China
has been a key player in the South Asian nuclear dynamics since the early 1960’s. With the South Asian nuclear tests, a new source of instability was brought into the security architecture of
Asia
. This has led to further ‘triangularising’ the region. Three nuclear weapon states –
China
,
India
and
Pakistan
– with different political systems, varying approaches to arms control regimes, and different foreign policy preferences, are now continually emphasizing the mantra of minimum nuclear deterrence. Their approach will have far reaching consequences for Asian security since possessing nuclear weapons does not imply having an effective deterrent force.
· Firstly, although
China
has an effective deterrent against
India
, the same cannot be said about
India
vis-à-vis
China
. Both
India
and
Pakistan
have rudimentary land and air based deterrent forces as they continue a slow motion deployment and refinement of their arsenals.
· Secondly the open literature suggests that during the Kargil crisis, both
India
and
Pakistan
had exhibited some ambiguity regarding their intent to deploy nuclear missiles and nuclear armed aircraft. Probably this explains the Indian decision of not crossing the Line of Control: a case of self deterrence
· Thirdly, although
Pakistan
does not have a declared nuclear doctrine, it is widely believed that nuclear weapons are its weapons of ‘first strike and last resort’, but
India
and
China
have declared a no-first-use posture. Operationally, this means that both
China
and
India
are prepared to absorb a first strike, and since they do not have a launch on warning posture, they are likely to adopt a launch after attack posture. Launch after attack implies a failure of deterrence
· Fourthly, in a crisis scenario, both
Pakistan
and
India
have to consider each other’s threats as credible. This credibility message has to be communicated to each other effectively and be perceived as credible.
· Finally, the gains accruing from any nuclear adventure have to outweigh the price. There could be horrendous military costs in terms of a counterforce strike or collateral damage in a counter value strike. This needs to be done before any such adventure is undertaken.
Deterrence harbours a fundamental, perhaps irresoluble, contradiction between its operational and political components. Can the conditions for stable deterrence be maintained in times of Southern Asian crisis? There is no guarantee that such a crisis would not escalate to the nuclear level, especially given the war hysteria that can be built up.
There has been a distinct lack of historical experience in dealing with crisis in
Southern Asia
that risk escalation to the nuclear level. The Ussuri river clashes provide the only case, apart from Kargil, when two nuclear weapons states proceeded to armed conflict. These armed conflicts highlight the truth that they entail elements that cannot be anticipated. In
Southern Asia
the added variable obtaining is domestic opinion. The Kargil crisis had all these elements of likely escalation and was a case in nuclear brinkmanship.
The military coup in
Pakistan
has been a setback to prospects of formal civilian control over
Pakistan
’s nuclear deterrent. The armed forces would anyway have retained operational control over the deterrent under civilian rule, but a formal civilian filter in an institutional setting could provide operational space in times of crisis for crisis stability.
China
already occupies an enviable position both in terms of attributes of power and negotiating strengths, whilst continuing to moderise its nuclear forces.
India
is facing a bumpy road ahead in regard to its reform process, and is faced with difficult choices regarding weaponising and deploying its forces.
Pakistan
has to set its house in order and reconsider its national priorities once it is able to rein in the Jehadi forces.
Decision-makers in
Beijing
,
Islamabad
and
New Delhi
should not lull themselves into thinking that a credible minimum deterrent posture would prevent crisis and outbreak of hostilities. Nuclear weapons were not created to deter. It was deterrence that was conceived of as the role for nuclear weapons. All countries have to address issues related to nuclear doctrines, alternative response options, early warning, and alert levels. If hostilities do break out, minimum deterrence says precious little about how the war will be shaped or when it may escalate to a higher level. Issues like these have to be thrashed out in peacetime. Continuing to defer discussion only increases the risk of a less than optimal response, should a crisis occur.
China
,
Pakistan
and
India
have to work out a restraint regime wherein nuclear weapons are used as tools of war prevention and war deterring, rather than weapons of war fighting.
