The Foreign Policy Implications of the US Midterms for India: A Divided Washington and a Cautious New Delhi

20 Nov, 2026    ·   5921

Ashutosh Nagda identifies the potential impact areas that India should keep an eye on




The Democrats have won both chambers of Congress in the US mid-term polls, flipping at least seven Senate seats and more than two dozen districts. This verdict is widely seen as a response to the rising cost of living, especially as a result of the Iran war. As per an AP poll, voters view the economy as the top issue facing the country, followed by the state of democracy.

For India, a useful question is what a Democrat-controlled Congress would mean for New Delhi. After a turbulent Trump 2.0, the verdict would mean a weaker Trump could benefit India. But reality differs from what the headlines suggest. From January 2027, the Democrats will chair the congressional committees on trade, immigration, foreign affairs, etc. These committees hold power to hold hearings, summon officials, review arm deals, investigate administrative decisions, and control funding, amongst other things. This gives them power to constrain the White House though not direct it. Overall foreign policy will remain an executive prerogative, and President Trump, as he announced, will have the veto. Nonetheless, congressional scrutiny and the make-up of the committees will matter for Indian-interest verticals (trade, visas, and defence) and foreign relations (Russia and Israel).

The midterm verdict shifts the balance of leverage in Washington more than it shifts its India policy. New Delhi’s interests depend less on who controls the Congress and more on how it engages with it.

 Where could the impact be?

 Three areas matter most to Indo-US ties: trade, immigration, and defence and strategic issues. The effect across these three will be uneven.

On trade, the long-pending India-US FTA talks have plateaued. Reports suggest India may have wanted to slow the trade deal until the mid-term polls to gauge which way wind might be blowing. After the results, fast-paced talks could conclude the deal and project domestic strength for the Trump administration. This could also mean imposing further tariffs on India as a stick to push for quick carrots. More tariffs are likely, and a few are already in the works. Take, for example, the currently waived off Russian oil sanctions, which would impose tariffs of up to 100 per cent on India. This act received bipartisan support during its passage in both the Senate and the House, so a new Congress won't challenge it if it's implemented. Section 301 tariffs for unfair trade are also in line. Once investigated, they won’t need congressional approval and will stack on top of the existing 10 per cent tariffs on forced labour.

Immigration has been a major point of friction. Trump 2.0 has been active in restricting legal immigration to the US through visa renewal procedural changes, a US$ 100,000 payment requirement on new H-1B petitions, and suspensions of the Program Electronic Review Management (PERM) process, among others. Though universal, these have disproportionately affected Indian immigrants and firms as over 70 per cent of H-1B visas are issued to Indians. A Democratic Congress might be able to block further legislative restrictions and intensify committee oversight of the executive branch’s practices. It can also work towards clearing the green-card backlog and perhaps soften the overall anti-immigrant rhetoric. But the executive’s authority over US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and the president’s veto power could mean little relief for H-1B and PERM challenges.

Congress perhaps matters most on Indo-US defence and strategic ties. In 2025, the two countries signed a major defence pact committing them to technology-sharing, co-production, and intelligence cooperation. This followed, and sits alongside, the launch of the COMPACT and TRUST technology initiative, during the February 2025 joint leaders' statement, which also reaffirmed the Quad. Turning these ambitions into reality depends on Congress authorisations and appropriations. It is important to note that the US Congress has championed deeper ties with India through successive administrations since 2001.

 What New Delhi should watch out for

New Delhi’s strategic community has long believed that a Republican administration suits India better. The Indo-US relationship advanced under President George W Bush through the 2008 civil nuclear agreement, and Prime Minister Modi openly backed Trump for president in 2020. But this comfort is partly perception. A Chatham House commentary argues that close relations with India reflect bipartisan consensus in the US and, Trump’s second term has left New Delhi disenchanted over Russian oil, tariffs, and Pakistan. Thus, a Democratic Congress might not be an automatic upgrade but perhaps a fresh impetus with its own set of challenges.

India’s work is cut out with the new Congress and it should look out at a few primary pressure points. The first will be values. Democrats will press harder on the subjects of human rights, democratic backsliding, and religious freedom. In 2023, before Modi’s visit, 75 Democrats urged then President Biden to raise human rights issues in India. New Delhi must expect letters and hearings, if not sanctions.

The second are Israel and Palestine. New Delhi has historically backed a two-state solution while having deepened defence and tech ties with Israel. The new crop of progressive Democrats have been critical of Israeli government actions and US support for them. The new democratic Congress can be expected to test decades of US support for Israel, which could inversely challenge India’s existing dual track.

Then there are Russia and China. On the former, Democrats are no softer than the Republicans, and may even be sterner, pressing the White House on enforcement. Congress reacted angrily to Trump’s waiver of the Lindsay Graham Sanctions act, with Democrats among the critics, though many Democrats have opposed the tariffs for their negative domestic impact. New Delhi can expect continued scrutiny of its purchases and relationship. The risk is less a tariff-demanding Congress than one pushing Trump to end the waiver. On China, Trump’s visit to Beijing may have unsettled India’s calculus, which has relied on Sino-US friction. However, Trump’s visit faced criticism for its perceived softening of US support for Taiwan and broader strategic competition with the mainland. Certain Democratic members of the Senate Foreign Relations committee denounced Trump for willing “to sacrifice American national security for minimal and reversible deals.” India can expect a Democratic Congress’ resistance to any drift towards a US-China duopoly.

Beyond this, India should attempt to lock in trade and technology agreements through institutionalised structures that outlast a volatile White House and a potentially hostile Congress. Then, on immigration, India should strengthen its case by working with US industry and bipartisan lawmakers, expanding its priority to the green card backlog alongside H-1B fees. Most importantly, New Delhi should deepen its engagement beyond the executive branch to committees, caucuses, and newly elected Indian-American members. This will ensure that it does not depend only on the White House’s goodwill.

The mid-term results have left Trump with weakened power and thus his remaining two years are expected to be more constrained and chaotic. For India, the results have not substituted any hard choices. Instead, it clarifies where New Delhi must channel its efforts.

 

Ashutosh Nagda is Senior Researcher with IPCS’ Centre for Internal and Regional Security (IreS).

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