of 1972 remain the only international instruments governing biological weapons. The BTWC has been signed by 162 countries, while 144 countries have submitted their instruments of ratification. A major limitation of the BTWC is the absence of provisions for the verification of its compliance. It remains a matter of faith whether the BTWC signatories are complying with its provisions. To overcome this lacuna the State Parties to the Convention had constituted an Ad Hoc Group in 1991 to devise adequate verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint. The Ad Hoc Group, which has spent some six and a half years attempting to negotiate a legally binding document to enhance confidence in compliance with the BWC, received a shock when the
An effective implementation of the chem-bio Conventions would greatly contribute to diminishing the threat of chem-bio terrorism, and support the global efforts to combat all forms of terrorism. A cooperative approach would be imperative to detect any chem-bio proliferation-relevant activities. This could best be undertaken in an institutional setting. It remains therefore in the national interest of all States to strengthen these Conventions.
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