Nuclear Deterrence in Southern Asia – I
16 Oct, 2001 · 615
Arpit Rajain examines the notion of nuclear deterrence and points out its fallacies
In 1946, strategic analyst Bernard Brodie wrote: “Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them”. This sums up the basic premise of nuclear deterrence: nuclear weapons must ensure that they prevent a nuclear exchange. Perceptions and psychology play a major role in the logic of deterrence. Deterrence attempts to create risks to ensure that the opponent does not pursue a certain action. This is premised on the threat to use or to punitively retaliate with nuclear weapons if those actions are undertaken. For deterrence to be stable, the risk must be disproportionately higher than any conceivable gains to be acquired.
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has been an unchecked fissile material trade. It is only a matter of time before terrorists get nuclear weapons. They are the most likely “proliferators”, because nuclear blackmail is the ultimate expression of fanaticism and terrorism. In the event of a terrorist outfit or an undeterrable leader acquiring these deadly weapons one cannot be certain that deterrence would work in the way intended. In the absence of an established deterrent relationship the threat may not be understood in the way intended. Would this have some unpredictable and perhaps counter-productive consequence? It is difficult to see deterrence operating against non-state actors. The threat of nuclear annihilation just cannot be used against these terrorists.
Nuclear weapons have produced four major changes in military strategy. First, modern delivery systems ensure that there is no foolproof defence against missiles. Second, nuclear weapons and their deployment involves non-combatants viz. the debate on counter-value or counter-force strategies. It is possible to destroy the adversary even before engaging its armed forces. Third, a nuclear war can be over within hours leaving statesmen and leaders no time to rethink their decisions. And finally, with the concept of short and decisive wars and quick retaliation, nuclear forces need to be on high alert. The Cold War foes projected threats of sudden attack, whilst expressing their faith in deterrence. The concept of deterrence is premised on the belief that rationally calculating decision-makers would refrain from a first strike, fearing a massive retaliatory strike.
For the success of nuclear deterrence, several conditions need to operate simultaneously from policy to an effective mind game. Some of the key elements for stable deterrence are:-
· Firstly, a deterrent force (be it a triad or air and land based) must be able to inflict intolerable damage on the adversary (deterrence by punishment) with the added caveat of an acceptable cost to itself, or deny the opponent (deterrence by denial) his desired objective. It could also be a combination of the two. An essential element of this policy is the safety of the nuclear arsenal. The deterring nation must ensure that its deterrent force is not destroyed in a pre-emptive strike.
· Secondly, the deterring nation must have all the necessary plans in readiness to demonstrate that it has the will and capability to deliver the “message”, either covertly or overtly. Often this posture can lead to a dilemma: The deterring nation must also exhibit willingness to engage in a war that it tries to deter or prevent crossing of the threshold from war-deterring to war-fighting with nuclear weapons.
· Thirdly, the deterring nation has to ensure the survivability of the deterrent force to absorb a first strike. The ‘retaliatory force’ must be protected against a ‘first strike’ but also inflict punitive retaliation in the ‘second strike’. This can be established by technical means, but also through policy.
· Fourthly, the deterrent message has to be conveyed with a high degree of credibility –meaning that the adversary must believe that the deterring nation ‘will’ exercise the nuclear option. Both nations must also believe at the same time that a real probability exists that the threatening nation will indeed retaliate, if required.
· Finally, the cost benefit analysis; the deterring nation must communicate to the opponent the price it might have to pay for endeavouring to achieve the objective. This price has to outweigh any possible gains from attempting to achieve this objective.
However, one of the consequences of the break-up of the
The nuclear threat would not work on terrorists as a “nuclear deterrent relationship” is not established with them. Even if they are threatened they may call the bluff as targeting them with even a small nuclear weapon would be impossible without incurring unacceptable collateral damage and provoking global outrage. Indeed, with Fidayeen (suicide attacks) on the rise, nuclear weapons are useless to deter them.
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