Pakistan’s Afghanistan Policies in Tatters

10 Oct, 2001    ·   603

Dr Subhash Kapila points out the unenviable situation Pakistan would find itself in after the recent crackdown on terrorist organizations in Afghanistan
Dr. Subhash Kapila
Pakistan ’s policies towards Afghanistan have been shaped by its own strategic aims arising from its security perceptions and the demands of the Pakhtun people within Pakistan for independence.

 

 

Until the 1970s, Pakistan ’s policies towards Afghanistan were focused on countering the Pakhtun demand for independence. The Afghan Governments of that period supported this demand of “self-determination” by the Pakhtun people living in the border areas of Pakistan ’s North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan province. Pakistan broke diplomatic relations with Afghanistan twice, in 1955 and 1962, over its support for Pakhtun “self-determination.” Pakistan and Afghanistan also had territorial disputes centering on parts of the NWFP and Baluchistan . This resulted in a number of border clashes between the two countries in the 1950s and 1960s. 

 

 

Pakistan had a providential opportunity presented to it with the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979. The United States in a bid to inflict a “ Vietnam ” on the Soviet Union , enlisted Pakistan as the instrument for launching this strategy. It was used in the proxy war in Afghanistan , wherein disparate Afghan ethnic groups were used for military operations against the Soviets by the United States . The Cold War was “Islamized” and the proxy war given the religious stamp of “Jehad.” Pakistan’s willingness to wage this proxy Islamic jehad in Afghanistan and the diversion of $ 4 billion worth of US arms and military equipment to Pakistan are well documented and part of history. However, Pakistan’s strategic aims, which prompted it to be “used” by USA, need to be re-called when history has brought it face to face with dilemmas arising from its Afghanistan policies. 

 

 

Pakistan ’s creation of the Taliban was an off-shoot of its strategic aims arising from its security perceptions. Briefly summed up, these were:

 

·                     Secure Pakistan ’s western flank by installating a puppet, pro-Pakistan Afghan-Pakhtun government in Kabul . Strategic outcomes envisaged were freeing more Pakistan Army formations for the Indian border and neutralization of the Pakhtun ‘self-determination’ demands within Pakistan . 

 

·                     Pakistan ’s acquisition of strategic depth against India , earlier sought through Iran .

 

·                     The Afghan jehad to be converted into an Islamic jehad against India in Kashmir , and further into a pan-Islamic jehad.

 

As Ahmed Rashid, in his book on the Taliban puts it: “Increasingly, the Kashmir issue became the prime mover behind Afghan’s policy and its support to the Taliban”. The Jalalabad Shura, and later the Taliban Government, was paid to permit transferring of Pakistan sponsored Islamic Jehadi terrorist bases from Pakistan to inside Afghanistan . This provided Pakistan with deniability.

 

 

Some may argue that it is premature to assert that Pakistan ’s Afghan’s policies lies in tatters. They would like to maintain this because of Pakistan ’s perception that it has once again emerged as a ‘frontline state’ for the United States following “Ground Zero” i.e. events of September 11, 2001.

 

 

Analytically, the following outcomes concerning the future of Afghanistan can be visualized, irrespective of whatever strategies the United States adopts to pursue its strategic objectives against global terrorism.

 

 

·                     Taliban regime would be displaced. Pakistan is unlikely to be given a free hand to install a puppet pro-Pak regime.

 

·                     The political dynamics of the post-Taliban period would highlight the Pakhtun issue once again, requiring accommodation or resolution.

 

·                     Pakistan ’s Kashmir-related Islamic jehadi terrorist camps transferred to Afghan territory would no longer be hosted there. They may be destroyed by US actions or re-transferred to Pakistan .

 

With these developments likely to emerge in the post-Taliban phase in Afghanistan , Pakistan ’s strategic aims stated above would be jeopardized. Pakistan ’s western flank would no longer be secure, strategic depth would not be assured, and Pakistan ’s denial of state-sponsored terrorism and proxy war in Kashmir would no longer be possible. Pakistan ’s Afghanistan policies would then lie in tatters.

 

 

Pakistan ’s emergence as a front-line state in current United States strategy vis-à-vis Afghanistan , despite quid-pro-quos by both sides, may not continue after Pakistan has been used. The existing security environment and political attitudes of the countries surrounding Afghanistan does not present a vacuum like in 1994-1996, which enabled Pakistan to create and impose the Taliban on Afghanistan . These countries have disapproved of what Pakistan has done to Afghanistan in the last five years. Their new perceptions would be different from their earlier policy of benign neglect. The United States cannot remain oblivious to pressures from these quarters. 

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